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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Transfer pricing is a significant taxation problem facing both tax authorities and 
multinational enterprises. Tax authorities around the world regulate transfer pricing 
through tax legislation, which requires that cross-border transactions within 
multinational enterprises be at arm’s-length. A number of countries in the 
international community have amended their transfer pricing tax legislation to be 
prescriptive by including regulations in their legislation on how to transact at arm’s-
length price.  
 
 
This research study presents an argument that the South African transfer pricing tax 
legislation is non-prescriptive as it does not have regulations on how to transact at 
arm’s-length price. With reference to the transfer pricing guidelines issued by the 
Organisation of Economic Development and Corporation and the experience of the 
United States of America in the enforcement of transfer pricing, this research study 
examines whether or not the South African transfer pricing tax legislation should be 
amended to be prescriptive by including regulations on how to transact at arm’s-
length price.  
 
 
The research findings reveal that to a certain extent the South African transfer pricing 
tax legislation is consistent with the transfer pricing guidelines issued by the 
Organisation of Economic Development and Corporation, but to a certain extent it is 
not. The research findings also reveal that non-prescriptive legislation has in the past 
created a problem in certain countries. Furthermore, the research findings reveal 
through an analysis of the United States of America’s transfer pricing enforcement 
experience, that prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation in a tax system has a 
positive impact.  
 
 
Recommendation is therefore made in this research study that the South African 
transfer pricing tax legislation should be amended to be prescriptive by including 
regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length price.  
 
 
 viii
Keywords of the study: arm’s-length price, arm’s-length principle, income tax, IRS, 
multinational enterprise, non-prescriptive, OECD, Practice Note 7, prescriptive, 
SARS, section 31, section 482, South Africa, tax legislation, taxation, tax law, tax 
authority, transfer pricing, transfer pricing methods, United States of America. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
 
 
The term ‘transfer pricing’ refers to the situation where related parties price their 
transactions between themselves, without reference to the market or other legitimate 
commercial considerations, in order to reduce their nominal profits and thereby 
reduce their income tax obligations (Interim report of the Commission of inquiry into 
certain aspects of the tax structure of South Africa, 1994: 231). 
 
 
Both the tax authorities and multinational enterprises around the world, view transfer 
pricing to be the dominant tax problem (Ernst & Young, 2005: 14). The abuse of 
transfer pricing deprives governments of their fair share of taxes from the profits 
generated by multinational enterprises. For this reason, transfer pricing has drawn the 
attention of tax authorities around the world.  
 
 
In an attempt to deal with transfer pricing and obtain their fair share of tax from 
multinational enterprises, tax authorities are addressing transfer pricing on a formal 
basis. Certain tax authorities have responded with comprehensive tax legislation to 
regulate transfer pricing (Fernandez and Pope, 2002: 120). Research shows that there 
is an increase in the number of countries implementing and modifying transfer pricing 
tax legislation (Ernst & Young, 2005: 6).  
 
 
Transfer pricing tax legislation in some countries embraces the arm’s-length principle 
as promulgated in the transfer pricing guidelines issued by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Tyrrall and Atkinson, 1998: 22). 
The OECD transfer pricing guidelines (hereafter called the OECD guidelines), 
constitute the international standard and are founded on the arm’s-length principle 
(Carlderon, 2007: 9).  
 
 
The term ‘arm’s-length principle’ refers to ‘a process by which the transfer price 
between affiliated companies is determined by using comparables either of the same 
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product sold by one of the affiliated parties to an unrelated party, of the same product 
bought by an affiliated party from an unrelated party, or of the same product sold 
between two parties unrelated to the affiliated parties and to each other’ (Avi-Yonah, 
2007: 3).  
 
 
A number of countries have adopted the OECD guidelines’ concepts when designing 
provisions on how to transact in accordance with the arm’s-length principle (United 
Nations, 1999: 8). Although a number of countries’ provisions on how to transact at 
arm’s-length price are based on the OECD guidelines’ concepts, the way in which 
these provisions are implemented is different in each country (Amerighi, 2004: 3). 
Some countries have included these provisions in their transfer pricing tax legislation 
and, by so doing, their legislation is considered to be ‘prescriptive’1 in providing 
guidance on how to transact at arm’s-length price. 
 
 
Meanwhile, other countries have not included these provisions in their transfer pricing 
tax legislation but provide them separately from the legislation as guidelines or 
practice notes. By so doing, their transfer pricing tax legislation is considered to be 
‘non-prescriptive’2 in providing guidance on how to transact at arm’s-length price.  
 
 
The analysis below of the situation on how transfer practices are regulated within the 
international community, reveals that non-prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation 
is no longer preferred and some countries are amending their legislation to be 
prescriptive. In other countries the analysis reveals that non-prescriptive transfer 
pricing tax legislation created problems, especially with regard to the court disputes 
between the tax authorities and taxpayers on matters involving the determination of 
the arm’s-length price.  
 
                                               
1
 The Collins English Dictionary explains ‘prescriptive’ as the approach of telling people exactly what they       
should do rather than providing them with suggestions. [http://dictionary.reverso.net/english-cobuild] (12 
February 2009). The Oxford English Dictionary explains ‘prescriptive’ as imposed methods, laws, rules or 
regulations which are legally established, direct or explicit on how something should be done. 
[http://www.askoxford.com/dictionaries] (12 February 2009). Therefore, prescriptive transfer pricing tax 
legislation refers to legislation with provisions on how to transact at arm’s-length price, that is legislation which 
is direct or explicit on how to transact at arm’s-length price.  
2
 ‘Non-prescriptive’ means the opposite of prescriptive. Therefore, ‘non-prescriptive’ transfer pricing tax 
legislation refers to legislation with no provisions on how to transact at arm’s-length price, that is legislation that 
is not direct or explicit on how to transact at arm’s-length price. 
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In the year 1968, the United States of America (US) amended its section 482 of 
Article 4 of the Internal Revenue Code (hereafter referred to as ‘section 482’) to be 
prescriptive after the treasury department contended that the section was not effective 
in protecting the US tax jurisdiction against transfer pricing practices (Avi-Yonah, 
2007: 6; IRS, 1999: 3; Tyrrall and Atkinson, 1998: 138).  
 
 
Prior to section 482 being amended to be prescriptive, the US courts developed their 
own principle tests when they were analysing and deciding what constitutes an arm’s-
length price in the transfer pricing cases, as section 482 had no formal provisions on 
how to transact at arm’s-length price (Avi-Yonah, 2007: 6).  
 
 
This resulted in the US courts being inconsistent in reaching the decisions on transfer 
pricing cases involving the arm’s-length price. It was after section 482 was amended 
to be prescriptive by having provisions on how to transact at arm’s-length price, that 
formal basis was created which the US courts now follow when analysing and 
deciding transfer pricing cases dealing with the arm’s-length price (Avi-Yonah, 2007: 
8, 9).  
 
 
In the year 1982, after the Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation 3 case judgment, 
the Australian Tax Office amended their section 136 to be prescriptive. In this case, 
the Australian Tax Authority applied section 136 to adjust taxpayer’s profits. Section 
136 at that time allowed the Australian Commissioner of Taxation to adjust the profits 
gained by multinational enterprises from cross border transactions involving transfer 
pricing. The section did not have any provision or regulations for the arm’s-length 
calculations. The Commissioner of Taxation could not justify or prove to the court on 
what basis of the legislation he arrived at the transfer pricing profit adjustments. As a 
result, the Australian High Court gave judgment in favour of the taxpayer (Smith, 
1990:12). 
 
 
It was after this judgment that the Australian taxation review committee 
recommended that section 136 be replaced by a new section because it had been 
                                               
3
  80 ATC 4371,  
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rendered less effective against transfer pricing in this case. After this judgment the 
arm’s-length principle embodied in the OECD guidelines, was incorporated into 
section 136 under division 13 (Smith, 1990:12).  
 
 
In the year 1997, Mexico amended its transfer pricing tax legislation to be prescriptive 
in providing guidance on how to transact at arm’s-length price. Although the Mexican 
transfer pricing tax legislation required taxpayers to transact at arm’s-length price, it 
had no regulations on how to fulfil such a transaction.  The Mexican transfer pricing 
tax legislation is now complemented by regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length 
price which are based on the OECD guidelines (MacGregor, 2000: 3).  
 
 
Other countries on the South American continent, such as Argentina, Brazil and 
Venezuela, have also adopted prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation (Deloitte 
Touché Tohmatsu, 2001). The same transfer pricing developments taking place on the 
South American continent are taking place on the European and Asian continents. A 
number of European and Asian continents have also amended their transfer pricing 
tax legislation to be prescriptive.  
 
 
In the year 1996, Denmark amended its transfer pricing tax legislation to be 
prescriptive. In the year 1998, France and China also amended their transfer pricing 
tax legislation to be prescriptive. The transfer pricing tax legislation of all three 
countries now contains regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length price which are 
based on the OECD guidelines (Tyrrall and Atkinson, 1998: 22). 
 
 
In the year 1999, the United Kingdom (UK) replaced their old transfer pricing tax 
legislation with new legislation. Section 770-3 of the Income and Corporation Taxes 
Act was replaced with Schedule 28AA of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 
(Rolfe, 2003: 501).  
 
 
The reason for the amendment was that section 770-3 was regarded as discretionary 
rather than mandatory and therefore not effective in ensuring that taxpayers complied 
with the arm’s-length price requirements. Schedule 28AA of the Income and 
 5 
Corporation Taxes Act 88 is now complemented by regulations on how to transact at 
arm’s-length price which are based on the OECD guidelines (Tyrrall and Atkinson, 
1998:134). 
 
 
In the year 2002, after the Supreme Court, 364664, case judgment, the Dutch transfer 
pricing tax legislation was amended to be prescriptive. This case involves the 
taxpayer who was a car importer and had imported various products, manufactured by 
its international group, for resale to distributors. The Dutch tax authorities studied the 
import prices of independent Dutch car importers. They challenged the taxable 
income of the taxpayer on the basis that the results of the study showed that the 
realised gross margin on the import activity was lower than those of non-related car 
importers. The tax authority, therefore, argued that the car importer’s transfer prices 
did not meet the arm’s-length standard (Van Herksen and Van der Lander, 2002: 192; 
Van Dam and Sinx, 2002: 188; Rolfe, 2003: 393). 
 
 
Based on this, the Dutch tax authorities adjusted the taxable income of the Dutch car 
importer. The Dutch transfer pricing tax legislation, at that time, lacked specific rules 
on how to calculate the inter-company prices and the arm’s-length requirements. The 
Dutch supreme court ruled against the Dutch tax authority as they could not prove 
from the legislation, on what basis they had adjusted the car importer’s profits. After 
the judgment in this case, the arm’s-length principle embodied in the OECD 
guidelines was codified in the Dutch Corporate Income Tax Act (Van Herksen and 
Van der Lander, 2002: 192; van Dam and Sinx, 2002: 188; Rolfe, 2003: 393).  
 
 
Having analysed what the situation is in the international community, the question 
then is: what is the situation in South Africa with regard to transfer pricing tax 
legislation and how does it apply to the transfer pricing practices?  
 
 
 
                                               
4
 36 466, HR 28 June 2002  
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The South African transfer pricing tax legislation is section 31 of the Income Tax Act 
58 of 1962 (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’). As in other countries’ transfer pricing 
tax legislation, section 31 also requires that taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length 
in certain situations. Although section 31 embraces the arm’s-length principle, it is not 
complemented by regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length price.  
 
 
Guidelines on how to transact at arm’s-length price are, however, contained 
separately in Practice Note 7. The problem is that all the practice notes issued by the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) are not intended to be prescriptive and 
therefore cannot be legally enforced (Practice Note 7:6). As section 31 of the Act does 
not have provisions on how to transact at arm’s-length and Practice Note 7 is not 
binding on taxpayers, the South Africa transfer pricing tax legislation is regarded as 
non-prescriptive.  
 
 
This situation could result in similar problems to those identified in the above analysis 
happening in South Africa, whereby inconsistent decisions by the courts caused 
revenue authorities to lose cases because they could not justify or substantiate the 
basis for their adjustment from the legislation.  
 
 
The question now remains whether or not section 31 of the Act should be 
complemented by regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length price. 
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1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
 
1.2.1 The statement of the problem 
 
 
This research study examines whether or not the South African transfer pricing tax 
legislation should be amended to be prescriptive by including regulations on how 
taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price.  
 
 
1.2.2 The sub-problems  
 
 
The first sub-problem relates to determining how taxpayers in South Africa are 
required to transact at arm’s-length prices in the absence of prescriptive transfer 
pricing tax legislation. 
 
 
In order to establish how taxpayers are supposed to transact at arm’s-length price in 
the absence of prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation, a normative study is 
conducted on the background and history of transfer pricing tax legislation in South 
Africa, section 31 of the Act, the arm’s-length principle, guidance on how to transact 
at arm’s-length price as is contained in Practice Note 7, the Income Tax return (IT14 
return) and the South African tax treaties on business profits and associated 
enterprises. In analysing section 31 of the Act the issue is, what are the provisions 
within section 31 of the Act providing guidance on how taxpayers should transact at 
arm’s-length price and what are the challenges in fulfilling the arm’s length 
requirements in terms of those provisions. In analysing Practice Note 7, the South 
African tax treaties and the IT14 return, the issue is what are the challenges that 
taxpayers faces in fulfilling the requirements of Practice Note 7, the South African tax 
treaties and the IT14 return in order to comply with section 31 of the Act. 
Furthermore, an analysis is conducted of the South African tax case law on what 
constitute an arm’s-length transaction. A comparative analysis of the South African 
tax case law principles is made, as applied by the courts in determining what 
constitutes an arm’s-length transaction with the arm’s length principle in Practice 
Note 7.  
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The second sub-problem relates to determining whether Practice Note 7 in its current 
status is consistent with the current status of the OECD guidelines, and whether, as a 
result of being consistent or not with the current status of the OECD guidelines, 
Practice Note 7 should be included as the regulations on how to transact at arm’s-
length price in the South African transfer pricing tax legislation, in order to amend 
the legislation so that it becomes prescriptive. 
 
 
Should Practice Note 7 be included in section 31 of the Act as the regulations on how 
to transact at arm’s-length price, this action will automatically result in making 
section 31 to be prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price. 
Research shows that a number of countries’ regulations on how to transact at arm’s-
length price are based on the OECD guidelines (Sauvant and Roffe, 1999: 15); as is 
Practice Note 7 (Practice Note 7: 6). The situation in South Africa is that, in the 
absence of the transfer pricing tax legislation that is non-prescriptive, taxpayers can 
only rely on Practice Note 7 in order to comply with section 31 of the Act. The issue, 
however, remains whether Practice Note 7 is consistent with the transfer pricing 
international standards promulgated in the OECD guidelines in their updated form.  
 
 
A further argument is that the OECD guidelines recommends that although a 
country’s transfer pricing guidelines might be based on the OECD guidelines, the 
country’s transfer pricing guidelines should still be consistent with the country’s 
domestic transfer pricing legislation (OECD guidelines, Para 16). The question is, to 
what extent is Practice Note 7 consistent with section 31 of the Act? Research further 
reflects that since the introduction of Practice Note 7 in August 1999, there have been 
several updates and developments on the OECD guidelines with the issuing of draft 
discussion papers suggesting changes in the OECD guidelines on certain issues that 
should be dealt with (OECD, Discussion Draft Part I: 2004; OECD, Discussion Draft 
Part II: 2008; OECD Discussion Draft Part III: 2004; OECD Discussion Draft Part 
IV: 2004; OECD Discussion Draft Aspect of Business Restructuring: 2008; OECD 
Discussion Draft Transactional Profit Methods: 2008). The question is, has Practice 
Note 7 noted these updates and developments? A comparable analysis between 
Practice Note 7 and the OECD guidelines is conducted to determine if Practice Note 
7, in its current state, is consistent with the OECD guidelines.  
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The third sub-problem relates to determining what the implications are of having 
non-prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation and of changing from non-
prescriptive to prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation by looking at the US 
transfer pricing experiences.  
 
 
The experience of the US in the enforcement of transfer pricing is analysed to 
investigate the implications of having non-prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation 
and the implications of changing from non-prescriptive to prescriptive transfer pricing 
tax legislation. The transfer pricing case law in the US prior and subsequent to the 
transfer pricing tax legislation being amended to be prescriptive, is analysed to assess 
the implications of having non-prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation and the 
impact of changing from non-prescriptive to prescriptive.  
 
 
The reason for selecting the US as a case study is based on the fact that the US is a 
significant global economic player. Secondly, it is reported that the US is the first 
country to implement transfer pricing tax legislation and as a result has a number of 
years experience in enforcing transfer pricing (Desai, 2002: 4). The third reason for 
the selection of the US is that the US transfer pricing tax legislation has had a 
significant influence to the development of similar tax legislation in a number of 
countries around the world, and also had a significant influence on the development of 
the OECD guidelines (Tyrrall and Atkinson, 1998:137).   
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
A qualitative case study research methodology is adopted to conduct this research 
study, with the literature review, documentation analysis and interviews used as 
methods of collecting the data used in this research study. A content analysis 
methodology was adopted to analyse the data and the research study findings. The 
research study included various forms of literature, ranging from books, journal 
articles, academic articles, policies, guidelines, court cases and income tax 
legislations. Interviews with certain tax law professionals were conducted to gain their 
views on the research question.  
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1.4 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
 
The research study is divided into 7 chapters and the outline is as follows:  
 
 
1.4.1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
This chapter presents the background of the study, problem statement, research 
method and the structure of the report.  
 
 
1.4.2 Chapter 2: The Transfer Pricing Tax Legislation in South Africa. 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the first sub-problem by analysing the 
transfer pricing tax legislation in South Africa. The chapter discusses the background 
and the history of transfer pricing tax legislation in South Africa, section 31 of the 
Act, the arm’s-length principle, the guidance on how to transact at arm’s-length price 
as is contained in Practice Note 7, the IT14 returns and the South African tax treaties 
on business profits and associated enterprise. The chapter also discusses the South 
African tax case law on what constitutes an arm’s-length transaction.  
 
 
1.4.3 Chapter 3: Practice Note 7 and the OECD Guidelines 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the second sub-problem of the research 
study. The chapter discusses the history and background of Practice Note 7 and the 
OECD guidelines, the contents of Practice Note 7 and the OECD guidelines. The 
chapter further discusses the developments and updates in the OECD guidelines. The 
chapter is concluded by conducting a comparable analysis between Practice Note 7 
and the OECD guidelines.  
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1.4.4 Chapter 4: The Transfer Pricing Tax Legislation in the US. 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the third sub-problem by analysing the 
transfer pricing enforcement experiences of the US.  
 
 
The chapter discusses the background and history of section 482. The Chapter also 
discusses other transfer pricing compliance provisions put in place in the US such as 
penalty provisions, documentation provisions, tax return, and tax treaties provisions. 
The chapter discusses the relationship between the US transfer pricing regulations and 
the OECD guidelines, and further discusses the implications of non-prescriptive 
transfer pricing tax legislation in the US prior to section 482 being amended to be 
prescriptive, and the subsequent impact of section 482’s amendment to be 
prescriptive. The transfer pricing case law in the US prior and subsequent to section 
482 being amended to be prescriptive, is analysed to assess the implications of having 
non-prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation and the effect of changing from non-
prescriptive to prescriptive legislation.  
 
 
1.4.5 Chapter 5: Research Methodology  
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the research methodology by discussing the 
research designed and the specific research methods used to conduct the research 
study. The chapter specifically discusses the research method adopted, research type, 
methods adopted for data collection and methods adopted for data analysis.    
 
1.4.6 Chapter 6: Research Findings 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse and present the research findings.  
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1.4.7 Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
 
This chapter concludes the research study. The chapter confirms the problem 
statement and sub-problems, provides a brief summary of previous chapters, interprets 
the research findings and provides recommendations. The conclusion discusses the 
contribution of this research study by comparing it with previous studies, and lastly 
provides areas for possible further research studies. 
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CHAPTER 2: TRANSFER PRICING TAX LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the first sub-problem of the research study. 
To this end the chapter analyses the evolution of the transfer practices, background 
and history of the transfer pricing tax legislation in South Africa. The chapter analyses 
section 31 of the Act, the updates and changes and the subsections within this section 
of the Act. In analysing section 31 of the Act, a discussion is presented on the extent 
of the provisions made on how to transact at arm’s-length price, and what the 
challenges are that  face taxpayers in South Africa with regard to transacting at arm’s-
length price. 
 
 
The chapter analyses the arm’s-length principle, challenges with regard to the 
application thereof and some practical consideration which should be taken into 
account when applying this principle. The chapter illustrates through a hypothetical 
case study, how taxpayers in South Africa are supposed to transact at arm’s-length 
price by following Practice Note 7. The chapter discusses also the arm’s-length 
principle approach in the South African treaties on permanent establishment of 
business profit and associated profit and in the IT14 returns. In analysing Practice 
Note 7, the South African treaties and the IT14 returns, the chapter also highlights to 
what extent taxpayers in South Africa are challenged in transacting at arm’s-length 
price. 
 
 
The chapter analyses the South Africa tax case law principles on what constitutes an 
arm’s-length transaction. A comparative analyses of the South Africa case law 
principles is made, as applied by the courts in determining what constitutes an arm’s-
length transaction with the arm’s length principle in Practice Note 7.  
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2.2 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE TRANSFER PRICING TAX 
LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
As pointed out in chapter 1, transfer pricing is one of the significant problems faced 
by the multinational enterprises and tax authorities. One of the reasons for transfer 
pricing practices is globalisation of trading. The World Trade Organisation estimates 
that inter-company transactions account for as much as 50% of all global trade. John 
Neighbour of the OECD places this figure even higher, estimating that about 60% of 
world trade takes place within the multinational enterprises (OECD Observer, 2002).  
 
 
South Africa is also part of this global scene, and since its re-emergence into the 
international market, rapid expansion of international trade with wide-ranging 
changes in the volume and complexity of the country’s commerce was brought to 
South Africa (Practice Note 7, Para 2.4).  
 
 
Since the year 1996, the South African Trade and Industry department (DTI) has 
reported an increase in trading activities between South Africa and the rest of the 
world with the largest trading partners being Europe, Asia and America (DTI South 
African Trade Statistics, 2006).  Although trading between South Africa and the 
international community is important as it creates economic growth for the country, it 
has also opened the way for abusive transfer pricing.  
 
 
Prior to South Africa becoming a trading partner within the international community, 
the abuse of trading activities through tax avoidance was regulated through the 
exchange controls and other anti-avoidance tax laws. The following is the analysis of 
how the transfer pricing tax legislation evolved in South Africa.  
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2.2.1 The Exchange Control Regulations 
 
 
Prior the year 1995, South Africa was prevented to a great extent by political 
pressures from trading with the international community. During this period whatever 
international trade occurred was regulated by the financial rand system under the 
exchange control regulations of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). These 
regulations were designed to prevent manipulation of the currency system in South 
Africa (Exchange Controls Manual, Updated October, 2006:C1).  
 
 
Under the financial rand system, the proceeds of local sale or redemption of assets 
owned by non-residents of South Africa could not be converted into foreign currency 
at the commercial rand rate of exchange, but had to be retained in South Africa with 
authorised foreign exchange dealers in the form of financial rand balances (Exchange 
Controls Manual, Updated October, 2006:C1).   
 
 
In the year 1995, after South Africa’s first democratic elections, the exchange control 
regulations were loosened to attract foreign investors. As a result, trade between 
South Africa and the international community increased (Exchange Controls Manual, 
updated October, 2006:C2).  
 
 
2.2.2 The Income Tax Act 
 
 
After the exchange control regulations were loosened the authorities in South Africa 
became aware that international traders, both domestic and foreign, were able to 
transfer profits from South Africa, a jurisdiction with high taxes, to other jurisdictions 
with lower rates (Interim report of the Commission of inquiry into certain aspects of 
the tax structure of South Africa, 1994: 231). This was because the Act had no 
specific section addressing transfer pricing transactions. The only relevant provision, 
section 31 of the Act, at that time covered only trade in commodities, and only where 
there was an appropriate tax treaty in force.  
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The general provisions for prevention of tax-avoidance, found in section 1035 of the 
Act which has since been replaced by section 80A6of the Act, were also ineffective as 
the legislation against transfer pricing. A commission led by Professor Michael Katz 
was therefore appointed by the Minister of Finance to do the research global 
provisions for transfer pricing, and select the appropriate provisions which were 
considered suitable for South Africa.  
 
 
The commission looked at a number of tax systems from various different countries 
and found that four approaches for countering transfer pricing abuses are commonly 
used. These approaches varied in stringency. (Interim report of the Commission of 
inquiry into certain aspects of the tax structure of South Africa, 1994: 231): 
 
                                               
5
 Section 103 (1) provided at that time; 
‘Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that any transaction, operation or scheme (whether entered into or carried 
out before or after the commencement of this Act, and including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the 
alienation of property)– 
(a) has been entered into or carried out which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for the 
payment of any tax, duty or levy imposed by this Act or any previous Income Tax Act, or of 
reducing the amount thereof; and 
(b) having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered 
into or carried out – 
(i) was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be 
employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the 
nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or 
 (ii) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons 
dealing at arm’s-length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the 
transaction, operation or scheme in question; and 
(c) was entered into or carried out solely or mainly for the purposes of the avoidance or the 
postponement of liability for the payment of any tax, duty or levy (whether imposed by this Act 
or any previous Income Tax Act or any other law administered by the Commissioner) or the 
reduction of the amount of such liability, 
the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax, duty or levy imposed by this Act, and the amount 
thereof, as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as 
in the circumstances of the case he deems appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, 
postponement or reduction.’ 

6
Section 80A is the new anti avoidance provision and provides that an avoidance arrangement is an      
impermissible avoidance arrangement if its sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit. The three elements 
of this section are as follows:  
 
a) Abnormality- (section 80A(a)(i), 80A(b) and 80(c)(i); 
b) Lack of \commercial substance – ( section 80A(a) (ii); or 
c) Misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act (section 80A(c )(ii) ) 
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a) The most stringent approach had legislative teeth backed up with formal, detailed 
and binding regulations as to what constitutes acceptable pricing, and is 
exemplified by the system of the US. 
 
 
b) The second approach had legislative teeth and detailed guidelines as to acceptable 
pricing but does not have formal regulations, and is exemplified by the German 
system. 
 
 
c) The third approach also had anti-transfer pricing legislation, but relied on the 
arm’s-length principle to dictate acceptable pricing practices, and is exemplified 
by the systems of the UK and other countries which rely strongly on OECD 
guidelines. 
 
 
d) The fourth approach had no specific transfer pricing legislation and relied on 
normal, general tax-avoidance preventions and tax law to combat transfer pricing 
abuse, and is exemplified by the system of the Netherlands. 
 
 
Consequently, the commission considered the third approach as the most appropriate 
for South Africa. On 19 July 1995, section 31 of the Act was amended and later in 
August 1999 Practice Note 7 was also introduced as the SARS Commissioner’s view 
on the transfer pricing practices in South Africa.  
 
 
2.3 SECTION 31 OF THE ACT  
 
 
Section 31 of the Act was introduced to prevent tax-avoidance and to control the flow 
of funds between South Africa and offshore jurisdictions. This section is divided into 
four subsections and regulates transfer pricing transactions on goods and services 
between the connected persons. Section 31 of the Act similar to other transfer pricing 
tax legislation around the world, requires that taxpayers who are regarded as 
connected persons should transact at the arm’s-length price.  
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The challenge in applying section 31 of the Act is that the section provides meanings 
and definitions of certain terminologies and explanations of conditions under which 
this section is applicable, but does not provide the meaning and definitions with 
regard to the arm’s-length price and provisions on how taxpayers should transact at 
arm’s-length.  
 
 
By virtue of section 31 of the Act not being complemented by these meanings and 
definitions and also not complemented by provisions on how taxpayers should 
transact at arm’s-length price, it is considered to be non-prescriptive. The following is 
the analysis of the updates to this section and its subsections: 
  
 
2.3.1 The Updates and Changes in Section 31 of the Act 
 
 
Section 31 of the Act has undergone several changes and updates since the year 2007. 
The first change came in the form of an amendment to the connected persons 
definition as contained in section 1 and section 31(2) of the Act. The amendment was 
made by including the word ‘group of companies’ in the connected persons definition 
effective from 1 January 2007.  
 
 
The second amendment constituted a restructuring of section 31 of the Act with the 
primary change being the removal of the term ‘international agreement’ effective 
from 1 October 2007. The third amendment was effected on 1 January 2009 with 
regard to subsection (1A) of section 31 of the Act.  
 
 
Even though several amendments were made to section 31 of the Act, these 
amendments failed to address the issue on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-
length price.  
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2.3.2 Subsection (1) of Section 31 of the Act. 
 
 
Subsection (1) of section 31 of the Act defines terminologies used in the section and 
these terminologies are the following: 
 
 
(a) Goods 
 
 
Goods is defined in subsection (1) of section 31 of the Act as any corporeal movable 
things, fixed property, or real rights. 
 
 
(b) Services 
 
 
Service is defined in subsection (1) of section 31 of the Act as: 
 
 
(i) the granting, assignment, cession or surrender of any right, benefit or 
privilege; the making available of any facility or advantage  
 
 
(ii) the granting of financial assistance, including a loan, advance or debt, and the 
provision of any security or guarantee  
 
 
(iii) the performance of any work  
 
 
(iv) an agreement of insurance  
 
 
(v) the conferring of rights to or the use of incorporeal property.  
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2.3.3 Subsection (1A) of Section 31 of the Act 
 
 
Subsection (1A) of section 31 of the Act was included under section 31 of the Act to 
address intellectual property transactions effecting transfer pricing. The purpose for 
the inclusion of subsection (1A) of section 31 of the Act was to allow the SARS 
Commissioner to address non arm’s-length or below market value transactions 
involving intellectual property under the transfer pricing provisions, where a company 
owns greater than 20% of the shares, regardless of the fact that another company 
holds the majority of the voting rights.  
 
 
Prior to the introduction of subsection (1A) of section 31 of the Act under the transfer 
pricing tax legislation, where a company owns greater than 20% of the shares in 
another company and another company holds the majority voting rights in that other 
company. The company which owns 20% could not be regarded as the connected 
person to both the company which holds the majority voting rights, and the other 
company of which it owns 20% shares.  
 
 
These types of transactions resulted in the abuse of the transfer pricing rules by 
multinational enterprises when they were entering into transfer pricing transactions 
involving intellectual properties.  
 
 
Subsequent to the amendments subsection (1A) of section 31 of the Act provides that; 
 
 
‘[where] any supply of goods or services has been effected in respect of any intellectual 
property as contemplated in the definition of “intellectual property” in Section 23I (1) or 
knowledge, “connected persons” shall mean a connected persons as defined in section 1, 
provided that the expression “and no shareholder holds the majority voting rights of such 
company” in paragraph (d)(v) of the connected person definition must be disregarded.’ 
 
 
The following hypothetical example illustrates how subsection (1A) of section 31 of 
the Act applies: 
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Table 1: Example on how subsection (1A) of section 31 of the Act  applies 
 
 
 
 
 
In this example, because Company B is the majority shareholder in Company D, 
Company A and C are not connected to Company D in terms of paragraph (d)(v) of 
connected person definition, only Company B and D are.  Prior to the inclusion of 
subsection (1A) of section 31 of the Act under section 31 of the Act, any transfer 
pricing transaction involving intellectual property effected at values below the market 
value between Companies A and D, or C and D, would not be subject to section 31 of 
the Act. The reason being that Company A and C were not regarded as being 
connected persons in relation to Company D.  
 
 
The connected person definition in relation to the company as it applies in section 31 
of the Act, is discussed later in this chapter.  
 
 
2.3.4 Subsection (2) of Section 31 of the Act 
 
 
Subsection (2) of section 31of the Act is regarded as the charging subsection and it 
empowers the SARS Commissioner to make transfer pricing adjustments when the 
consideration of the transfer pricing transactions between connected persons is less 
than, or greater than the arm’s-length price. Subsection (2) of section 31 of the Act 
reads as follows:  
 
 
Company A
SA
Company
 
B
SA
Company C
SA
20% 60% 20%
Company
 
D
Foreign Co
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‘Where any supply of goods or services has been affected - 
 
(a) between - 
 
(i) (aa) a resident  
(bb) any other person who is not a resident; 
 
(ii) (aa) a person who is not a resident   
        (bb) a permanent establishment in the Republic of any other person who is not a resident;  
 
 
(iii) (aa) a person who is a resident  
   (bb) a permanent establishment outside the Republic of any other person who is a  
resident; 
 
(b) between those persons who are connected persons in relation to one another;  
 
(c) at a price which is either - 
 
(i) less than the price which such goods or services might have been expected to fetch if the 
parties to the transaction had been independent persons dealing at arm’s-length (such 
price being the arm’s-length price);  
 
(ii) greater than  the arm’s-length price, 
 
the Commissioner may, for the purpose of this Act in relations to either the acquiror or supplier, in 
the determination of taxable income of either the acquiror or supplier adjust the consideration in 
transaction in respect of the transaction to reflect an arm’s-length price for goods or services.’  
 
 
 
A transaction is subject to subsection (2) of section 31 of the Act provided it meets 
three conditions. The first condition is with regard to a taxpayer’s resident status and a 
place where the transaction happens. The second condition is that the transaction must 
be between connected persons. The third condition is that the consideration of the 
transaction between connected persons must be at arm’s-length. These conditions as 
required in subsection (2) of section 31 of the Act are analysed as follows: 
 
2.3.4.1 The residency status of the taxpayer and the place where a transaction 
happens 
 
 
A transaction is subject to subsection (2)(a) of section 31 of the Act when it is 
between a non-resident and a resident, a resident and permanent establishment 
business activity in the Republic or between non-resident and permanent 
establishment business activity outside the Republic. Transactions subject to 
subsection (2)(a) of section 31 of the Act were in the past referred to as ‘international 
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agreement’ transactions prior to the term ‘international agreement’ being removed 
from the Act, effective from October 2007.  
 
 
In terms of subsection (2)(a) of section 31 of the Act, the residence status of taxpayers 
is an important factor that should be taken into account in determining whether a 
transaction is subject to section 31 of the Act. The transactions taking place between 
the two persons who are tax residents in South Africa will not be subject to subsection 
(2) of section 31 of the Act, as the profits of these persons are subject to tax in South 
Africa. In this situation neither of the two taxpayers can use transfer pricing to avoid 
tax as they are both residents in South Africa and are both subject to corporate tax in 
South Africa. 
 
 
Therefore for this purpose, the residence test is used to determine whether or not 
parties in a transaction are resident in South Africa and whether as a result of this test, 
transfer pricing is not used to shift profits of the parties in the transaction from South 
Africa to the country where the other party in a transaction is resident. Subsection (2) 
(a) of section 31 of the Act provides two conditions through which the taxpayer can 
become a tax resident in South Africa. This is through ordinary residence status and 
conducting business activities through a permanent establishment. Both these tests are 
analysed as follows: 
 
 
a)  The ordinary residence test of a company 
 
 
The definition of a resident in relation to a company (legal person) in the Act reads as 
follows: 
 
 
‘“resident” means any– 
 
(b) person (other than a natural person) which is incorporated, established or formed in 
the Republic or which has its place of effective management in the Republic,’ 
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b) The permanent establishment residence test  
 
 
The place where the business activities of the taxpayer are happening is used as a test 
to determine if a permanent establishment exists. The Act regards the place where 
certain business activities of a taxpayer are taking place to constitute a residence for a 
taxpayer. Such business activities are defined in the tax treaties in South Africa and 
Article 5 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD Model Treaty) as permanent 
establishments. According to the tax treaties in South Africa and the OECD Model 
Treaty the permanent establishment7 may include the following business activities;  
 
 
 (a) a place of management 
 (b) a branch 
 (c) an office 
 (d) a factory 
 (e) a workshop 
 (f) a mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural 
      resources. 
 
 
2.3.4.2 Connected persons 
 
 
A transaction is subject to subsection (2)(b) of section 31 of the Act if a consideration 
of such is a transaction taking place between connected persons. Paragraph (d) of 
section 1 of the Act defines a connected person in relation to the company as follows: 
 
 
‘(d)        in relation to a company-  
 
(i)   any other company that would be part of the same group of companies as that 
company if the  expression 'at least 70 permanent establishment r cent' in 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of 'group of companies' in this section were 
replaced by the expression 'more than 50 permanent establishment r cent';  
   
                      (ii)  and (iii) ......  
 
(iv)  any permanent establishment person, other than a company as defined in section 1 
of the Companies Act, 1973   (Act 61 of 1973), who individually or jointly with 
any connected permanent establishment person in relation to himself, holds, 
directly or indirectly, at least 20 permanent establishment r cent of the company's 
equity share capital or voting rights;  
 
                                               
7 The term permanent establishment may include more than the business activities mentioned above. In other tax 
treaties that South Africa has signed and ratified, such as the US, other business activities in addition to the above 
are mentioned to explain what permanent establishment means.   
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 (v)  any other company if at least 20 per cent of the equity share capital of such  
company is held by such other company, and no shareholder holds the majority 
voting rights of such company;  
 
           (vA)  any other company if such other company is managed or controlled by-  
                          (aa) any person who or which is a connected person in relation to such 
                                                       company;  or  
(bb) any person who or which is a connected person in relation to a person          
contemplated in item (aa) ; and  
         
(vi) where such company is a close corporation-  
(aa)  any member;  
(bb) any any relative of such member or any trust which is a connected person 
in relation to such member; and  
(cc) any other close corporation or company which is a connected person in 
relation to-  
 
(i) any member contemplated in item (aa) ; or  
(ii) the relative or trust contemplated in item (bb) ; and  
 
                           
2.3.4.3 The arm’s-length consideration 
 
 
A transaction is subject to subsection (2)(c) of section 31 of the Act if a consideration 
of such a transaction between connected persons is less than or greater than the arm’s-
length price. Although section 31 of the Act requires that a transaction between 
connected persons should be at arm’s-length price, the challenge faced by SARS and 
taxpayers regarding the application subsection (2)(c) of section 31 of the Act is that 
the subsection requires that transactions affected by this section should be at arm’s-
length, but does not provide regulations on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-
length price.  
 
 
Furthermore, subsection (2)(c) of section 31 of the Act does not provide explanations 
on some of the important meanings with regard to arm’s-length, such as the 
following: 
 
 
a) The meaning of the word arm’s-length price 
 
 
b) What is regarded as less than arm’s-length price  
 
 
c) What is regarded as greater than arm’s-length price. 
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2.3.5 Subsection 31(3) of Section 31 of the Act. 
 
 
Subsection (3) of section 31 of the Act deals with financial assistance transactions 
such as thin capitalisation transactions and the granting of loans between connected 
parties. These kinds of transactions are also required to be at arm’s-length in terms of 
subsection (2) of section 31 of the Act. Subsection (3) of section 31 of the Act reads 
as follows: 
 
‘(3) (a)  Where any person who is not a resident (hereinafter referred to as the investor) has granted 
financial assistance contemplated in paragraph (c) of the definition of “services” in subsection (1), 
whether directly or indirectly, to— 
(i) any connected person in relation to the investor who is a resident; or 
 
(ii) any other person (in whom he has a direct or indirect interest) other than a natural person, 
which is a resident (hereinafter referred to as the recipient) and, by virtue of such interest, is 
entitled to participate in not less than 25 per cent of the dividends, profits or capital of the 
recipient, or is entitled, directly or indirectly, to exercise not less than 25 per cent of the votes 
of the recipient, 
and the Commissioner is, having regard to the circumstances of the case, of the opinion that the value of 
the aggregate of all such financial assistance is excessive in relation to the fixed capital (being share 
capital, share premium, accumulated profits, whether of a capital nature or not, or any other permanent 
owners’ capital, other than permanent capital in the form of financial assistance as so contemplated) of 
such connected person or recipient, any interest, finance charge or other consideration payable for or in 
relation to or in respect of the financial assistance shall, to the extent to which it relates to the amount 
which is excessive as contemplated in this paragraph, be disallowed as a deduction for the purposes of 
this Act. 
 (b)  For the purposes of paragraph (a), financial assistance granted indirectly shall be deemed 
to include any financial assistance granted by any third person who is not a connected person in relation 
to the investor, a connected person contemplated in paragraph (a) or the recipient, where such financial 
assistance has been granted by arrangement, directly or indirectly, with the investor and on the strength 
of any financial assistance granted, directly or indirectly, by the investor or any connected person in 
relation to the investor, to such third person.’ 
 
 
The guideline on the application of subsection (3) of section 31 of the Act is 
contained in Practice Note 2. The transfer pricing matters relating to subsection (3) of 
section 31 of the Act is excluded from this research study. The reason for excluding 
these matters is that they are considered to be a topic on which another research study 
could be conducted.  
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2.4 THE ARM’S-LENGTH PRINCIPLE 
 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, an arm’s-length principle simply refers to the process 
of determining the arm’s-length price. An arm’s-length price is thus the price that 
services or goods can be expected to have reached if the parties in the transaction 
had been independent persons dealing at arm’s-length.  
 
 
The arm’s-length principle is endorsed by the OECD member countries as the 
appropriate standard to be used for tax purposes by multinational enterprises and 
tax authorities. The arm’s-length principle enables taxpayers or tax authorities to 
analyse whether the results obtained in a cross-border controlled transaction, are 
comparable to the results the multinational enterprises would have obtained had 
the transaction been carried out between independent enterprises (Deloitte Touché 
Tohmatsu, 2001:9).  
 
 
The genesis of arm’s-length principle as an internationally accepted principle 
goes back to the year 1933 (Russo, 2005). The authorative statement of the arm’s-
length principle is found in Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty. The OECD 
Model Treaty is the framework for bilateral treaties between OECD member 
countries and other non-member countries. The arm’s-length principle in the 
OECD Model Treaty reads as follows: 
 
 
‘[When] conditions are made or imposed between… two [associated] enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made between 
independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued 
to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be 
included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.’ 
 
 
As already mentioned, section 31 of the Act has also adopted the arm’s-length 
principle and guidance on how to comply the principle is provided separately in 
Practice Note 7. According to Practice Note 7 the arm’s-length principle simply 
means that the transaction of multinational enterprise should have the substantive 
financial characteristics of a transaction between independent parties, where each 
party strives to gain the utmost possible benefit from the transaction (Practice Note 7 
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Para. 7:8). The process of how the arm’s-length principle should be applied in South 
Africa is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
 
2.4.1 The Challenges Facing Arm’s-length Principle 
 
 
The OECD guidelines state that there are certain cases when there could be practical 
difficulties in applying the arm’s-length principle. Such cases are when the 
multinational enterprises have engaged in transactions that independent enterprises 
would not undertake. The following are the analysis of such cases when it could be 
difficult to apply arm’s-length principle. 
 
 
a) Intellectual Property Transactions 
 
 
The intellectual property transactions within the multinational enterprises are such 
transactions which could be difficult to compare with similar transactions by 
independent parties. The OECD guidelines state that in such transactions the arm’s-
length principle would be difficult to apply because there is little or no direct evidence 
of what conditions would have been established by independent enterprises (OECD 
guidelines, Para. 1.10).  
 
 
b) Difficulties in finding comparables 
 
 
The second case when practical difficulties could be experienced is when the tax 
administration and taxpayers have difficulty in obtaining adequate information when 
applying the arm’s-length principle. As the arm’s-length principle requires that the 
transactions of the multinational enterprises be compared to the transactions 
undertaken by the independent enterprises, the difficulty of finding the comparable 
transactions could make the application of the arm’s-length principle difficult (OECD 
guidelines, Para. 1.12). 
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2.4.2 Practical Considerations in Applying Arm’s-length Principle 
 
 
Chapter 1 of the OECD guidelines provides practical consideration that should be 
taken into account when applying the arm’s-length principle (OECD guidelines, Para. 
1.15 -1.70). These practical considerations are also acknowledged by Practice Note 7 
(Practice Note 7, Para. 7.5 and Para. 11).  
 
 
These practical considerations are as follows: comparability analysis; recognition of 
the actual transactions undertaken; evaluation of separate and combined transactions; 
use of an arm’s-length range; use of multiple year data; losses; the effect of 
government policies; intentional set-offs; use of customs valuations; and use of 
transfer pricing methods. The discussion below shows how these practical 
considerations should be taken into account when the arm’s-length principle is 
applied. 
 
 
2.5 THE APPROACH TO THE ARM’S-LENGTH PRINCIPLE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
 
Even though section 31(2) of the Act does not make provisions on how taxpayers 
should transact at arm’s-length price, it requires that the consideration of goods or 
services supplied or acquired between connected persons should not be greater or 
less than the arm’s-length price.  
 
 
As already mentioned in this chapter, the guidance on how taxpayers should 
transact at arm’s-length price in South Africa is achieved through the application 
of the arm’s-length principle which is contained in Practice Note 7. The 
requirement to apply the arm’s-length principle in Practice Note 7 is similar to the 
approach contained in the OECD guidelines.  
 
 
In addition to Practice Note 7 the South African tax treaties on permanent 
establishment of business income and associated enterprises also requires that 
taxpayers should in certain instances apply the arm’s-length principle. The IT14 
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returns requires that taxpayers’ transfer pricing transactions which are required to 
be at arm’s-length as required by section 31 of the Act, should be disclosed in the 
return.  
 
 
In the absence of the non-prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation, the question still 
remains how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length. The following is the analysis 
of Practice Note 7, South African treaties on permanent establishment business 
income and associated enterprises, and the IT14 return to establish how taxpayers in 
South Africa should transact at the arm’s-length price.  
 
 
2.5.1 Practice Note 7 
 
 
Practice Note 7 is largely based on the OECD guidelines and it states that the 
determination of an arm’s-length price is not an exact science but requires 
judgment on the part of both the taxpayer and the SARS Commissioner (Practice 
Note 7, Para. 7.6). An arm’s-length price does not necessarily constitute a single 
price, but a range of prices and the facts of each case will determine where, within 
that range, a specific arm’s-length price will lie (Practice Note 7, Para. 7.5). 
 
 
The theory in determining the arm’s-length price is that transactions of 
independent enterprises are subject to the full play of market forces and so these 
are, by definition, prices of the independent enterprises’ arm’s-length prices. As a 
result the prices of independent enterprises provide a benchmark against which 
the transactions can be evaluated by the multinational enterprises.  
 
 
Endorsed by both Practice Note 7 and the OECD guidelines, the process of testing 
whether the transactions undertaken by the multinational enterprises reflect 
arm’s-length nature as compared to the transactions undertaken by the 
independent companies, can be achieved by applying the comparability analysis, 
applying certain practical considerations, evaluating and selecting appropriate 
transfer pricing method, and calculating the arm’s-length range of prices. This 
process is analysed as follows:  
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2.5.1.1 Comparability Analysis 
 
 
The process of determining whether the prices or margins of multinational enterprises 
reflect the arm’s-length nature, requires that a comparability analysis should be 
conducted to determine the degree of comparability between the transaction of 
multinational and independent enterprises.  
 
 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty states that an adjustment to the profit of the 
multinational enterprises can be made to the extent that the conditions of these 
enterprise transactions differ from the conditions that would have been evident 
between independent enterprises. Therefore, the comparability process compares the 
conditions of the multinational and independent enterprises to test whether a 
transaction between independent enterprises is sufficiently similar to those undertaken 
by multinational enterprises.  
 
 
Practice Note 7 and the OECD guidelines state that comparability analysis should be 
conducted taking into account the economic relevancy with respect to the following 
factors (OECD guidelines, Para. 1.15): 
 
 
a) Characteristics of property or services 
 
 
The OECD guidelines recommend that when comparing the conditions in the 
transactions undertaken by the multinational enterprises to the conditions of those 
undertaken by the independent parties, the characteristics of property or services 
involved in such transactions is important. The characteristics of the property or 
services matters when it comes to the comparability of the prices charged by 
multinational enterprises and that charged by independent enterprises for the same 
transaction (OECD guidelines, Para. 1.19).  
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b) Functional analysis 
 
 
In testing whether the conditions in the transactions undertaken by multinational 
enterprises to those in the transactions undertaken by independent enterprises are 
similar, the OECD guidelines recommend that it is important to look at the functions 
performed in such transactions (OECD guidelines, Para. 1.20-1.21).  
 
 
The OECD guidelines recommend that if the same level of functions are performed 
by both multinational enterprises and independent enterprises in similar type 
transactions. Therefore, the economic return derived by the multinational enterprise 
should be similar to that derived by the independent enterprise in the same type of 
transaction.  
 
 
The OECD guidelines do, however, acknowledge that in certain instances the 
economic rewards may be different. For example, instances where the assets utilized 
in the transaction and risks assumed by the multinational are different from that of the 
independent enterprises (OECD guidelines, Para. 1.22- 1.27). In these instances the 
multinational enterprises and the independent parties might be rewarded differently on 
the same type of transaction undertaken, because of the conditions with regard to their 
responsibilities in the transaction not being similar. 
 
 
c) Contractual terms 
 
 
The OECD guidelines state that, ‘in arm’s-length dealings, the contractual terms of a 
transaction generally define explicitly or implicitly how the responsibilities, risks and 
benefits are to be divided between the parties’(OECD guidelines, Para. 1.28). The 
OECD guidelines further mention that in cases where the transaction takes place 
between the two independent enterprises, the terms and conditions in the contract will 
be such that each party will strive to enjoy the utmost benefit.    
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Therefore, in testing whether the conditions in the transactions undertaken by the 
multinational enterprises and those in the transactions undertaken by the independent 
enterprises are similar, the contractual terms and conditions are also important. 
 
 
d) Economic circumstance 
 
 
In testing whether the commercial conditions in the transactions undertaken by the 
multinational enterprises and those in the transactions undertaken by the independent 
enterprises are similar, the OECD guidelines recommend also that it is important to 
look at the economic conditions in which multinational and independent enterprises 
do business. The reason is that arm’s-length price may vary across different markets 
even for transactions involving the same property or services (OECD guidelines, Para. 
1.30). 
 
 
e) Business strategies 
 
 
The OECD guidelines recommend that business strategies must also be taken into 
consideration in determining comparability of the transactions undertaken by 
multinational and independent enterprises.  The business strategy may be that the 
multinational enterprise will introduce their new product at a lower price than the 
price offered by other businesses in the same market (OECD guidelines, Para. 1.31-
1.32). 
 
 
The multinational enterprise will lower their price as a business strategy to penetrate 
the market, thereby offering lower prices than those of the independent enterprises.    
 
2.5.1.2 Other Practical Considerations  
 
 
To further achieve a high degree of comparability between the transactions of 
multinational and independent enterprises, the OECD guidelines recommend that 
certain practical considerations should be taken into account. This is done to eliminate 
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any material differences that might be present in the commercial conditions of the 
multinational and the independent enterprises. Such practical considerations are as 
follows: 
 
a) Recognition of the actual transaction undertaken 
 
 
Practice Note 7 provides that when comparing the conditions of the actual transaction 
undertaken by multinational enterprises to those of independent enterprises, the 
economic structure and the underlying agreement of the transaction undertaken by the 
multinational enterprises, have to correspond with those usually adopted on the free 
market (Practice Note 7 Para. 11.10). 
 
b) Evaluation of separate and combined transactions 
 
 
Practice Note 7 provides that when comparing the commercial conditions of 
multinational and independent enterprises the principle should be that transactions 
should be evaluated on a transaction-by transaction basis (Practice Note 7 Para. 
11.11).  
 
 
Simultaneously, the guidelines recognise that there are some circumstances in which 
it would be appropriate to aggregate transactions. This is where separate transactions 
are so closely linked or continuous that they cannot be evaluated adequately on a 
separate basis. A number of examples are given, such as long-term contracts for the 
supply of commodities or services, rights to use intangible property, and pricing a 
range of closely linked products where the determination of pricing for each 
individual product or transaction is impractical (OECD Guidelines Para. 1.43).  
 
c) Presence of losses 
 
 
The OECD guidelines suggest that when comparing the commercial conditions of 
multinational enterprises to those of independent enterprises, losses should also be 
taken into consideration. A loss-making company belonging to a profitable group may 
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trigger special tax scrutiny. Genuine losses can be accepted in a situation where the 
entire group is in a loss-making situation, in a start-up cost situation, when there are  
unfavourable economic conditions and when losses occur as a result of the business 
strategy (Practice Note 7, Para. 11.9, OECD guidelines Para. 1.52-1.54). 
 
 
d) Government policies  
 
 
The OECD guidelines suggest that when comparing the commercial conditions of 
multinational and independent enterprises, government controls should also be 
considered. The government price controls may include; price controls and interest 
rate controls, anti-dumping duties, exchange rate policy, control over royalties, and 
management fees (OECD guidelines Para. 1.55-1.59). 
 
e) Intentional set-offs  
 
 
When comparing the commercial conditions of multinational enterprises and 
independent parties, the OECD guidelines provide that international set-offs is one of 
the issues to be considered. International set-offs occur when one associated 
enterprise has provided a benefit to another within the group, that is balanced to some 
degree by different benefits derived from that enterprise in return. In such cases it is 
recommended by the OECD guidelines that it is necessary to evaluate the transactions 
separately to check the arm’s-length price (OECD guidelines Para. 1.60-1.64). 
 
f) Customs valuations 
 
 
Since pricing for customs and tax purposes may vary, customs price analysis is 
considered relevant  when comparing the commercial conditions of multinational 
enterprises to the commercial conditions of independent enterprises (OECD 
guidelines Para. 1.65-1.67).   
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2.5.1.3 Evaluation and selection of the transfer pricing methods  
 
 
Once the comparability analysis has been conducted and practical considerations have 
been taken into account, transfer pricing methods should be evaluated and the 
appropriate method selected and applied to determine whether or not the prices or 
margins of multinational enterprises reflect the arm’s-length nature, as compared to 
the prices or margins of independent companies.  
 
 
Practice Note 7 and chapter 2 and 3 of the OECD guidelines present these transfer 
pricing methods. The transfer pricing methods in the OECD guidelines are divided 
into two categories, namely; the traditional transaction methods and the transactional 
profit (or profit-based) methods. 
 
 
Traditional transactional methods compare actual prices or other less direct indicators 
such as gross margins on third party transactions, with the same measures in a 
controlled party’s transactions. The methods classed as traditional transaction 
methods are the comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price method, and 
the cost plus method.  
 
 
Transaction profit methods compare the overall net profits of intra-group transactions 
with the net operating profit of comparable transactions carried out by independent 
companies. Two transactional profit methods are the profit split method and the 
transactional net margin methods.  
 
 
The traditional transactional methods were once considered the best methods 
compared to the transactional profit methods. The latter were considered methods of 
last resort as the OECD guidelines recommended that the use of these methods should 
be limited to exceptional situations where no data was available or where the 
available data was not of sufficient quality (OECD guidelines Para. 2.49, 3.49 and 
3.54).  
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Although these methods are regarded as methods of last resort, in practice they are 
widely used as compared to the traditional transactional methods. As mentioned 
above, the reason being the problem of availability of data of the independent 
comparable transactions on other methods (Rolf, 2004/2005: 27). The OECD is in the 
process of reviewing whether or not the transactional profit methods should maintain 
their status of last resort8.  
 
 
The analysis of the traditional transactional methods and the transactional profit 
methods is summarized as follows: 
 
 
a) Controlled Uncontrolled Price Method 
 
 
The Controlled Uncontrolled Price method is the preferred among transfer pricing 
methods as the most theoretically pure application of the arm’s-length principle. The 
method compares the price charged for property or services transferred in a controlled 
transaction to that charged for the same property or services transferred in an 
uncontrolled transaction in comparable circumstances.  
 
 
The controlled transaction would be within the multinational enterprises and the 
uncontrolled transaction would be between the independent parties. 
 
 
In testing whether the prices of multinational enterprises reflect the arm’s-length 
nature as compared to the prices of the independent parties, comparability under the 
Controlled Uncontrolled Price method requires that there be no difference that would 
materially affect the open market price, or that reasonably accurate adjustments can 
be made to reflect any differences between the controlled and uncontrolled 
transactions. The extent and reliability of the necessary quantitative adjustments will 
affect the relative reliability of this method. 
 
                                               
8
 See the OECD document on Transactional Profit Methods, Discussion Draft for Public Comment dated 25 
January 2008. The document analysis the application of the transactional profit methods and experiences faced 
by countries on transactional profit methods. In the document comments are also invited from the public to 
provide solutions with regard to the challenges faced with the application of these methods. 
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b) Resale Price Method 
 
 
The Resale Price method involves reselling a product purchased from an associated 
enterprise to an independent enterprise and comparing the prices of the two 
transactions (OECD guidelines, Para. 2.14). Because gross profit margins represent 
gross compensation after the cost of sale for specific functions performed (taking into 
account assets used and risks assumed), product differences are less important here 
than in the Controlled Uncontrolled Price method (OECD guidelines, Para. 2.17). 
 
 
In testing whether the prices of multinational enterprises reflect the arm’s-length 
nature as compared to the prices of the independent parties, comparability under the 
Resale Price method requires that there be no differences that would materially affect 
the resale price margin in the open market, or that reasonably accurate adjustments 
can be made to account for such differences.  
 
 
The extent and reliability of adjustments will affect the relative reliability of the 
Resale Price method analysis. Fewer adjustments are needed to account for product 
differences than under the Controlled Uncontrolled Price method, but other 
comparability attributes such as functions generally are given more weight under the 
Resale Price method.  
 
 
c) Cost Plus Method 
 
 
Under the Cost Plus method, an arm’s-length price is determined by applying an 
appropriate mark-up on costs incurred. The underlying rationale is that the mark-up 
provides an appropriate profit for the functions performed, assets employed, and risks 
borne by the taxpayer. This method is probably the most useful for semi-finished 
goods sold between related parties or if the controlled transaction is provision of 
services (OECD guidelines, Para. 2.32). 
 
 
In testing whether the prices or margin prices of multinational enterprises reflect the 
arm’s-length nature as compared to the prices of the independent parties, 
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comparability under the Cost Plus method requires that no differences exists that 
would materially affect the cost plus mark-up in the open market, or that reasonably 
accurate adjustments can be made to reflect any differences.  
 
 
The extent and reliability of adjustments will affect the relative reliability of the cost 
plus analysis. Like the Resale Price method, the fewer the differences the greater the 
reliability of the Cost Plus method (OECD, Para. 2.34). 
 
 
d) Profit Split Method 
 
 
With the Profit Split method as mentioned in the OECD guidelines in paragraph 3.5, 
the arm’s-length price is determined by ‘identifying the profit to be split for the 
associated enterprises from the controlled transactions [and]…then those profits 
between the associated enterprises on an economically valid basis that approximates 
the division of profit that would have been anticipated and reflected in an agreement 
made at arm’s-length’.  
 
 
The profit split method calculates the profit (either total or residual) from the 
controlled transactions and splits those profits based on the contribution of each 
entity. The OECD guidelines recommend two approaches for applying the profit split 
method (OECD Guidelines Para. 3.15 – 3.25): 
 
 
(i) Contribution analysis 
 
 
‘Contribution analysis applies where the combined profit of the transaction is divided between 
the associated entities based upon the relative value of the functions performed by each of the 
associated enterprises participating in the controlled transactions, supplemented as much as 
possible by external market data that indicate how independent enterprises would have 
divided profits in similar circumstances.’ 
 
 
(ii) Residual profit analysis 
 
 
‘Residual profit analysis applies where profit is divided in two stages. In the first stage, each 
participant is allocated sufficient profit to provide it with a basic return appropriate for the 
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type of transaction in which it is engaged. (…) In the second stage, any residual profit (or loss) 
remaining after the first stage division would be allocated among the parties based on an 
analysis of the facts and circumstances that might indicate how this residual would have been 
divided between independent enterprises.’ 
 
 
e) Transactional Net Margin Profit 
 
 
Under the Transactional Net Margin method, an arm’s-length price is determined by 
examining the net profit margin that a taxpayer realises from a controlled transaction 
relative to an appropriate base, for example cost, sales or assets. Under the 
Transactional Net Margin method, comparability between the controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions is established through a functional analysis. 
 
 
In testing whether the prices or margin prices of multinational enterprises reflect the 
arm’s-length nature as compared to the prices of the independent parties, 
comparability under the Transactional Net Margin method compares the profit level 
indicator of the multinational enterprises with the profit level indicator(s) of 
comparable independent parties. According to the OECD guidelines this method, 
although classified as a transactional profit method, is more closely aligned to the 
Cost Plus and Resale Price methods than to the profit split method.  
 
2.5.1.4 Calculating the arm’s-length price or margin range  
 
 
Once the methods have been selected and applied, this is the appropriate transfer 
pricing method, the statistical analysis is computed to calculate the arm’s-length price 
or margin range of the independent enterprises. The computation of the statistical 
analysis in calculating the arm’s-length price or margin range is conducted by taking 
into consideration two of the practical considerations, namely; the use of arm’s-length 
range and the use of multiple year data. 
 
 
a) The use of arm’s-length range 
 
 
In conducting the calculations to determine the arm’s-length price the OECD 
guidelines and Practice Note 7 requires that a statistical range be computed when 
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applying one of the prescribed methods (OECD, Para. 1.45 and Practice Note 7 Para. 
11.4.2). The application of the most appropriate method or methods in computing the 
arm’s-length range to test if prices or margins of the multinational enterprises reflect 
the arm’s-length nature as compared to the prices or margins of the independent 
enterprises, normally produces a range of results that could be regarded as being at 
arm’s-length (OECD, Para. 1.45). The OECD guidelines state that any point within 
the range can be considered as arm’s-length.  
 
 
Both Practice Note 7 and the OECD guidelines recommend that taxpayers can 
compute the arm’s-length range using more than one transfer pricing method in order 
to substantiate that their prices or margins are at arm’s-length. Although this approach 
is not compulsory in South Africa, Practice Note 7’s view is that the use of more than 
one method could be a relevant exercise in the case where complicated transactions 
are involved (Practice Note 7, Para. 11.6; OECD guidelines, Para. 1.69).  
 
 
The computation of the arm’s-length range9 is conducted by arranging the financial 
data such as the prices, gross margins and net margins of the independent enterprises. 
The range consists of the lowest value and the highest value of the data. The point 
within the lowest value and the highest value in the range is referred to as the 
interquartile range10(Groenbner and Shannon, 1989).  
 
 
The interquartile range consists of three points, this is the lower quartile point, 
median11 which is the middle point, and the upper quartile point (Groebner and 
Shannon, 1989). An example of how the arm’s-length range is computed is illustrated 
in the next section through a hypothetical case study, showing how multinational 
                                               
9
  Range is the difference between the highest value and the lowest value in the set of data arrayed in the 
descending and ascending order.    
10
  Interquartile range is the distance within the range representing the lower quartile value and higher quartile 
value. The lower quartile value is known as the first quartile and is the value that divides the lower 25% of the 
data from the upper 75%. The second value within the interquartile range is called the median, which 
represents the second quartile. The third value within the interquartile range represents the third quartile and 
divides the lower 75% of the data from the upper 25%.  
11
  Median is value occupying the middle place of the data arrayed in the descending and ascending order.   
Median is also known as the value that divides a set of data into two halves. 
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enterprises in South Africa should substantiate that their prices or margins are at 
arm’s-length. 
 
 
b) The use of multiple year data 
 
 
The OECD states that in order to produce a reliable arm’s-length result when testing 
whether the prices or margins of the multinational enterprises reflect the arm’s-length 
nature, a transaction must be observed over a period of time, so that one can gain a 
better understanding of facts and circumstances that may have influenced the 
transactions undertaken by the multinational enterprises. The OECD states that the 
multiple year data is useful in providing information about the relevant business and 
product life cycles of the comparable (OECD guidelines, Para. 1.49). 
 
2.5.1.5 Hypothetical Case Study 
 
 
This section presents a hypothetical case study to illustrate how the arm’s-length price 
or margin range is calculated. The case study is as follows:  
 
 
a) Case Study 
 
 
US-Holdco is a company incorporated in the US and has a subsidiary company in 
South Africa called SA-Subco. US-Holdco manufactures sports shoes in the US and 
sells the shoes to independent retailers and wholesalers globally. In order to boost its 
sales figures, US-Holdco has subsidiary companies around the world; their main 
responsibilities are sales and marketing. SA-Subco is a US-Holdco subsidiary 
company. US-Holdco rewards SA-Subco with a service fee for sales and marketing 
activities executed in SA. The transfer pricing policy applied between US-Holdco and 
SA-Subco is that a 10% mark-up on total costs incurred, should be rewarded for sales 
and marketing activities. The following are the financial results of SA-Subco for three 
years:  
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Table 2: SA-Subco income statements 
 
 
 
 
 
The first issue that the management of SA-Subco will have to deal with in order to 
comply with the transfer pricing requirements in South Africa, is to address the 
following two questions:  
 
 
(i) Is the sales and marketing transaction between SA-Subco and US-Holdco 
subject to section 31 of the Act?  
 
 
(ii) Is the consideration of the sales and marketing transaction between SA-Subco 
and US-Holdco at arm’s-length as required by section 31 of Act? 
 
As discussed in section 2.3 in this chapter, a transaction is subject to section 31 of the 
Act if it involves goods and services and when it is between connected persons, and 
the connected persons are the non-resident and a resident taxpayer.  
 
 
In this situation, SA-Subco is a connected legal person to US-Holdco because US-
Holdco is a holding company to SA-Subco. The sales and marketing transaction 
between US-Holdco and SA-Subco constitute a service as defined under subsection 
31(1) of the Act. Furthemore, US-Holdco is non-resident as it is not incorporated in 
South Africa but in the US, and SA-Subco is a resident in SA as it is incorporated in 
South Africa.  
 
 
Therefore, SA-Subco is required in terms of section 31 of the Act to illustrate that the 
sales and marketing transaction with US-Holdco is at arm’s-length. Even though 
SA Subco 2008 2007 2006 Average 
Turnover 30562 29877 25875 28771
Less: Total Costs 27785 27156 23518 26153
Operating Profit/Loss 2777 2721 2357 2618
Operating Margin 9.09% 9.11% 9.11% 9.10%
Total Costs Mark Up 9.99% 10.02% 10.02% 10.01%
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section 31 of the Act does not make provision on how taxpayers should transact at 
arm’s-length price, in addressing the second question above, SA-Subco is still 
required in terms of section 31 of the Act to illustrate that their sales and marketing 
transaction with US-Holdco is at arm’s-length. SA-Subco can do that by following the 
arm’s-length principle process contained in Practice Note 7.  
 
 
As discussed previously, SA-Subco should illustrate to SARS that their transaction of 
sales and marketing with US-Holdco is at arm’s-length. This illustration can be 
achieved by following the following steps:  
 
 
(i) Conducting comparability analysis of SA-Subco’s commercial conditions with 
the commercial conditions of independent enterprises involved in sales and 
marketing activities. 
 
 
(ii) Evaluating, selecting and applying the appropriate transfer pricing methods on 
the financial results of the independent enterprises involved in sales and 
marketing activities.  
 
 
(iii) Computing the statistical analysis to calculate the arm’s-length price or margin 
range of independent enterprises involved in sales and marketing business 
activities. And comparing the arm’s-length prices or margin range of 
independent enterprises to SA-Subco’s prices or margins to determine if SA-
Subco’s prices or margin are within the arm’s-length range.  
 
 
a) Step 1  
 
 
In the first step, SA-Subco would start by searching for the independent enterprises 
involved in sales and marketing activities in the public data bases, and compare the 
commercial conditions of these independent enterprises to their own by reviewing  the 
following comparability factors: 
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(i) The characteristics of the sales and marketing services performed by the 
independent enterprises. 
 
 
(ii) The functions performed by independent enterprises involved in sales and 
marketing business activities. 
 
 
(iii) The contractual terms binding the independent enterprises involved in sales 
and marketing business activities.  
 
 
(iv) The economic circumstances under which the independent enterprises are 
involved in sales and marketing business activities. 
 
 
(v) The business strategies employed by the independent enterprises involved in 
sales and marketing business activities.  
 
Other practical considerations which SA-Subco should take into account to further 
achieve a high degree of comparability, are the recognition of the actual transactions 
undertaken, evaluation of separate and combined transactions, losses, effect of 
government policies, intentional set-offs and use of customs valuations. Assume that 
after SA-Subco has searched in the public data base for independent enterprises 
involved in the sales and marketing activities and the search results has resulted in 10 
independent enterprises found in the public data base.  
 
 
The following are the financial results of the independent enterprises found in the 
public data base: 
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Table 3: Income statements of comparable sales and marketing companies  
 
 
 
 
 
b) Step 2 
 
 
The second step that SA-Subco would take is to evaluate each transfer pricing method 
and select the appropriate method suitable for SA-Subco. As discussed previously, the 
evaluation of these methods should be conducted taking into consideration the 
transfer pricing policy applied by the tested party, in this case being SA-Subco; also 
by taking into consideration the type of business structure of a tested party, for 
example whether a business is a distributor, manufacturer or service provider. As 
discussed previously both Practice Note 7 and the OECD guidelines make 
recommendations which methods are appropriate for each business structure.  
 
 
The appropriate method is then selected and applied to calculating the arm’s-length 
price or margin realised by independent enterprises involved in sales and marketing 
business activities. The transfer pricing policy implemented by SA-Subco, is total 
costs incurred plus 10% that SA-Subco charges to US-Holdco for sales and marketing 
service transactions. Therefore, the Cost Plus method would be the appropriate 
method to apply in this situation. As discussed above, the Cost Plus method is 
appropriate when the provision of service(s) transactions is involved and when a 
mark-up on costs incurred is applied in a transaction.  The Cost Plus method would be 
applied on the financial results of the independent enterprises found in the public data 
No Comparable 
Companies
Turnover Total 
Costs 
Operating 
Profit/Loss
Turnover Total 
Costs 
Operating 
Profit/Loss
Turnover Total 
Costs 
Operating 
Profit/Loss
1 Company A 57234 54789 2445 49968 44345 5623 42383 38561 3822
2 Company B 61373 59446 1927 56956 54234 2722 49546 46123 3423
3 Company C 58559 61867 -3308 52456 54989 -2533 47123 49786 -2663
4 Company D 43674 41678 1996 41383 39564 1819 37453 35164 2289
5 Company E 37337 38768 -1431 34893 36132 -1239 30123 31256 -1133
6 Caompay F 30571 27836 2735 29867 26897 2970 25343 22325 3018
7 Company G 66897 61632 5265 60236 51123 9113 55234 47345 7889
8 Company H 55260 53763 1497 49756 47671 2085 43167 40673 2494
9 Company I 39768 35678 4090 34145 29231 4914 29765 24876 4889
10 Company J 32157 34678 -2521 27345 23461 3884 25761 23487 2274
2007 20062008
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base to find out what the percentage (%) mark-up is on the costs incurred by 
independent enterprises involved in sales and marketing business activities.  
 
 
The table of figures below shows the outcome of the application of the Cost Plus 
method on the financial data of the independent enterprises involved in sales and 
marketing business activities.  
 
 
Table 4: The cost plus method results on the independent enterprises involved in sales 
and marketing business activities 
 
 
 
 
 
The above table of figures shows the calculations of the Total Cost Mark-Up12  
percentage (%) realised by the independent enterprises involved in the sales and 
marketing business activities. The Average Total Costs Mark-Up13 percentage (%) is 
also shown in this calculation on a three-year period. As discussed previously the 
reason for the three-year average calculations is that, Practice Note 7 and the OECD 
guidelines recommend the use of the multiple year data information in order to 
address certain business aspects and product life cycles of the independent enterprises 
when the arm’s-length price is calculated.  
                                               
12
  The Total Cost Mark-Up percentage (%) is calculated by dividing Operating Profit/Loss by Turnover less 
Operating Profit  and multiple by 100 (Total Cost Mark Up = Operating Profit/Turnover – Operating Profit x 
100).  
13
   The Average Total Cost Mark-Up is calculated by adding up the Total Cost Mark-Up of  the number of years 
involved and divide the answer by the number of years (Average Total Cost Mark-Up= Total Cost Mark-Up( 
y1+y2+y3)/ 3).      
 
2008 2007 2006 Average 2008 - 2006
No Comparable 
Companies 
Total 
Costs
Operating 
Profit/Loss
Total Costs 
Mark Up
Total 
Costs 
Operating 
Profit/Loss
Total Costs 
Mark Up
Total 
Costs 
Operating 
Profit/Loss
Total Costs 
Mark Up
Total 
Costs 
Operating 
Profit/Loss
Total Costs 
Mark Up
1 Company A 54789 2445 4.46% 44345 5623 12.68% 38561 3822 9.91% 45,898 3,963 9.02%
2 Company B 59446 1927 3.24% 54234 2722 5.02% 46123 3423 7.42% 53,268 2,691 5.23%
3 Company C 61867 -3308 -5.35% 54989 -2533 -4.61% 49786 -2663 -5.35% 55,547 -2,835 -5.10%
4 Company D 41678 1996 4.79% 39564 1819 4.60% 35164 2289 6.51% 38,802 2,035 5.30%
5 Company E 38768 -1431 -3.69% 36132 -1239 -3.43% 31256 -1133 -3.62% 35,385 -1,268 -3.58%
6 Caompay F 27836 2735 9.83% 26897 2970 11.04% 22325 3018 13.52% 25,686 2,908 11.46%
7 Company G 61632 5265 8.54% 51123 9113 17.83% 47345 7889 16.66% 53,367 7,422 14.34%
8 Company H 53763 1497 2.78% 47671 2085 4.37% 40673 2494 6.13% 47,369 2,025 4.43%
9 Company I 35678 4090 11.46% 29231 4914 16.81% 24876 4889 19.65% 29,928 4,631 15.98%
10 Company J 34678 -2521 -7.27% 23461 3884 16.56% 23487 2274 9.68% 27,209 1,212 6.32%
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c) Step 3 
 
 
Once the appropriate transfer pricing method has been selected and applied, SA-
Subco would compute the statistical range to determine the arm’s-length range of 
prices or margins realised by the independent enterprises involved in sales and 
marketing business activities.  
 
 
As discussed previously, this process is done to test if SA-Subco’s prices or margins 
on Total Cost Mark-Up percentage (%) are within the same range as the prices or 
margins of the independent enterprises involved in sales and marketing business 
activities.  
 
 
The table of figures below shows the calculations of the arm’s-length range on the 
three-year period and on average of a three-year period of the Total Cost Mark-Up 
percentage (%) realised by the independent enterprises involved in the sales and 
marketing business activities.  
 
 
Table 5: Arm’s-length range calculations on cost plus method 
 
 
 
 
 
The result of the arm’s-length range calculations shows the Minimum Point within -
5.10% on average and the Maximum point of 15.98 % on average. The Lower 
Quartile point is 4.43% on average and the Upper Quartile point is 11.46% on 
average. Meanwhile, the Median point is 5.81% on average. The table below shows 
graphically at what point of the arms’-length range SA-Subco is at, as compared to 
Minimum -7.27% -4.61% -5.35% -5.10%
Lower Quartile -3.69% 4.37% 6.13% 4.43%
Median 3.85% 8.03% 8.55% 5.81%
Upper Quartile 8.54% 16.56% 13.52% 11.46%
Maximum 11.46% 17.83% 19.65% 15.98%
Simple 
Average
Total Costs Mark Up 
(2008-2006)
Inter-Quartile Range
2008 2007 2006
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the other independent enterprises involved in the sales and marketing business 
activities. 
 
 
Table 6: Arms’-Length Range Graph on Total Cost Mark-Up Method  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SA-Subco realised an average Total Cost Mark-Up percentage (%) of 10.01% as per 
their transfer pricing policy with US-Holdco.  Comparing SA-Subco’s Total Cost 
Mark-Up percentage (%) of 10.01% with the Total Cost Mark-Up percentage (%) 
realised by the independent enterprises involved in sales and marketing business 
activities, it is confirmed that SA-Subco is transacting at arm’s-length with its holding 
company, US-HoldCo. Because the arm’s-length range calculations shows that SA-
Subco’s Total Cost Mark-Up percentage (%) is within the arm’s-length range, this 
position of SA-Subco is not challenged by SARS.  
  
 
As suggested by Practice Note 7, SA-Subco can also compute the second arm’s-
length range using another transfer pricing method to support and substantiate that 
their prices or margins are at arm’s-length. The following table of figures shows the 
calculations of the arm’s-length range results of independent enterprises involved in 
sales and marketing business activities when the second transfer pricing method is 
applied, in this case the second method being the Transactional Net Margin.  
-5.10%
15.98%
11.46%
5.81%4.40%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
Minimum Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile Maximum
 SA Subco at 10.01% 
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Table 7: Arm’s-length range calculations on transactional net margin method  
 
 
 
 
 
With the Transactional Net Margin method the calculation of the arm’s-length range 
is between -5.38% and 13.70%. SA-Subco’s financial result with the Transactional 
Net Margin method, is 9.10%. The calculations of the arm’s-length range using the 
Transactional Net Margin method show that SA-Subco is still within the arm’s-length 
Range. These results still place SA-Subco in a position where it cannot be challenged 
by SARS.   
 
 
The table below shows graphically at what point within the arms’-length range SA-
Subco is at, as compared to the independent enterprises involved in the sales and 
marketing business activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 2007 2006 Average 2008 - 2006
No Comparable 
Companies 
Turnover Operating 
Profit/Loss
Operating 
Margin
Turnover Operating 
Profit/Loss
Operating 
Margin
Turnover Operating 
Profit/Loss
Operating 
Margin
Turnover Operating 
Profit/Loss
Operating 
Margin
1 Company A 57234 2445 4.27% 49968 5623 11.25% 42383 3822 9.02% 49862 3963 8.18%
2 Company B 61373 1927 3.14% 56956 2722 4.78% 49546 3423 6.91% 55958 2691 4.94%
3
Company C 58559 -3308 -5.65% 52456 -2533 -4.83% 47123 -2663 -5.65% 52713 -2835 -5.38%
4 Company D 43674 1996 4.57% 41383 1819 4.40% 37453 2289 6.11% 40837 2035 5.03%
5 Company E 37337 -1431 -3.83% 34893 -1239 -3.55% 30123 -1133 -3.76% 34118 -1268 -3.71%
6 Caompay F 30571 2735 8.95% 29867 2970 9.94% 25343 3018 11.91% 28594 2908 10.27%
7 Company G 66897 5265 7.87% 60236 9113 15.13% 55234 7889 14.28% 60789 7422 12.43%
8 Company H 55260 1497 2.71% 49756 2085 4.19% 43167 2494 5.78% 49394 2025 4.23%
9 Company I 39768 4090 10.28% 34145 4914 14.39% 29765 4889 16.43% 34559 4631 13.70%
10 Company J 32157
-2521 -7.84% 27345 3884 14.20% 25761 2274 8.83% 28421 1212 5.06%
Minimum -7.84% -4.83% -5.65% -5.38%
Lower Quartile -3.83% 4.19% 5.78% 4.23%
Median 3.71% 7.36% 7.87% 5.04%
Upper Quartile 7.87% 14.20% 11.91% 10.27%
Maximum 10.28% 15.13% 16.43% 13.70%
Simple 
Average
Operating Margin 
(2008-2006)
Inter-Quartile 
Range
2008 2007 2006
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Table 8: Arms’-length range graph on transactional net margin method 
 
 
 
 
 
The issue is, what would the argument be if SA-Subco and US-Holdco decide to 
change their transfer pricing policy of Total Cost Mark-Up from 10% to 6%, since 
this initiative will reduce SA-Subco’s taxable income? Could SARS argue that 
because SA-Subco’s Total Costs Mark-Up margins have dropped by 4%, therefore the 
situation is a reflection that SA-Subco is not transacting at arm’s-length price with 
US-Holdco?  
 
 
In defence, SA-Subco could argue that the arm’s-length range calculations on Total 
Cost Mark-Up above still shows that 6% is within the arm’s-length range. SA-Subco 
could further argue that Practice Note 7 states that, ‘the outcome results that fall 
within a properly constructed arm’s-length range can still be regarded as being arm’s-
length. It is only when the prices or margins of the taxpayer are outside the arm’s-
length range that adjustments can be made’ (Practice Note 7, Para. 11.4.7). Practice 
Note 7 further emphasises that, in situations where prices or margins of the taxpayer 
are outside of the arm’s-length, facts and circumstances should be provided by the 
taxpayer to support its position. If it cannot be supported by facts and circumstances, 
Practice Note 7’s view is that an adjustment to the midpoint will be appropriate in 
such cases. (Practice Note 7, Para. 11.4.7).  
-5.38%
13.70%
10.27%
5.04%4.23%
-10.00%
-5.00%
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
Minimum Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile Maximum
 SA Subco at 9.10% 
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Another argument is that Practice Note 7 refers to the arm’s-length price as a range of 
prices and not a single price. The range of prices consists of the lower point and the 
upper point. On the other hand section 31 of the Act makes reference to the arm’s-
length price as a single price. Section 31 of the Act also makes reference to the prices 
less than and greater than the arm’s-length price.  
 
 
The issue is, by referring to the price less than and greater than the arm’s-length price, 
does section 31 of the Act refer to the points outside the arm’s-length range, which is 
the point below the lower point - and the point above the upper point of  the arm’s-
length range? The reason for this argument is that section 31 of the Act is not 
complemented by any meanings and explanations of what the arm’s-length price is.  
 
2.5.1.6 The critical analysis of Practice Note 7 process of determining the arm’s-
length price 
 
 
As section 31 of the Act is not complemented by key words and terminologies on the 
transfer pricing subject. Taxpayers can make use of any other methods which are not 
recommended by Practice Note 7 or the OECD guidelines. Both Practice Note 7 and 
the OECD guidelines agree that the process of determining that a transaction is at 
arm’s-length is not an exact science; meaning that there are different ways in which 
the arm’s-length price can be determined.  
 
 
In situations where taxpayers have made use of any other methods to determine the 
arm’s-length price other than the process in Practice Note 7 and the OECD guidelines, 
the SARS Commissioner cannot reject such processes as section 31 of the Act does 
not prescribe the process on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price. 
Practice Note 7 was designed to be a practical guide and was not intended to be a 
prescriptive or an exhaustive discussion of every transfer pricing issue that may arise 
(Practice Note 7, Para. 3.1).  
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This simply means that Practice Note 7 cannot be binding law to both taxpayers and 
the SARS Commissioner. The South African case law shares the same sentiment that 
Practice Note 7 cannot be regarded as law.  
 
 
In ITC 167514 it was said that SARS Practice Notes cannot override the law. In this 
case the taxpayer claimed the interest as a tax deduction. The taxpayer argued the 
interest deduction based on the Practice Note issued by the Commissioner. The 
Commissioner disallowed the interest deduction based on the Act. The court rejected 
the taxpayer’s argument of the use of the Practice Note. The court claimed that it 
cannot always be assumed that the Commissioner will consider himself bound by his 
own practice notes and that it is not good policy if the practice constitutes a departure 
from the provisions of the Act.  
 
 
In rejecting the taxpayer presenting the Practice Note as argument, the Judge coded 
Viscount Radcliffe in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Frere15when saying that,  
 
 
‘he had never understood the procedure of extra-statutory concessions in the case of a body to 
whom at least the door of Parliament is opened every year for adjustment of the tax code’.  
 
 
The judge further coded Scott L.J. in Absalom v Talbot16 case when he said  
 
‘The fact that such extra-legal concessions have to be made to avoid unjust hardships is 
conclusive that there is something wrong with the legislation.’ 
 
The court rejected the taxpayer’s argument of the Practice Note by saying that the 
place where the deductibility of interest incurred should be regulated in these 
circumstances and should not be in the Practice Note but the Income Tax Act. 
Therefore, in situations where there are disputes between the taxpayer and SARS on 
whether the transaction is at arm’s-length or not, it is only the court of law that can 
rule if the process used by taxpayers is reasonable in determining the arm’s-length 
nature of a transaction.  
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
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The argument is, on what basis would the courts in South Africa rule that a 
transaction is at arm’s-length or not? This argument will be addressed later in this 
chapter when a case law on what constitutes an arm’s-length transaction in South 
Africa is discussed.  
 
 
2.5.2 The South African Tax Treaties on Business Profits and Associated 
Enterprises 
 
 
South Africa has signed tax treaties with a number of countries around the world. The 
South African tax treaties on business profits and associated enterprises require that 
the arm’s-length principle should be applied. These tax treaties have been modelled 
from the OECD Model Treaty. Articles 7 of the OECD Model Treaty deals with the 
taxing of the business profits. Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty deals with the 
taxing of associated enterprises.   
 
 
These two articles read as follows (OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital, 2005: 28,30): 
 
‘Article 7 Business Profits 
 
1. The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that State 
unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State through a 
permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on business as 
aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State but only so 
much of them as is attributable to that permanent establishment. 
 
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, where an enterprise of a Contracting State 
carries on business in the other Contracting State through a permanent establishment 
situated therein, there shall in each Contracting State be attributed to that permanent 
establishment the profits which it might be expected to make if it were a distinct and 
separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar 
conditions and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is a 
permanent establishment. 
 
3. In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be allowed as 
deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the permanent 
establishment, including executive and general administrative expenses so incurred, 
whether in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or elsewhere. 
4. Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to determine the profits to be 
attributed to a permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total 
profits of the enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that 
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment 
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as may be customary; the method of apportionment adopted shall, however, be such 
that the result shall be in accordance with the principles contained in this Article. 
 
5. No profits shall be attributed to a permanent establishment by reason of the mere 
purchase by that permanent establishment of goods or merchandise for the enterprise. 
 
6. For the purposes of the preceding paragraphs, the profits to be attributed to the 
permanent establishment shall be determined by the same method year by year unless 
there is good and sufficient reason to the contrary. 
 
7. Where profits include items of income which are dealt with separately in other 
Articles of this Convention, then the provisions of those Articles shall not be affected 
by the provisions of this Article.’ 
 
 
‘Article 9 Associated Enterprises 
 
1.        Where 
 
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State,or  
 
b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or 
capital of an enterprise of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other 
Contracting State, 
 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their 
commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those 
conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, 
have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly. 
 
2.  Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State - 
and taxes accordingly - profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has 
been charged to tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits which 
would have accrued to the enterprise of the first-mentioned State if the conditions made 
between the two enterprises had been those which would have been made between 
independent enterprises, then that other State shall make an appropriate adjustment to 
the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In determining such adjustment, 
due regard shall be had to the other provisions of this Convention and the competent 
authorities of the Contracting States shall if necessary consult each other.’ 
 
 
The view of Article 7 is that when permanent establishment business profits are taxed, 
a permanent establishment should be treated as a separate legal entity from its head 
office. Article 7(1) establishes the main rule of taxing permanent establishment 
business profits and the exception. And Article 7(2) and (3) states that in order to 
determine the business profits attributable to a permanent establishment, the arm’s-
length principle should be applied (Russo, 2005).  The commentary on Article 7 in the 
OECD Model Treaty also embraces the application of the arm’s-length principle 
when the permanent establishment business profits are attributed.  
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Article 9’s view is that arm’s-length principle should be applied when the associated 
enterprises are taxed. As already mentioned in this chapter, Article 9 contains an 
authorative statement about the arm’s-length principle and that in order to comply 
with the arm’s-length principle the OECD guidelines should be consulted as guidance 
(Russo, 2005).  
 
 
The OECD has also confirmed this, that in order to comply with the arm’s-length 
principle the OECD guidelines should be consulted as guidance by inserting under 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty a new paragraph as a commentary statement in 
the year 1992. The new paragraph establishes that the OECD guidelines should be 
followed as guidance in applying the arm’s-length principle (Russo, 2005).  
 
 
Due to the fact that the South African tax treaties on business profits and associated 
enterprises have been modelled from Article 7 and Articles 9 of the OECD Model 
Treaty and the fact that these articles relies on the OECD guidelines for the 
determination of the arm’s length price. It would appear that the South African tax 
treaties on business profits and associated enterprises would also require taxpayers to 
adopt the OECD guidelines in determining the arm’s length price. 
 
 
The argument often raised in South Africa is whether or not the tax treaties are 
prescriptive on how taxpayers in South Africa should transact at arm’s-length price. 
This argument arises because the South African tax treaties on business profits and 
associated enterprises require that the arm’s-length principle should be applied with 
regard to the taxation of business profits and associated enterprises, and again because 
all the tax treaties in South Africa are deemed to be part of the Act in terms of section 
108 of the Act read in conjunction with the section 231 of the South African 
Constitution. Both these sections read as follows: 
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Section 108 of the Act reads, 
 
 
‘108     Prevention of or relief from, double taxation—(1) The National Executive may enter 
into an agreement with the government of any other country, whereby arrangements are made 
with such government with a view to the prevention, mitigation or discontinuance of the 
levying, under the laws of the Republic and of such other country, of tax in respect of the same 
income, profits or gains, or tax imposed in respect of the same donation, or to the rendering of 
reciprocal assistance in the administration of and the collection of taxes under the said laws of 
the Republic and of such other country.  
 
    (2) As soon as may be after the approval by Parliament of any such agreement, as 
contemplated in section 231 of the Constitution, the arrangements thereby made shall be 
notified by publication in the Gazette and the arrangements so notified shall thereupon have 
effect as if enacted in this Act.  
 
    (3) ......  
 
    (4)......  
 
    (5) The duty imposed by any law to preserve secrecy with regard to such tax shall not 
prevent the disclosure to any authorized officer of the country contemplated in subsection (1), of 
the facts, knowledge of which is necessary to enable it to be determined whether immunity, 
exemption or relief ought to be given or which it is necessary to disclose in order to render or 
receive assistance in accordance with the arrangements notified in terms of subsection (2).’  
 
 
Section 231 of the South African Constitution reads as follows: 
 
‘231.   International agreements.- (1) The negotiating and signing of all international 
agreements is the responsibility of the national executive. 
(2)  An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by 
resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an 
agreement referred to in subsection (3). 
(3)  An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an 
agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, entered into by the national 
executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable 
time. 
(4)  Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into 
law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an agreement that has been 
approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or 
an Act of Parliament. 
(5)  The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the 
Republic when this Constitution took effect.’ 
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The argument that tax treaties in South Africa are part of the Act is also backed by the 
South African tax case law. In ITC 154417, it was decided that,  
 
 
‘The terms of a double taxation agreement on which statutory status has been conferred are to 
be considered as any other statutory provisions to determine the extent to which these conflict 
with the provisions of another statute and whether such provisions have been modified 
thereby.’ 
 
 
In terms of the judgment in ITC 1544, this simply means that the tax treaties in South 
Africa are legally enforceable as part of the Act. As a result of this argument, the fact 
that the South African tax treaties requires that arm’s-length principle as contained in 
the OECD guidelines should be applied on business profits and associated enterprises, 
makes the Act to be prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length 
price.  
 
 
The SARS Commissioner has, however, a different view on this argument. The SARS 
Commissioner’s view is that tax treaties in South Africa cannot impose tax liability. 
The SARS Commissioner is of the view that the tax treaties in South Africa merely 
allocate existing tax liabilities between countries and does not impose tax. 
Furthermore, the SARS Commissioner’s view is that the tax treaties in South Africa 
do not restrict or limit the application of section 31 of the Act, regardless of the 
method selected to determine an arm’s-length price. The SARS Commissioner’s view 
is that no inconsistency exists between domestic law and the tax treaties, as both 
embody the arm’s-length principle.  
 
 
The argument however is that, the domestic law being section 31 of the Act in this 
case does not have regulations on how one should apply the arm’s length principle 
meanwhile the tax treaties relies on the OECD guidelines in applying the arm’s length 
principle. So inconsistency does exist between the domestic law and the tax treaties.  
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2.5.3 The IT14 Return 
 
 
The IT14 return of companies requires that transfer pricing transactions subject to 
section 31 of the Act be disclosed. Since 2006 tax year IT14 return probes fairly 
thoroughly, asking the following questions: 
 
 
a) Did the company enter into any cross-border transactions in terms of an 
international agreement as defined in section 31? 
 
 
b) Did the company receive any financial assistance from a non-resident 
connected person or from an investor as defined in section 31(3) and Practice 
Note 2 issued by the SARS Commissioner? 
 
 
c) If “yes”, were the provisions of section 31(3) and Practice Note 2 adhered to? 
 
 
d) Does the company have a transfer pricing policy document in support of the 
transfer pricing policy as applied in relation to transactions as defined in 
section 31? 
 
 
e) Does the company pay or charge management fees, licences royalties, interest 
or annuities to connected persons in terms of an international agreement as 
defined in section 31? 
 
 
f) Has the company provided goods, services or anything of value to a non-
resident connected person for no consideration? (Please note that “goods and 
services” includes a loan). 
 
 
g) Have any transactions with non-resident connected persons in terms of an 
international agreement, as defined in section 31 been the subject of an 
advanced pricing agreement in another jurisdiction? 
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If the answer to any of these questions is yes, the taxpayer must prepare schedules and 
attach them to the IT14 return. For transfer pricing purposes these schedules must 
detail all transfer pricing transactions entered into with connected persons and the 
transactions must also comply with the arm’s-length requirements in section 31 of the 
Act.  
 
 
A brochure sent together with the IT14 return to taxpayers recommends that where 
the taxpayer has answered yes to the above questions, the following information 
should be attached to the IT14 return (Brochure to the IT14 return): 
 
 
a) copy of the agreement entered into  
 
 
b) copy of the transfer pricing policy document  
 
 
c) schedule giving proof that the provisions of section 31(3) (thin capitalisation) 
have been complied with.  
 
 
Although it is required that the above information should be submitted with the IT14 
return when taxpayers have entered into transfer pricing transactions in terms of 
section 31 of the Act, the argument still remains that the IT14 return and the brochure 
to the IT14 return does not prescribe how taxpayers in South Africa should transact at 
arm’s-length price.  
 
 
The other argument is whether or not in terms of section 69 of the Act which regulates 
the furnishing of the tax returns, the IT14 return would be regarded prescriptive on 
how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price if this return provided an 
explanation on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length with regard to affected 
transfer pricing transactions.  
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In a situation where the IT14 return provided an explanation on how taxpayers should 
transact at arm’s-length price, this situation would automatically make the Act in 
terms of section 69(1)(b) and (f) and section 69(2)(b) read in conjunction with the 
IT14 return to be prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price. 
The basis of this argument is that, any information requested by the SARS 
Commissioner from a taxpayer through the IT14 return, is legally enforceable in 
terms of the above mentioned sections of the Act.   
 
 
Section 69(1)(b) and (f) and section 69(2)(b) read as follows: 
 
‘69.  Duty to furnish information or returns. (1)  Every person shall, if required by the 
Commissioner, furnish to him, in such form and within such time as may be prescribed or as 
the Commissioner may direct, returns showing  - 
 (b) all amounts received by or accrued to or in favour of any person in respect of 
any share or interest in any business carried by the person furnishing the 
return 
 (f) all such other information in his possession with regard to the income 
received by or accrued to or in favour of himself or of any other person as 
may be required by the Commissioner. 
(2)  In addition to the returns specified in subsection (1), every person shall, if required 
by the Commissioner - 
 (b) supply such information and furnish such returns or such further or other 
returns as the Commissioner may require.’ 
 
 
Even though the IT14 return request extensive information on transactions effecting 
transfer pricing, the IT14 return do not provide taxpayers in South Africa with a 
solution on how they should transact at arm’s-length price as section 31 of the Act 
requires.   
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2.6 TAX CASE LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA ON WHAT CONSTITUTES ARM’S-
LENGTH TRANSACTION 
 
 
There is currently no tax case law in South Africa on the transfer pricing subject. The 
reason seems to be that the transfer pricing cases challenged by taxpayers have been 
resolved through negotiated settlements. The other reason might be the absence of 
prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation in providing guidance on how to transact at 
arm’s-length. As a result both SARS and taxpayers have been reluctant to pursue 
judicial determinations in respect of transfer pricing disputes. 
 
 
Even though there is no tax case law in South Africa dealing specifically with transfer 
pricing disputes, it is necessary to analyse the available tax case law in South Africa 
which deals with what constitute an arm’s-length transaction. The reason for this is 
that should it happen that there be a transfer pricing case brought to court in South 
Africa, the court is likely to refer to the previous court judgment in deciding whether 
or not the transaction is at arm’s-length.  
 
 
There have been a number of tax case laws in South Africa which dealt with what 
constitutes an arm’s-length transaction. The basis on which the majority of these cases 
were decided is derived from the general anti-avoidance tax legislation which is 
section 103 of the Act. In analysing whether or not a transaction is at arm’s-length, 
the courts in South Africa have followed the abnormality test principle.  
 
 
The courts developed a hypothesis test in analysing and reaching decisions on these 
cases. A hypothesis test is in the form of a question asking ‘whether or not abnormal 
rights and obligations have arisen in the transaction between the related parties which 
would not have arisen if the parties in the transactions were not related’. In applying 
this principle test the courts have analysed the following factors: 
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a) The special relationship of parties involved in a transaction.  
 
 
The courts would look at whether or not any special relationship of related parties 
involved in a transaction, have created abnormal rights and obligations for either of 
the parties. Would the transaction have been entered into if parties were not related?  
 
 
b) The circumstances under which the transaction was entered. 
 
 
The courts would further look at what the independent party would do under similar 
circumstances. Would a comparable independent enterprise have concluded the 
transaction to enhance its economic or commercial position? Is it a normal practice 
within the industry which the related parties operate?  
 
 
c) The unusual features in the transactions. 
 
 
The courts would look at whether or not any unusual features exist in the transaction 
undertaken by related parties. 
 
 
d) The pricing or the value of the transaction. 
 
 
The courts would look at whether the amount charged in a transaction reflects a fair 
market value as compared to the benefit derived from transaction. How much would a 
comparable independent party pay for the same goods or services in a comparable 
situation? 
 
 
2.6.1 Case Law Analysis  
 
 
The analysis of the following tax case law shows how the courts in South Africa have 
addressed the above factors in deciding whether or not a transaction is at arm’s-
length. 
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In ITC 154618, the taxpayer who was executing a business as a close corporation, 
claimed a wear and tear deduction on the market value of the assets and not on the 
costs of the assets at the time of liquidation when the taxpayer acquired the assets. 
The cost of the assets at the time of liquidation was less than the market value at the 
time of liquidation.   
 
 
The Commissioner denied the taxpayer the tax deduction on the assets, on the basis 
that the true market value on which the deduction should have been made was the 
liquidation value on which the taxpayer had acquired the assets. 
 
 
The taxpayer contended that the value of the assets during the time of liquidation 
when he acquired the assets, was not the true arm’s-length price of the assets but the 
arm’s-length was the book value during the time the assets were acquired. The 
reasons provided by the taxpayer for the argument, was that the circumstances under 
which the assets were acquired were not one of a willing buyer and willing seller. The 
circumstances were of forced seller and privileged buyer.  
 
 
In making the judgment on this case the court analysed the circumstances under 
which the transaction was entered and ruled that the sale of assets by the liquidator to 
the taxpayer was at arm’s-length, based on the fact that the transaction was a cash sale 
and had taken place at a market place where everyone, including the taxpayer, had a  
free choice to purchase the assets.  
 
 
In ITC 61019, a company claimed a tax deduction on directors’ fees. The director’s 
fees were considered excessive as it was more than double as compared to the 
previous year’s amounts. In this case the court dealt with two issues when making a 
decision with regard to the directors’ fees; the special relationship between the 
directors and the company and the considerations of the directors’ fees. The court 
made the statement that,  
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‘it is hardly conceivable that such a tremendous increase would have been awarded by an 
independent employer or company’. 
 
 
The court further said that,  
 
 
‘these figures were too remarkable not to evoke criticism’.  
 
 
The court considered the award of the directors’ fees in relation to the profits and 
turnover of the company and ruled that the directors’ fees awarded by the company to 
its directors were excessive and unjustifiable. Based on these facts of the transaction, 
the court considered the transaction not to be at arm’s-length. 
 
 
In Smith v Commissioner for Inland Revenue20, the taxpayer, a sole shareholder of the 
company in South Africa, formed another company in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and 
transferred the shares he owned in the South African company to the company in 
Rhodesia. The company in Rhodesian became the sole shareholder of the company in 
South Africa. During the year of assessment the South African company declared a 
dividend to its sole shareholder, the Rhodesian company.   
 
 
The Commissioner disregarded the transfer of shares by the taxpayer to the Rhodesian 
company to be at arm’s-length transaction and deemed the taxpayer still to be the 
shareholder of the South African company;  taxing the dividend declared by the South 
African company in the hands of the taxpayer.  
 
 
In deciding on the arm’s-length nature of the transaction of the transfer of shares from 
the South African company to the taxpayers’ company in Rhodesia, the court 
considered the special relationship of parties involved in the transaction. The facts 
that the shares were transferred from the company in South Africa of which the 
taxpayer was the sole shareholder, to the company in Rhodesia of which the taxpayer 
was still the shareholder, the court viewed the transaction not to be at arm’s-length.  
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The court further considered the fact that the shares were transferred without any 
considerations, and under normal business circumstances shares would be disposed at 
a given price. Having considered these facts, the court considered this transaction not 
an arm’s-length transaction.  
 
 
In Ovenstone v SIR21, the taxpayer being the appellant in this case, sold his shares in 
the private company to the trust which he formed for his children who were also the 
beneficiaries of the trust. The purchase price for the sale of shares was to be paid by 
the loan provided by the taxpayer to the trust. The interest rate charged by the 
taxpayer to the trust for the loan, was the same interest rate that the taxpayer was 
charged by the bank from where he had borrowed the money.   
 
 
The commissioner was not pleased with either of the two transactions; the sale of 
shares to the trust and the loan provided by the taxpayer to the trust for the purchase 
of shares. The court analysed both transactions and came to the conclusion that they 
did not reflect arm’s-length requirements. In relation to the sale of shares to the trust, 
the court stated, 
 
 
‘The creation of the rights and obligations was in itself an abnormal manner of doing business. 
People do not normally or usually do business in this manner. Moreover, a transaction of this 
magnitude, and on the terms agreed, would normally be recorded in writing, which was not 
done in this case’. 
 
 
In relation to the loan made by the taxpayer to the trust the court came to the 
conclusion that the transaction lacked commercial, business or arm’s-length 
characteristics. In analysing the transaction the court said the following: 
 
 
‘it was not a wholly business, commercial, or at arm’s-length transaction without any element 
of bounty. Indeed, a strong element of bounty was present. That appellant was actuated by 
liberality, generosity, and filial affection in making the loans is indicated by his making 
available to his sons gratuitously the privilege (which he conceded had ‘some value’) of 
taking up some of the Buitesee shares that had been privately placed with him. He asked for 
no security for the loans. The terms of repayment of the loans and interest were also vague: 
that was to be done out of the dividends received, but nothing was apparently stipulated about 
by when they had to be repaid or what was to happen if the dividends were insufficient or 
ceased. The reason for the vagueness about the terms of the loans was probably because the 
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appellant, as he indeed admitted, regarded them as ‘a family transaction’. That all indicates 
that the rate of interest appellant charged his children for loans of that kind was probably, or at 
least possibly, unduly favourable. No evidence was adduced for appellant to prove that it was 
the ordinary, full or fair rate for loans of that kind prevailing at that time. That it was the same 
rate that the bank charged appellant does not go far enough to discharge that onus. For, having 
regard to appellant’s business standing, wealth, and relationship with his bank, that rate might 
well have been a special, low rate of interest. In the absence of evidence on these important 
aspects the only conclusion is that appellant did not prove that these loans to his minor 
children were wholly commercial or business transactions without an appreciable element of 
bounty. They must therefore be regarded as being dispositions that were partly gratuitous and 
partly for consideration.’  
 
 
This case shows that the analysis made by the court on both transactions in deciding 
on the arm’s-length nature of the transactions, focused the attention on the 
relationship of the parties to the transaction, the behaviour of the parties in the 
transaction and the presence of any unusual features in the transaction. Based on the 
analysis of these factors the court was satisfied that the two transactions did not reflect 
any arm’s-length nature. This kind of conclusion by the court is, however, not always 
easy to reach, as can be seen in the following case: 
 
 
In SIR v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert22, the facts of the case were that Geustyn, 
Forsyth and Joubert were partners practicing as consulting engineers and converted 
their partnership into an unlimited company. The three former partners now became 
shareholders and sole directors. At transfer of the partnership business to the 
company, the goodwill of the partnership business was valued at R240 000 and the 
amount was transferred in equal parts to the loan accounts of the former partners. 
Interest was levied on the outstanding balances each year. In addition, each director 
received a salary of R10 000 per annum and further received fees in the sum of R7 
500. 
 
 
The Commissioner, however, was of the opinion that the formation of the company 
amounted to a scheme which had been entered into with the object of reducing the 
liability to pay tax and that the means by which, and the manner in which the 
transaction had been entered, would not have been entered by parties transacting at 
arm’s-length. The court differed with the Commissioner’s opinion based on the 
following analyses: 
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a) The court said there is nothing abnormal in converting an existing partnership into 
a company; indeed such transactions may fairly be regarded as relatively 
commonplace in the commercial world. 
 
 
b) That professional men continuing their profession in partnership, should transfer 
their practice to an unlimited company may at first sight appear to be somewhat 
extraordinary, but the undisputed facts of the case placed a different perspective 
on the matter. The South African Association of Consulting Engineers expressly 
sanctioned its members forming unlimited companies to practice in corporate 
form, and more than half of the Association’s members had already formed 
companies. More than half of the consulting engineers who were not members of 
the Association were also registered companies. Nor was this peculiar to the 
Republic, for the majority of consulting engineers in England, Canada, France, 
Switzerland and Japan practice in corporate form. 
 
 
c) The stated case showed that the partners regarded the advantages to be derived 
from incorporation as considerable. Such advantages inter alia embraced the fact 
that a company, unlike a partnership, is not dissolved upon the death or retirement 
of a member, the facility of participation in consortiums of engineers engaged in 
large projects; the ability to increase the participation in profits by qualified 
employees while, at the same time, eliminating the necessity to restrict the number 
of partners to the legal limit of 20. In the latter connection it was also mentioned 
that the three original shareholders sold 1500 shares to six new shareholders who 
were all qualified employees of the company. The admission of more employees 
as shareholders was contemplated, and it was anticipated that the total number of 
shareholders would in the foreseeable future rise to 15. 
 
 
In making a decision whether or not the transaction reflected the arm’s-length nature, 
the court encountered greater difficulty. The court said that, 
 
 
‘the criterion of ‘persons dealing at arm’s-length is not easy of application in a case such as 
this one. For the section under which the criterion is applied, enjoins the application of that 
criterion in relation to a transaction, operation or scheme’ of the nature of transaction, 
operation or scheme in question’.  
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The court was also concerned with partners who have, in the circumstances as 
outlined above, made over their practice, not to an independent third party with whom 
they would ordinarily deal at arm’s-length, but to an unlimited company of which 
they are the sole shareholders and directors and whereof they have full and complete 
control.  
 
 
It is evident in this case that the application of the arm’s-length principle is not an 
exact science as it is mentioned by Practice Note 7 and the OECD guidelines (Practice 
Note 7, Para. 7.6). The analysis of facts by the court shows that the court was satisfied 
that the dissolving of the partnership and the formation of the company was an arm’s-
length transaction as this decision made business sense.    
 
 
On one hand the court found it difficult to apply the arm’s-length principle with 
regard to the transfer of goodwill transaction that took place between the partnership 
and the company when the partnership was dissolved. The court was not satisfied that 
this transaction reflected an arm’s-length nature based on the relationship between the 
company and the partnership.  
 
 
In CIR v Louw23, the facts were the same as in Geustyn’s case. The partners dissolved 
the partnership and formed the company and then sold the partnership business with 
all the assets to the newly formed company. After the incorporation of the company, 
interest-free loans were made by the company to the directors who were the 
shareholders of the same company.    
 
 
The Commissioner was of the opinion that the formation of the company amounted to 
a scheme which had been entered into with the object of reducing the liability to pay 
tax and that the means by which and the manner in which the transactions had been 
entered, would not have been entered by parties transacting at arm’s-length.  
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In dealing with the transaction of the dissolving of the partnership and the 
incorporation of the company the court said,  
 
 
‘the incorporation of a professional practice is ‘. . . the action of a normal businessman . . . ’ 
 
 
In passing this judgment the court applied the principle which was applied in 
Geustyn’s case. The court considered whether in applying the ‘normality’ yardstick, it 
should take account of the special relationship between the partners and the company 
which they had formed, or ignore it and apply the yardstick as though the company 
were a stranger? It was decided by the court that it was not possible to make the 
analysis of the transaction but ignore the special relationship between the partners and 
the company, and yet give proper judgment.  
 
 
In reaching the judgment with regard to this transaction the court said, 
 
 
‘it must be borne in mind that in a case such as the present one, the transaction is a 
multipartite one to which all the partners and the company are parties; and each partner 
contracts both with the company and his fellow partners and seeks to extract from the 
transaction the best possible advantage for himself.’ 
 
 
Giving due regard to the facts above, the court ruled that the dissolving of the 
partnership and the incorporation of the new company was an arm’s-length 
transaction. With regard to whether the transactions of interest-free loans to the 
directors have created rights or obligations which would not normally be created 
between persons dealing at arm’s-length, the court said,  
 
 
‘There is no evidence, further, to show that the conduct of a Director in accepting a small 
salary, to be determined each year, to assist in building up the capital of the company, is an 
abnormal action and one that would not occur normally in a private company in which the 
shareholders were attempting to build up capital to enable the company to compete with large 
public companies alternatively to provide for the contingency of a period in which work was 
slack. There is no evidence that the salary which the appellant earned was small in relation to 
salaries earned by other construction or civil engineers – the evidence relates to his previous 
earnings as a partner of the firm. Assuming that there was evidence that the salary was small, 
there is no evidence that this is an unusual action on the part of a shareholder or a Director in a 
company, as the present, seeking to build up reserves.’ 
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Having regard to these facts the court ruled that the transaction of the directors’ loans, 
seen in the context of the amounts allocated to directors by way of salary and 
dividend, the court was of the opinion that the transaction did not reflect the arm’s-
length nature.  
 
 
The analysis in both the Geustyn and Louw cases confirms that in making a decision 
whether or not the transaction is at arm’s-length, the court would look at how the 
relationship of the parties has influenced the transaction. The court also looks at the 
behaviour of the parties in the transaction, the presence of any unusual features in the 
transaction and what the practice is within industry or the market in which the parties 
conduct their business.  
 
 
The analogy of these factors in determining what constitutes an arm’s-length 
transaction, can also be illustrated again in the following cases: 
 
 
In Hickling v SIR24 case, the taxpayer and two others were the sole shareholders and 
directors of a dormant private company. The dormant company was sold to a 
company, Ryan Nigel, whose main business activity was to buy dormant companies. 
With the purchase price money received by Ryan Nigel, the dormant company 
declared dividends to its shareholders.  
 
 
The Commissioner was of the view that the transaction that took place between Ryan 
Nigel and the dormant company was a scheme which had been entered into with the 
objective of avoiding tax, and that the means by which the transactions had been 
entered would not have been entered by parties transacting at arm’s-length.  
 
 
In deciding whether or not the transaction in this case was at arm’s-length, the court 
first outlined the factors that should be present in an arm’s-length transaction and 
thereafter analysed the facts of the transaction in this case. In outlining factors that are 
found in an arms’ length transactions, the court said that each party should be 
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independent of the other and, in so dealing, each party will strive to get the utmost 
possible advantage from the transaction. 
 
 
In an at arm’s-length transaction the rights and obligations created are more likely to 
be regarded as normal than abnormal. The means or manner employed in entering into 
it or carrying it out are also more likely to be normal than abnormal. The next 
observation made by the court in outlining the factors in an arm’s-length transaction 
was that, when considering the normality of the rights or obligations so created or of 
the means or manner so employed, due regard should be paid to the circumstances 
present.  
 
 
The court further mentioned that in some circumstances, what may be normal might 
however not be normal in other circumstances. The last observation made by the court 
was that facts in the transaction are also important when assessing whether or not the 
transaction reflects the arm’s-length nature.  
 
 
Based on the following facts of the transaction, the court ruled that the transaction 
was at arm’s-length. 
 
 
a) The court was satisfied that neither Reklame nor shareholders of the dormant 
company, as directors or otherwise, were associated with or interested in Ryan 
Nigel. Nor did the latter hold any sway over them.  
 
 
b) The court also found that it was Ryan Nigel who drew up the agreement and 
tendered it to them as an offer to purchase their shares on an accept-it-or-reject-it 
basis. To the shareholders the advent of Ryan Nigel with its offer was the deus ex 
machina for solving their problem of having to keep their ‘untidy’, dormant 
company in existence.  
 
 
c) The court was also satisfied that the transaction was done during Ryan Nigel’s 
normal course of business as it was part of Ryan Nigel’s business to purchase the 
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shares of companies with capital and distributable reserves. This offer was indeed 
made in the ordinary course of that business. 
 
 
d) Furthermore, the court learnt that the agreement between the parties obliged the 
shareholders to divest themselves of their shares and control of their dormant 
company. Against that Ryan Nigel had to pay them the purchase price. The court 
was therefore satisfied that the reciprocal obligations were, of course, normal 
incidents of such a contract of sale.  
 
 
All of the above facts satisfied the court that both parties dealt with each other at 
arm’s-length. In analysing the facts in this case and making a decision, the court also 
relied on the decision reached in the following case: 
 
 
In ITC 163625, the taxpayer entered into transactions of sale and lease-back of assets 
with his bank. The transactions resulted in a tax benefit for both taxpayer and bank. 
The tax benefit for the taxpayer was that he disposed of the assets that were regarded 
as capital in nature, therefore he could not pay tax on them and when he leased them 
back from the bank he could claim the rental payments as a tax deduction. The tax 
benefit for the bank was that they could claim a tax deduction on the tax allowances 
provided on the assets purchased from the taxpayer. 
 
 
The commissioner was of the opinion that the transactions between the taxpayer and 
the bank was a scheme which had been entered into with the objective of avoiding tax 
and that the means by which the transactions had been entered into, would not have 
been entered into by parties transacting at arm’s-length. 
 
 
In deciding whether or not the transactions in this case were at arm’s-length, the court 
reached the decision that both the sale and lease of the assets transactions were 
concluded at arm’s-length. The court based their decisions on the following facts: 
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a) Both parties were independent enterprises with no special relationship. The Court 
was satisfied that because there was no special relationship between the parties, 
the terms of the agreement of the transaction could not have been influenced by 
the parties’ special relationship.  
 
 
b) The analysis of the terms of the agreements in the transactions showed that both 
parties were concerned businesses striving to secure the utmost possible advantage 
from the transactions. The court was satisfied with the clauses put by the bank in 
the agreement with regard to the rights and obligations in the transactions.  
 
 
c) Circumstances under which both parties had entered into these transactions were 
common and usual as far as these kinds of transactions are concerned. This was 
based among other things on the fact that the taxpayer, being the party which was 
borrowing the money, had a solid credit rating and therefore the bank would be 
willing to enter into such kinds of transactions.  
 
 
The analysis above establishes that when deciding what constitutes an arm’s-length 
transaction, the courts in South Africa have followed the hypothesis statement 
‘whether or not abnormal rights and obligations have arisen in the transaction between 
the related parties which would not have arisen if the parties in the transactions were 
not related’.  
 
This hypothesis statement followed by the South African tax case law is similar to the 
arm’s-length hypothesis statement in Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty. The 
arm’s-length principle under Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty requires that in 
establishing whether or not a transaction is at arm’s-length, an analysis should be 
made whether or not the conditions of connected person transactions are comparable 
to the conditions of transactions carried out between independent enterprises. In 
establishing that, Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty requires that the OECD 
guidelines should be applied which contain the transfer pricing methods of calculating 
the arm’s-length price or margin realised by independent enterprises.  
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The tax case law in South Africa does however not provide any methods of 
calculating the arm’s-length price, other than providing the legal evaluation to prove 
that a transaction is not at arm’s-length. The difference between the two approaches is 
that the South African tax case law relies on a legal test exercise in determining 
whether or not the transaction is at arm’s-length. In terms of the legal test approach 
the taxpayer can perform a self-examination of a transaction entered into with a 
related party without a reference or use of any comparables in proving that such a 
transaction is at arm’s-length.  
 
 
Meanwhile, the process in the Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty of determining 
whether or not a particular transaction is at arm’s-length, relies on the economic test 
exercise. The economic test exercise is achieved by following the process in Practice 
Note 7 or the OECD guidelines. As it was discussed in this chapter, determining 
arm’s-length price through the economic test exercise is achieved through the analysis 
referring to the comparable situation or of the industry or market prices.  
 
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter that Practice Note 7 is not legally binding to 
taxpayers and this allows taxpayers in South Africa to make use of any other methods 
or processes to substantiate that their transactions are at arm’s-length. The argument is 
therefore that, if a taxpayer decides not to apply the economic test exercise but 
decides to apply the legal test exercise to substantiate that a particular transaction with 
the offshore connected person is at arm’s-length; can the courts or SARS reject 
taxpayers’ approach and require that taxpayers should conduct the economic test 
exercise in Practice Note 7 to substantiate that the transaction is at arm’s-length?  
 
 
In this situation the decision will be taken by the courts in deciding whether or not the 
legal test exercise is the correct approach to substantiate that a transaction is at arm’s-
length as opposed to the economic test exercise in the OECD guidelines and Practice 
Note 7. The tax case law analysis in this section has established that in certain 
instances the courts considered the economic test exercise in deciding whether or not 
a transaction was an arm’s-length transaction.  
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Such cases are Ovenstone and Geustyn. In Ovenstone, the court rejected the interest 
rate charged by the taxpayer to his children on the basis that it was not the market 
interest rate charged by the banks in the market. In Geustyn, the taxpayer proved to 
the court that the change of partnership to a company was a normal practice within the 
engineering companies in the country and the court accepted this evidence.  
 
 
This shows that to a certain extent the courts in South Africa can accept it if taxpayers 
have applied economic test exercise in Practice Note 7 and the OECD guidelines in 
substantiating that their transactions are at arm’s-length. But to a certain extent the 
court may also reject the use of Practice Note 7 and the OECD guidelines by 
taxpayers in substantiating that their transactions are at arm’s-length, as it has been 
established previously in this chapter in ITC 1675 the courts disregarded the use of the 
Practice Notes as a law in South Africa.   
 
 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to address the first sub-problem of this research study 
which is determining how taxpayers in South Africa are required to transact at arm’s-
length prices in the absence of prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation. In 
addressing the research question further, the next chapter discusses the current status 
of Practice Note 7 and compares it to the OECD guidelines in determining whether, as 
a result of being consistent or not consistent with the OECD guidelines, Practice Note 
7 can be included as provision on how to transact at arm’s-length price in the South 
Africa transfer pricing tax legislation in order to amend the legislation such that it 
becomes prescriptive. 
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CHAPTER 3: PRACTICE NOTE 7 AND THE OECD GUIDELINES 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the second sub-problem of the research 
study. To this end this chapter analyses the background and history of the OECD 
guidelines, the updates and developments in the OECD guidelines, and the structure 
and the contents of the OECD guidelines. The chapter further provides an analysis of 
the background and history of Practice Note 7 and then provides an analysis of the 
extent that Practice Note 7 concurs with the OECD guidelines.  
 
 
3.2 THE OECD GUIDELINES 
 
 
3.2.1 Background and History of the OECD Guidelines 
 
 
The OECD was formed in the year 1961 as an organisation of countries sharing a 
commitment to democratic government and market economy. The predecessor of the 
OECD is the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which was 
established to regulate the American and Canadian aid under the Marshall plan for 
rebuilding of Europe after the Second World War. The OECD was formed with the 
aim of building strong economies in member countries; improving efficiency, market 
systems, expanding free trade and contributing to the development in industrialised as 
well as developing countries (Cernic, 2008:77). 
 
 
The OECD consists of more than 30 country members and is organised in committees 
of member country representatives. In addition to the country members there are also 
countries which are not members but observers, and South Africa is one of the 
observers. One of the objectives of the OECD has been to strive to build an 
international consensus on principles of international taxation. The committee at the 
OECD responsible for tax policies is called Committee on Fiscal Affairs and is 
governed by a council of member representatives (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 
2001:7). 
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The spread of multinational enterprises in the 1960s resulted in an increasing volume 
of trade between members of the same multinational enterprises and raised concerns 
for the tax authorities with regard to the protection of their tax base. As a result tax 
authorities began to review and institute certain developments on their tax legislation 
and administrative regulations in order to minimise possible tax avoidance 
opportunities that arose from the manipulation of transfer prices. Hence the reason the 
OECD was formed (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:7).  
 
 
The developments explained above were followed by tightening of tax legislation and 
administrative regulations and became concerns also for the multinational enterprises 
because of the possibility of double taxation arising from international, inconsistent 
tax rules. These developments led to the OECD developing the OECD guidelines to 
help both the multinational enterprises and the OECD country members on how to 
address transfer pricing practices. The purpose of introducing the OECD guidelines 
was to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income attributable to transactions carried 
out with related parties as if the transactions were carried out with independent 
companies under normal market conditions. In other words, to ensure that transactions 
between related parties adhere to the arm’s-length principle (Deloitte & Touch 
Tohmatsu, 2001:7).  
 
 
Although the OECD guidelines are an agreed consensus among the OECD member 
countries, they were not developed with the intention of being binding law or 
supersede the OECD member countries’ national rules. The OECD recommends that 
local transfer pricing laws should be formed with regard to the spirit of the OECD 
guidelines. To date the OECD guidelines constitute the international standard that 
OECD member countries have agreed should be used in analyzing transfer pricing 
issues between multinational enterprises and tax authorities (Deloitte & Touch 
Tohmatsu, 2001:7).  
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3.3 THE UPDATES AND DEVELOPMENTS OF THE OECD GUIDELINES 
 
 
The OECD issued the first transfer pricing report in the year 1979, namely Transfer 
Pricing and Multinational Enterprises (hereinafter called the 1979 report). The 
purpose of the report was to provide guidance on how multinational enterprises 
determine the arm’s-length price with regard to transfer pricing transactions. The 
1979 report addressed the following issues (United Nations, 2001: 8):  
 
 
a) The arm’s-length principle as an appropriate approach to adopt in arriving at 
profits of related entities for tax purposes. 
 
 
b) The consideration that the transfer pricing problems should not be confused with 
the consideration of problems of tax fraud or tax avoidance, even though transfer 
pricing policies may be used for such purposes. 
 
 
c) The protection of the interests of the national tax authorities involved and to 
prevent double taxation of the enterprises involved.    
 
 
d) The ideal transfer pricing methods, the comparable uncontrolled price; and if no 
useful evidence is available, cost plus or resale methods should be acceptable 
from an arm’s-length point of view. 
 
 
e) That other methods are not excluded, but with respect to these other methods the 
report is vague and negative; profit-split method is necessarily arbitrary; profit 
comparison is only an indication for further investigation; the return on capital 
invested presents difficulties; net yield expectations are imprecise. That such 
methods may be used as a double-check (profit comparison) or as a solution in 
bilateral negotiations among countries (profit-split). 
 
 
f) Global methods and formulary methods for allocating profits to affiliates are not 
endorsed, as they are incompatible with Articles 7 and 9 of the OECD Treaty 
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Model; they are arbitrary, disregard market conditions, ignore the management’s 
own allocation of resources, do not bear a sound relationship to the economic 
facts, and carry the risk of double taxation. 
 
 
g) That it is always useful to begin with a functional analysis (actual functions, 
responsibilities, risks). 
 
 
h) The recognition of the actual transaction, not to substitute another transaction for 
it; (if required) the price for the actual transaction should be adjusted to an arm’s-
length price. 
 
 
i) That the transfer pricing policies of multinational enterprises may in fact be 
market-oriented and, where the different entities within such groups have their 
own profit responsibility, they may be free to contract either with an associated 
enterprise or with a third party with the result that there is a degree of bargaining 
within the group which produces a price effectively indistinguishable from the 
arm’s-length price. 
 
 
The 1979 report further discusses in some detail the transfer pricing treatment of the 
transactions such as goods (Chapter 2), technology and trademarks (Chapter 3), 
services (Chapter 4) and loans (Chapter 5) (United Nations, 2001:9). 
 
 
The 1979 report was followed by the report in the year 1984 (hereinafter called the 
1984 report) which addressed three specific topics; the mutual agreements, transfer 
pricing in the banking sector, and the allocation of central costs. The 1984 report is 
referred to as Transfer Pricing for Multinational Enterprises - Three Taxation Issues 
and it was issued as an elaboration of the 1979 report (United Nations, 2001:8).  
 
 
In the year 1995, the OECD revised the 1979 report and replaced it with the document 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax authorities. This 
document also known as the OECD guidelines contained five chapters when it was 
first issued (United Nations, 2001:9; Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:7). 
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Chapter I of the OECD guidelines contained the arm’s-length principle and addressed 
its status as the international standard and includes guidelines for its application. 
Chapter II contained the traditional transaction methods, explains the application of 
the comparable uncontrolled price method, the resale price method and the cost plus 
method. Chapter III contained the other methods, the traditional transactional 
methods, namely the profit split method and the transactional net margin methods 
(Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:8).  
 
 
Chapter IV contained the administrative approaches in dealing with resolving transfer 
pricing disputes, details penalties, corresponding adjustments, procedures to avoid 
double taxation, simultaneous examinations, safe harbours, advance pricing 
agreements and arbitration. Chapter V contained transfer pricing documentation 
guidelines and established the type of information that taxpayers should maintain 
when setting transfer prices (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:8).  
 
 
The last part of the OECD guidelines was the Annex which contained guidance on the 
advance pricing arrangements, and the Glossary defines important transfer pricing 
terms. Since then, the OECD guidelines were updated several times and three other 
chapters and an annexure have been added to the document. The following is the 
analysis of these updates and changes.  
 
 
3.3.1 The Chapter on Intangible Property 
 
 
In April, the year 1996 the OECD added Chapter VI in the OECD guidelines as an 
additional chapter. Chapter VI deals with the special considerations on how the arm’s-
length principle should be applied to intangible property transactions within the 
multinational enterprises. Chapter VIII also sets out the important facts and 
circumstances that should be taken into consideration for transfers of intangible 
property within the multinational enterprise (United Nations, 2001:19; Deloitte & 
Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:7). A brief analysis of the contents of Chapter VI is provided 
in the next section.  
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3.3.2 The Chapter on Intra-Group Service  
 
 
In the same year in which Chapter VI was added, Chapter VII was also added to the 
OECD guidelines. Chapter VII deals with the special considerations on how the 
arm’s-length principle should be applied to intra-group services transactions. The 
chapter defines the characteristics of different types of intra-group services (United 
Nations, 2001:19; Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:7). A brief analysis of the 
contents of Chapter VII is conducted in the next section.  
 
 
3.3.3 The Chapter on Cost Contribution Arrangements  
 
 
In the year 1997, the OECD added Chapter VIII in the OECD guidelines addressing 
the transfer pricing treatment of the cost contribution arrangements. Chapter VIII 
addresses how the arm’s-length principle should be applied under the cost 
contribution arrangements within the multinational enterprises. The chapter also 
provides guidance on determining the participants of the cost contribution 
arrangements, how their respective contributions should be valued, and whether the 
allocation of contributions is appropriate in light of the expected benefits to be 
received. The tax treatment of contributions and other payments made under the cost 
contribution arrangements is also discussed (United Nations, 2001:19; Deloitte & 
Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:7). A brief analysis of the contents of Chapter VIII is 
conducted in the next section.  
 
 
3.3.4 Annex on Advance Pricing Agreements and Mutual Agreements Procedure 
 
 
In February 1998, the Annex was added to the OECD guidelines. It contained 
practical examples and procedures for monitoring the implementation of the 
guidelines. In October 1999, another Annex was added to the OECD guidelines which 
covered the guidelines for conducting advance pricing arrangements under the mutual 
agreement procedure (United Nations, 2001:19; Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:7). 
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3.3.5 Attribution of Profit to a Permanent Establishment 
 
 
As discussed in chapter 2 of this research study, permanent establishment business 
activities exist when a multinational enterprise is conducting a business in another 
jurisdiction in place of management; a branch, an office, a factory, a workshop, a 
mine, an oil or gas well, a quarry or any other place of extraction of natural resources.  
 
 
The OECD has issued a number of draft discussion papers suggesting guidance on 
how profits between the multinational enterprise and its permanent establishment 
business activities should be allocated. In the discussion draft papers, the OECD 
invited inputs from the general public and the business community to provide their 
views on the profit allocation to a permanent establishment (OECD, Discussion Draft 
Part I: 2001).  
 
 
The purpose of the issuing of the discussion draft papers was to provide further 
guidance in addition to the OECD guidelines, on the treatment of transfer pricing 
transactions taking place within one legal entity operating in two different countries.  
 
 
When the OECD issued the OECD guidelines in the year 1995, it stated that the 
arm’s-length principle should only be applied between associated enterprises or 
between two legal entities related, and not within one legal entity operating in more 
than one country. In this instance, it means that where multinational enterprise is 
conducting a business through a branch or an office in another country, the OECD 
guidelines did not make the provision on the application of the arm’s-length principle 
for this kind of transaction happening between a multinational enterprise and its 
branch in another country (Russo, 2005:10).   
 
 
The reason for this was that a multinational enterprise and its branch was regarded in 
the OECD guidelines as one legal entity and not as two separate legal entities. The 
other reason for the issue of the discussion draft papers on permanent establishment 
business activity is that it has been established that Article 7 of the OECD Model 
Treaty is interpreted differently in a number of member countries (Russo, 2005:10).  
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The different interpretation by OECD member countries has resulted in a problem of 
how Article 7 of the OECD Model Treaty and the OECD guidelines is applied when 
the profits of a permanent establishment are allocated. Hence for these reasons, the 
OECD has issued a number of discussion draft papers proposing guidance on how the 
profits to a permanent establishment should be allocated (Russo, 2005:10). 
 
 
In the year 2001 the OECD issued a discussion draft paper called Part I discussion 
draft paper. The revised paper on Part I was issued in 2004. The 2001 discussion draft 
provides that an anlysis should be done when applying the arm’s-length principle 
within a single taxpayer. The 2001 discussion draft’s view to the arm’s-length 
approach with regard to how the profits a permanent establishment should be 
allocated, is based on the following two-step analysis. The first is the hypothesis of 
the permanent establishment as an enterprise separate from the one of which it is part, 
and the second step is to attribute an arm’s-length amount of profits to this 
hypothesized separate enterprise (OECD Discussion Draft Part III: 2004; Russo, 
2005:10).  
 
 
The 2001 discussion draft further mentions that there are four circumstances under 
which this approach should be applied when allocating profit to a permanent 
establishment. These circumstances are as follows (Russo, 2005:10). 
 
 
a) The use of a capital asset 
 
 
b) The use of an intangible asset 
 
 
c) The provision of internal service  
 
 
d) The capital allocation and funding of a permanent establishment’s operations. 
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The revised discussion draft issued in 2004 still emphasises the approach proposed in 
the 2001 discussion draft. This is substantially based on the inputs received from the 
general public with regard to the 2001 discussion draft. The 2004 revised discussion 
draft also discusses the three other issues with regard to the allocation of the profits to 
a permanent establishment, namely (Russo, 2005:10); 
 
 
a) The allocation of functions, risks and assets to the permanent establishment. 
 
 
b) The allocation of free capital to the permanent establishment.  
 
 
c) The special considerations for agency permanent establishments. 
 
 
In the same year that the Part I discussion draft paper was issued, Part II and Part III 
of the discussion draft paper were also issued. Part II and Part III of these discussion 
drafts were also revised later in 2003.  
 
 
Part II of the discussion draft discusses how the arm’s-length principle should be 
applied to a permanent establishment business activity involving the banking 
business. Part II of the discussion draft considers what might be called traditional 
banking activities, the borrowing and on-lending of money and provides guidance on 
how the income from such activities (mostly interest or interest equivalents) might be 
attributed to a permanent establishment of a banking enterprise (OECD, Discussion 
Draft Part II, 2004). 
 
 
Part III of the discussion draft discusses the global trading of financial instruments 
(global trading), an activity that is commonly carried out by banks but also by 
financial institutions other than banks. In this discussion draft, particular attention is 
given as to how the arm’s-length principle applies to a number of factual situations 
commonly found in enterprises carrying on a global trading business through a 
permanent establishment, and how the arm’s-length principle should be applied to the 
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banking business conducted through the permanent establishment (OECD, Discussion 
Draft Part III: 2004). 
 
 
In the year 2005 the OECD issued Part IV of the discussion draft. Part IV discusses 
how the arm’s-length principle should be applied to the insurance business conducted 
through the permanent establishment. Part IV of the discussion draft discusses the 
insurance business activities and provides guidance on how the income from such 
activities might be attributed to a permanent establishment of insurance enterprise 
(OECD, Discussion Draft Part IV: 2004). 
 
 
3.3.6 Transactional Profit Methods 
 
 
In the year 2008 the OECD issued the discussion draft document entitled transactional 
profit methods. The objective of this discussion draft document was to propose a 
suggestion on whether or not the transactional profit methods should maintain their 
status as a last resort as highlighted in the OECD guidelines. The reason for changing 
them from the status of last resort was due to the fact that there was an increasing 
number of countries indicating that in practice, transactional profit methods are being 
applied in a number of cases than would be expected. This was happening even 
though the OECD guidelines endorsed the transactional methods to be preferable as 
compared to profit methods (OECD, Discussion Draft Transactional Profit Methods, 
2008:5).   
 
 
In addressing the issue of whether or not the transactional profit methods should 
maintain their status as last resort, as highlighted in the OECD guidelines, the 
discussion draft discusses the following three points (OECD, Discussion Draft 
Transactional Profit Methods: 2008:5): 
 
 
‘Examination of the arguments in favour of maintaining the last resort status: what the reasons 
were for giving transactional profit methods a last resort status in the TP Guidelines and 
whether there are new concerns that have arisen since 1995; assess the validity of these old 
and new concerns and whether there are ways to alleviate them.  
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Examination of the arguments in favour of changing the last resort status: what the reasons are 
for many taxpayers and tax administrations to use transactional profit methods despite their 
last resort status and the arguments raised in favour of changing the status of these methods.  
Examination of the various possible options with respect to the status of transactional profit 
methods: what the options are (including whether different solutions should be promoted for 
the profit split methods and for the transactional net margin method (hereafter “TNMM”) or 
for specific transactions), their pros and cons, and what safeguards or conditions should be 
satisfied in order for these various options to be acceptable.’ 
 
 
When the OECD guidelines were issued in 1995, it described the transactional profit 
methods as methods of last resort and that the use of these methods should be limited 
to exceptional situations where no data is available or where the available data is not 
of sufficient quality to rely solely or at all on the traditional transaction methods 
(OECD guidelines, Para, 2.49).  
 
 
The discussion draft document suggests that certain changes should be made to 
paragraphs 2.49, 3.49, 3.50, 3.54 and 3.56 in the OECD guidelines and emphasises 
that the transactional profit methods should no longer be regarded as methods of last 
resort. The discussion draft document states that the paragraphs mentioned above, 
should be updated and reworded.  
 
 
The discussion draft suggests that paragraph 2.49 should be worded as follows: 
 
 
‘As noted in paragraphs 1.68 and 1.68a, the selection of a transfer pricing method always aims 
at finding the most appropriate method for a particular case. One essential element is to take 
account of the respective strengths and weaknesses of each of the OECD recognised methods. 
Traditional transaction methods are the most direct means of establishing whether conditions 
in the commercial and financial relations between associated enterprises are arm’s-length. As 
a result where, taking account of the comparability analysis of the controlled transaction under 
review and of the availability of information, a traditional transaction method and a 
transactional profit method can be applied in an equally reliable manner, the traditional 
transaction method is preferable to other transactional profit methods. Moreover, where taking 
account of the comparability analysis of the controlled transaction under review and of the 
availability of information, the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP) and another 
transfer pricing method can be applied in an equally reliable manner, the CUP method is to be 
preferred.’ 
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The discussion draft further suggest that certain wordings in paragraph 3.49, 3.50, 
3.54 and 3.56 in the OECD guidelines be deleted and such wordings are as follows: 
 
 
‘Traditional transaction methods are to be preferred over transactional profit methods as a 
means of establishing whether a transfer price is at arm’s-length, i.e. whether there is a special 
condition affecting the level of profits between associated enterprises. To date, practical 
experience has shown that in the majority of cases, it is possible to apply traditional 
transaction methods.’(Para 3.49) 
 
‘Therefore, for the reasons set out in this Report and particularly those in paragraphs 3.52-3.57 
below, as a general matter the use of transactional profit methods is discouraged.’(Para 3.50) 
 
‘Instead, transactional profit methods are being recognised as methods that assist in 
determining in cases of last resort whether transfer pricing complies with the arm’s-length 
principle.’(Para 3.54) 
 
‘Consequently, transactional profit methods should never be used by tax administrations if 
they do not yet have the necessary institutional legal framework to ensure that the proper 
precautions are taken. This would include the existence of an effective administrative appeals 
mechanism. The Committee on Fiscal Affairs intends to engage the major non-Member 
countries in a dialogue on the application of the principles and methods set out in this Report 
and any revisions hereto.’(Para 3.56) 
 
 
When consensus is reached on these changes and updates with regard to the 
transactional profit methods this will simply mean that the status of these methods 
will now be on the same level as the traditional transactional methods in the OECD 
guidelines and not regarded as methods of last resort.  
 
 
3.3.7 Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructuring 
 
 
In the year 2005 the OECD issued the discussion draft document entitled transfer 
pricing aspects of business restructurings in recognition of the widespread 
phenomenon of business restructurings by multinational enterprises. The OECD 
believes that since the mid 1990s, business restructuring has taken place and such 
structures have transfer pricing implications as they consists of the following (OECD, 
Discussion Draft Aspects of Business Restructuring, 2009: 6): 
 
 
a) Conversion of fully-fledged distributors into limited-risk distributors or 
commissionnaires for a related party that may operate as a principal. 
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b) Conversion of fully-fledged manufacturers into contract-manufacturers or toll-
manufacturers for a related party that may operate as a principal. 
 
c) Rationalisation and/or specialization of operations (manufacturing sites and/or 
processes, research and development activities, sales, services). 
 
 
d) Transfers of intangible property rights to a central entity (for example, a so-called 
‘IP company’) within the group.  
 
 
The view of the OECD is that business restructurings will normally be accompanied 
by a reallocation of profits among the members of the multinational enterprise group, 
either immediately after the restructuring or over a few years (OECD, Discussion 
Draft Aspects of Business Restructuring, 2009:7).  
 
 
The objective of this discussion draft document was to discuss the extent to which 
such a reallocation of profits is consistent with the arm’s-length principle and more 
generally, how the arm’s-length principle applies to business restructurings. In 
achieving this objective, the discussion draft document addresses the following four 
key issues (OECD, Discussion Draft Aspects of Business Restructuring, 2009): 
 
 
a) The first issue provides general guidance on the allocation of risks between related 
parties and in particular the interpretation and application of paragraphs 1.26 to 
1.29 of the OECD guidelines. 
 
 
b) The second issue discusses the arm’s-length compensation for the business 
restructuring itself, the application of the arm’s-length principle and the OECD 
guidelines to the restructuring; in particular the circumstances in which at arm’s-
length the restructured entity would receive compensation for the transfer of 
functions, assets and/or risks, and/or an indemnification for the termination or 
substantial renegotiation of the existing arrangements. 
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c) The third issue examines the application of the arm’s-length principle and the 
OECD guidelines to post-restructuring arrangements. 
 
 
d) The fourth issue discusses some important notions in relation to the exceptional 
circumstances where a tax administration may consider not recognising a 
transaction or structure adopted by a taxpayer, based on an analysis of the existing 
guidance at paragraphs 1.36-1.41 of the OECD guidelines and of the relationship 
between these paragraphs and other parts of the OECD guidelines. 
 
 
3.3.8 Proposed Revision of chapters I-III of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines  
 
 
In the year 2009 the OECD issued the discussion draft document entitled proposed 
revision of chapters I-III of the transfer pricing guidelines. The objective of this 
discussion draft document was to address issues with regard to comparability analysis 
and transfer pricing profit methods. (OECD, Discussion Draft on proposed revision of 
chapters I-III of the transfer pricing guidelines, 2009: 2). In addressing these issues, 
the discussion draft document discusses the following four points: 
 
 
‘-- Hierarchy of transfer pricing methods: In the existing TPG, there are two categories of 
OECD recognised transfer pricing methods: the traditional transaction methods (described in 
Chapter II of the TPG) and the transactional profit methods (described in Chapter III). 
Transactional profit methods (the transactional net margin method and the profit split method) 
currently have a status of last resort methods, to be used only in exceptional cases where there 
are is no or insufficient data available to rely solely or at all on the traditional transaction 
methods. Based on the experience acquired in applying transactional profit methods since 
1995, the OECD proposes removing exceptionality and replacing it with a standard whereby 
the selected transfer pricing method should be the “most appropriate method to the 
circumstances of the case” (see paragraphs 2.1-2.9 in the attached). In order to reflect this 
evolution, it is proposed to address all transfer pricing methods in a single chapter, Chapter II 
(Part II for traditional transaction methods, Part III for transactional profit methods). 
 
-- Comparability analysis: The general guidance on the comparability analysis that is currently 
found in Chapter I of the TPG was updated and completed with a new Chapter III containing 
detailed proposed guidance on comparability analyses. 
 
-- Guidance on the application of transactional profit methods: Additional proposed guidance 
on the application of transactional profit methods was developed and included in Chapter II, 
new Part III. 
 
-- Annexes: Three new Annexes were drafted, containing practical illustrations of issues in 
relation to the application of transactional profit methods and an example of a working capital 
adjustment to improve comparability.’ 
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3.4 THE STRUCTURE AND THE CONTENTS OF THE OECD GUIDELINES 
 
 
To date, the OECD guidelines are divided into eight chapters, two Annexes and a 
Glossary. The following is the brief analysis of these chapters, the Annexes and the 
Glossary.  
 
 
3.4.1 Chapter I 
 
 
Chapter I of the OECD guidelines discusses the arm’s-length principle and the 
challenges encountered when the arm’s-length principle is applied. Chapter I further 
discusses a number of factors which should be considered when applying the arm’s-
length principle, such as comparability analysis which is used to compare conditions 
in controlled transactions with conditions in uncontrolled transactions (Deloitte & 
Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:9). 
 
 
As discussed in chapter 2 of this research study, Chapter I of the OECD guidelines 
lists the five comparability factors which should be examined to determine whether 
the transactions might be considered comparable, namely; characteristics of property 
transferred or services provided; functions performed, assets used and risks assumed 
by the party under examination (for example, a functional analysis); contractual 
terms; economic circumstances such as geographic location, size of the markets, 
extent of competition in the markets, relative competitive positions, availability of 
substitute goods or services, and business strategies. 
 
 
Chapter I further discusses other factors which should be considered when the arm’s-
length principle is applied. Such factors are the use of arm’s-length range, multiple 
year data, arm’s-length range and the use of transfer pricing methods. These factors 
are discussed in detail in chapter 2 of this research study.  
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3.4.2 Chapter II and III  
 
 
The Chapter II of the OECD guidelines discusses the three transfer pricing methods 
classified as traditional methods. These methods are the controlled uncontrolled price 
method, the resale price method and the cost plus method. Chapter II of the OECD 
guidelines specifies how to apply these methods and the special circumstances under 
which the methods would likely be the best method. A detailed description of these 
three methods is discussed in chapter 2 of this research study (Deloitte & Touch 
Tohmatsu, 2001:10).  
 
 
Significantly, chapter II of the OECD guidelines expresses a preference for the 
traditional transactional methods. This expression might however change soon as the 
OECD reach consensus on the issue of the discussion draft document on the profit 
methods. Chapter III of the OECD guidelines discusses the other transfer pricing 
methods classified as transactional methods. These methods are the profit methods 
and the transactional net margin method (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:11).  
 
 
The transactional profit methods are currently regarded as the methods of last resort. 
As already mentioned above, these methods might in future be of the same status as 
the traditional methods, after the OECD has reached consensus on the issue of the 
discussion draft document on the profit methods. A detailed description of these two 
methods is discussed in chapter 2 of this research study. 
 
 
3.4.3 Chapter IV 
 
 
Chapter IV of the OECD guidelines discusses seven administrative aspects which the 
OECD guidelines suggest that tax authorities of the OECD member countries should 
adopt, to ensure that multinational enterprises are compliant with the arm’s-length 
principle. These administrative aspects are transfer pricing compliance practices, 
mutual agreement procedures, simultaneous examinations, safe harbour rules and 
advance pricing agreement. These aspects are analysed as follows:   
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3.4.3.1 Transfer pricing compliance practices  
 
 
Chapter IV provides three main elements which tax authorities should consider 
applying when ensuring that transfer pricing practices are compliant with the arm’s-
length principle. These elements are; examination practices, the burden of proof, and 
penalty systems.  
  
a) Examination Practices 
 
 
Regarding examination practices, chapter IV encourages tax authorities to initiate 
their transfer pricing analysis from the perspective of the method that the taxpayer has 
selected in setting its prices (OECD guidelines, Para. 4.8). Chapter IV further 
provides that tax authorities should be flexible in their transfer pricing approaches and 
not demand from taxpayers an unrealistic precision on their transfer pricing results. 
Chapter IV also recommends that examination practices should take account of the 
taxpayer’s commercial judgment and should avoid demanding precision (OECD 
guidelines, Para. 4.9). 
 
b) Burden of Proof 
 
 
Chapter IV provides that enforcement of the burden of proof differs from country to 
country (OECD guidelines, Para. 4.9). In some countries the burden of proof is on 
taxpayers and in others it is on tax authorities. In this instance where the burden of 
proof is on the taxpayer in one country, and is on the tax administration in another 
country and it happens that transfer pricing adjustment is made on a taxpayer doing 
business in both countries, conflict may arise (OECD guidelines, Para. 4.15). In this 
situation, chapter IV provides that neither countries nor taxpayers should misuse the 
burden of proof.   
 
 
Chapter IV discusses this concept from a practical perspective, indicating that the 
burden of proof rules should not be used as a justification for making groundless or 
unverifiable assertions about transfer pricing. Both the taxpayer and tax 
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administration should be prepared to show in good faith that the pricing asserted is 
consistent with the arm’s-length principle (OECD guidelines, Para. 4.16).  
 
 
Chapter IV reminds tax authorities that in a mutual agreement situation, the state 
proposes a transfer pricing adjustment as the burden of demonstrating that the 
adjustment is consistent with the arm’s-length principle (OECD guideline, Para. 4.17). 
 
c) Penalties 
 
 
Chapter IV reflects that these penalties are classified differently in each country. The 
penalties are classified as interest, penalties or other classification names (OECD 
guideline, Para. 4.22). This chapter further provides that the penalty should encourage 
consistency rather than inconsistency to the arm’s-length principle (OECD guideline, 
Para. 4.22).  
 
 
Chapter IV provides that fairness requires that penalties be proportionate to the 
offence for which they are imposed. The guidelines state further that sizeable no-fault 
penalties can be too harsh, and would be unfair whether the taxpayer has made 
reasonable efforts in good faith to set prices consistent with the arm’s-length principle 
(OECD guideline, Para. 4.27). 
 
3.4.3.2 Mutual Agreement Procedure 
 
 
The mutual agreement procedure is the process by which tax authorities consult with 
each other to resolve disputes regarding double taxation conversions. Chapter IV 
provides that the mutual agreement procedures can be achieved by following the 
principles provided in Article 25 of the OECD Model Treaty (OECD guideline, Para. 
4.29). 
 
 
It follows that the chapter enhances that mutual agreement procedures should apply 
when transfer pricing corresponding adjustments on the profits of multinational 
enterprises, have been made by tax authorities in different countries. Under these 
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circumstances chapter IV recommends that tax authorities should apply paragraph 2 
of Articles 9 of the OECD Model Treaty (OECD guideline, Para. 4.32). 
 
 
Some concerns are highlighted with regard to the application of the mutual agreement 
procedures when transfer pricing corresponding adjustments have been made. These 
concerns are as follows (OECD guideline, Para. 4.42). 
 
 
a) time limits under domestic law may make corresponding 
    adjustments unavailable if those limits are not waived in the 
    relevant tax treaty 
 
b) mutual agreement procedures may take too long to complete 
 
c) taxpayer participation may be limited 
 
d) published procedures may not be readily available to instruct 
    taxpayers on how the procedure may be used 
 
e) there may be no procedures to suspend the collection of tax 
    deficiencies or the accrual of interest pending resolution of the 
    mutual agreement procedure. 
 
 
As the corresponding adjustments happen because of the primary transfer pricing 
adjustments, chapter IV mentions that corresponding adjustments may take place as a 
result of secondary transfer pricing adjustment. It further provides that such primary 
adjustments could be ‘whereby the excess profits resulting from a primary adjustment 
are treated as having been transferred in some other form and taxed accordingly. 
Ordinarily, the secondary transactions will take the form of constructive dividends, 
constructive equity contributions, or constructive loans’.  
 
 
In these circumstances, chapter IV mentions that secondary adjustments will take 
place when withholding tax on dividends is withheld and arm’s-length interest is 
levied on the loan by the country making the transfer pricing adjustment. It provides 
that in these instances mutual agreement procedures should be applied to deal with the 
double tax which will arise.  
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3.4.3.3 Simultaneous Tax Examination  
 
 
Chapter IV provides further that tax authorities could perform the transfer pricing tax 
examination simultaneously to ensure that multinational enterprises comply with the 
arm’s-length principle.  
 
 
It defines simultaneous tax examination as ‘a form of mutual assistance, used in a 
wide range of international issues that allows two or more countries to cooperate in 
tax investigations’. The OECD encourages tax authorities to perform simultaneous tax 
examinations as these are useful in the exchange of information and help reduce the 
possibilities for economic double taxation, reduce the compliance cost to taxpayers, 
and speed up the resolution of issues (OECD guideline, Para. 4.78). 
 
3.4.3.4 Safe Harbours 
 
 
A safe harbour is a provision that allows taxpayers to follow a simple set of rules 
whereby transfer prices would be automatically accepted as being at arm’s-length by 
the tax authorities. Chapter IV provides that the objectives of safe harbours are; 
 
 
‘simplifying compliance for eligible taxpayers in determining arm’s-length conditions for 
controlled transactions; providing assurance to a category of taxpayers that the price charged 
or received on controlled transactions will be accepted by the tax administration without 
further review; and relieving the tax administration from the task of conducting further 
examination and audits of such taxpayers with respect to their transfer pricing.’ 
 
 
It follows that Chapter IV discourages the use of safe harbours and therefore 
recommends they should not be used, for a number of reasons; primarily because of 
the potential for double taxation and inconsistency with the arm’s-length principle 
(OECD Guideline, Para. 4.94).   
 
 
The use of safe harbours could have a number of adverse consequences which should 
be weighed against the expected benefits. The concerns stem from the following 
reasons (OECD guideline, Para. 4.103): 
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‘a) the implementation of a safe harbour in a given country would not only 
    affect tax calculations within that jurisdiction, but would also impinge 
    on the tax calculations of associated enterprises in other jurisdictions, 
    and 
 
b) it is difficult to establish satisfactory criteria for defining safe harbours, 
    and accordingly they can potentially produce prices or results that may 
    not be consistent with the arm’s-length principle.’ 
 
 
The conclusion is that Chapter IV discourages the use of safe harbours for a number 
of reasons, primarily because of the potential for double taxation and inconsistency 
with the arm’s-length principle (OECD guideline, Para. 4.94). 
 
3.4.3.5 Advance Pricing Agreement 
 
 
An advance pricing agreement is an agreement that determines, in advance, an 
appropriate set of criteria for the determination of transfer pricing for the transactions 
over a fixed period of time. Chapter IV provides that advanced pricing agreements 
can be arranged in three different cartegories namely, unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral. The chapter discusses the differences among the unilateral, bilateral and 
multilateral advanced pricing agreements. It endorses the preference of the bilateral 
and multilateral advanced pricing agreements. One of the reasons bilateral and 
multilateral advanced pricing agreements is preferred is because of elimination of 
possible double taxation (OECD guidelines, Para. 4.131).   
 
 
This chapter states a number of advantages and disadvantages regarding the use of 
advanced pricing agreements (OECD guidelines, Para. 4.143-4.159). 
 
3.4.3.6 Arbitration 
 
 
Arbitration is the process whereby a dispute between the tax authorities is resolved 
(OECD guidelines, Para. 4.167). Chapter IV contains a brief discussion about the 
arbitration on transfer pricing issues. 
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3.4.4 Chapter V 
 
 
Chapter V of the OECD guidelines provides substantial guidance on the type and 
level of transfer pricing documentation to be prepared by taxpayers and submitted to 
the tax authorities, to ensure that their transaction complies with the arm’s-length 
principle. The documentation serves as proof by illustrating that taxpayers have 
conducted their transactions with related taxpayers at arm’s-length. In terms of both 
the taxpayers and the tax administrators, Chapter V provides that (OECD guidelines, 
Para. 5.4);  
 
 
‘the process of considering whether transfer pricing is appropriate for tax purposes should be 
determined in accordance with the same prudent business management principles that would 
govern the process of evaluating a business decision of a similar level of complexity and 
importance. It would be expected that the application of these principles will require the 
taxpayer to prepare or refer to written materials that could serve as documentation of the 
efforts undertaken to comply with the arm’s-length principle, including the information on 
which the transfer pricing was based, the factors taken into account, and the method selected. 
It would be reasonable for tax authorities to expect taxpayers when establishing their transfer 
pricing for a particular business activity, to prepare or to obtain such materials regarding the 
nature of the activity and the transfer pricing, and to retain such material for production if 
necessary in the course of a tax examination. Such actions should assist taxpayers in filing 
correct tax returns.’ 
 
 
Chapter V further acknowledges that taxpayers should make reasonable efforts at the 
time transfer pricing is established to determine whether the transfer pricing is 
appropriate for tax purposes in accordance with the arm’s-length principle (OECD 
guidelines, Para. 5.3). The level of appropriate documentation is to be determined 
under the same prudent business management principles that would govern the 
process of evaluating a business decision of a similar level of complexity and 
importance (OECD guidelines, Para. 5.4). 
 
 
The guidelines recommend that the required documents should not impose costs and 
burdens disproportionate to the circumstances (OECD guidelines, Para. 5.7). Non-
prescriptive detail is highlighted about the type of information that may be relevant to 
a transfer pricing inquiry. From the OECD guidelines’ point of view useful 
documentation includes the following items (OECD guidelines, Para. 5.18): 
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a) An outline of the business (general commercial and industry conditions, 
controlled transaction, functions performed, possible risks assumed).  
 
 
b) The structure of the organisation (each associated enterprise involved in the 
controlled transaction under review). 
 
 
c) Ownership linkages within the multinational enterprises group. 
 
 
d) Financial data, at least the amount of sales and operating results from the last few 
years preceding the transaction. 
 
 
e) The level of the taxpayer’s transactions with foreign associated enterprises, e.g. 
the amount of sales of inventory assets, the rendering of services, the rent of 
tangible assets, the use and transfer of tangible property, and interest on loans. 
 
 
f) Pricing practices, including business strategies and special circumstances, depend 
on method used. 
 
 
3.4.5 Chapter VI 
 
 
Chapter VI discusses special facts and circumstances that may arise when determining 
whether the conditions established between associated enterprises regarding the 
transfer of intangible property are at arm’s-length.  
 
3.4.5.1 Types of Intangible Properties  
 
 
Chapter VI commences by providing definitions of the types of intangible properties 
that multinational enterprises use in their businesses and these include the following 
(OECD guidelines, Para. 6.2):  
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a) Rights to use industrial assets such as patents, trademarks, trade names, designs or 
models. 
 
 
b) Literary and artistic property rights. 
 
 
c) Intellectual property such as know-how and trade secrets. 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the commercial intangibles and splits the commercial 
intangibles into trade and marketing intangibles.  
 
 
a) Trade intangibles 
 
 
Trade intangibles are often created through risky and costly research and development 
(R&D) activities, and the developer generally tries to recover the expenditure on these 
activities and obtain a return thereon through product sales, service contracts, or 
license agreements.  
 
 
b) Marketing intangibles 
 
 
Marketing intangibles include trademarks and trade names that aid in the commercial 
exploitation of a product or service, customer lists, distribution channels, and unique 
names, symbols, or pictures that have an important promotional value for the product 
concerned. Chapter VI provides that some marketing intangibles for example, 
trademarks, may be protected by the law of the country concerned and used only with 
the owner's permission for the relevant product or services. The value of marketing 
intangibles depends upon many factors, including the reputation and credibility of the 
trade name or the trademark fostered by the quality of the goods and services 
provided under the name or the mark in the past, the degree of quality control and 
ongoing R&D, distribution and availability of the goods or services being marketed, 
the extent and success of the promotional expenditures (OECD guidelines, Para. 6.4). 
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3.4.5.2 The arm’s-length determination  
 
 
Chapter VI further addresses the following two principal issues about the treatment of 
the intangible property namely; how to determine arm’s-length pricing when 
valuation is uncertain at the time of the transaction, and how to deal with marketing 
activities  (OECD guidelines, Para. 6.1).  
 
 
a) How to determine arm’s-length pricing when valuation is uncertain at the time of 
the transaction.  
 
 
In determining the arm’s-length price for intangible property Chapter VI provides that 
comparability should be taken into account from the perspective of both the transferor 
of the property and the transferee. From the perspective of the transferor, the arm’s-
length principle would examine the pricing at which a comparable independent 
enterprise would be willing to transfer the property and from the perspective of the 
transferee, a comparable independent enterprise may or may not be prepared to pay 
such a price, depending on the value and usefulness of the intangible property to the 
transferee in its business (OECD guidelines, Para. 6.14).  
 
 
It follows that Chapter VI further reflects that (OECD guidelines, Para. 6.20);  
 
 
‘when applying the arm’s-length principle to controlled transactions involving intangible 
property some special factors relevant to comparability between the controlled and 
uncontrolled transactions should be considered. These factors include the expected benefits 
from the intangible property (possibly determined through a net present value calculation). 
Other factors include: any limitations on the geographic area in which rights may be 
exercised; export restrictions on goods produced by virtue of any rights transferred; the 
exclusive or non-exclusive character of any rights transferred; the capital investment (to 
construct new plants or to buy special machines), the start-up expenses and the development 
work required in the market; the possibility of sub-licensing, the licensee's distribution 
network, and whether the licensee has the right to participate in further developments of the 
property by the licensor.’ 
 
 
In the sale of goods incorporating intangible property, it may also be possible to use 
the control uncontrolled price or resale price method (OECD guidelines, Para. 6.24). 
With regard to the valuation process of the intangible properties, when valuation is 
uncertain at the time of a transaction, the behavior of independent enterprises is a 
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guide for pricing. This chapter points out several possibilities (OECD guidelines, 
Para. 6.30).  
 
 
Independent enterprises might use anticipated benefits to determine pricing, where 
subsequent developments can be reasonably predicted. In some cases independent 
enterprises might use shorter term agreements or price adjustment clauses to protect 
against valuation uncertainty. Another possibility is that independent enterprises 
would bear the risk of unpredictable developments, but that major unexpected events 
changing the fundamental assumptions of the transaction would lead to a 
renegotiation.  
 
 
Chapter VI in this situation states that the arm’s-length pricing among associated 
enterprises should take into account which of these alternatives independent 
enterprises might choose, if faced with a comparable level of uncertainty in a 
comparable transaction (OECD guidelines, Para. 6.33). 
 
 
Developments subsequent to the establishment of transfer pricing that materially 
affect the evaluation may prompt a tax administration to inquire what independent 
enterprises would have done to account for the valuation uncertainty, but hindsight is 
not allowed. Thus, although the subsequent developments may prompt an inquiry, the 
inquiry should relate to what independent enterprises would have done on the basis of 
information available to them at the time of the transaction. 
 
 
b) How to deal with marketing activities  
 
 
On marketing activities the guidelines address the question of determining the proper 
return to a distributor that markets a product but does not own the trademark (OECD 
guidelines, Para. 6.37). The guidelines provide that a distributor who bears marketing 
costs, should share in the potential benefits from the marketing activities and not as 
the owner of the trademark. If extraordinary marketing expenditures are incurred, an 
additional return may be required (OECD guidelines, Para. 6.38). 
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3.4.6  Chapter VII 
 
 
Chapter VII makes an analysis of the transfer pricing treatment of the intra-group 
services between the related enterprises. Emphasis is placed on two crucial issues 
which should be considered when the intra-group services between the related 
enterprises are addressed and these issues are (OECD guidelines, Para. 7.5): 
 
 
a)  Whether an intra-group service has in fact been provided by one member of a 
multinational enterprise to other members of that group.  
 
 
b)  What the charge for such services should be in accordance with the arm’s-length 
principle. 
 
 
3.4.6.1 The determination of whether a service has been rendered or received 
 
 
In addressing this first issue, Chapter VII provides that the following tests should be 
applied (OECD guidelines, Para. 7.6-7.8): 
 
 
a) Whether the activity (service rendered) provides the respective group member 
with an economic benefit. 
 
 
b) Whether the activity (service rendered) provides a respective group member with 
commercial value that enhances their commercial position.  
 
 
c) Whether an independent enterprise in comparable circumstances would have been 
willing to pay for the activity if it were performed by an independent enterprise or 
would have performed the activity in-house. 
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Based on these tests, Chapter VII concludes that where the answers to the tests are in 
the affirmative, an intra-group service would be evident. In cases where the answers 
to the tests are negative, that particular service should not be considered as an intra-
group service under the arm’s-length principle. 
 
 
Once it has been determined that an intra-group service has been rendered, Chapter 
VII provides that it is crucial to determine whether the service can or cannot be 
charged to the service recipient. Lists of the intra-group services which are non-
chargeable and those chargeable, are provided. The following is the analysis of both 
categories of these intra-group services:   
 
3.4.6.2 Non-chargeable Costs 
 
 
Non-chargeable costs relate to services for which no direct or measurable benefit is 
bestowed on the companies receiving the service. Chapter VII further states that there 
are, however, exceptions where certain of these services may carry a charge for 
example, centralised and on-call services. The following are the list and descriptions 
of services that cannot be charged for: 
 
 
a) Stewardship 
 
 
Stewardship activities include those activities that are performed even though group 
members do not need the activity (and would not be willing to pay for them if they 
were an independent enterprise). Such activities are performed by the service provider 
solely because of its ownership interest in one or more of the group members. 
Stewardship activities may also include the provision of a coordinating centre which 
would provide planning services, technical advice (trouble shooting) or emergency 
management.  
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b) Shareholder Services  
 
 
Shareholder services relate to group members even though the respective group 
members do not receive any direct benefit from such services. They include duties 
that are performed directly for shareholders and relate to the monitoring of related 
companies as well as the ownership structure of the group. The service provider in 
this case merely performs such services because of its ownership interest. All the 
costs which relate to the activities that a parent company carries out in relation to its 
capacity as shareholder of the group, should not be charged to related affiliates. 
 
 
c) Duplicate Services 
 
 
Duplicate services relate to services performed by one group member that merely 
duplicates a service that another member is performing for itself, or that is being 
performed for such other group member by a third party. Chapter VII states that no 
charge should be made for duplicate services. The only exceptions are cases where the 
duplication of the service is temporary due to group restructuring or where the 
duplication is undertaken to reduce the risk of incorrect business decisions. 
 
 
d) Services that provide an Incidental Benefit 
 
 
An incidental benefit arises where an intra-group service which relates only to certain 
identified group members, incidentally provides benefits to other group members who 
are not intended to receive any benefit from the provision of the service. The 
incidental benefits which fall on other group members should not cause such members 
to be treated as receiving an intra-group service, because the services producing the 
benefits would not ordinarily be one that an independent enterprise would be willing 
to pay for. 
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e) Centralised Services 
 
 
Centralised services relate to services that are made available to the group as a whole. 
They essentially refer to those services that are centralised in the parent company or 
are rendered by a group service centre. It should be noted that some centralised 
services, depending on the extent to which an independent company would have been 
willing to pay for the services or to perform the service for themselves, will be 
considered as intra-group services.  
 
 
f) On-call Services 
 
 
On-call services are services that would be provided by a service provider upon 
request of the recipient. This issue being addressed is that in determining the 
chargeability of such services, the question is whether the availability of such services 
is a separate service for which an arm’s-length charge should be determined. An intra-
group service would exist to the extent that it would be reasonable to expect an 
independent enterprise in comparable circumstances, to incur standby charges to 
ensure the availability of the services when the need arises. It is unlikely that an 
independent enterprise would be willing to pay for on-call services where: the 
potential need for the service is remote; where the advantage of having the service is 
negligible; where on-call services could be obtained promptly from other sources 
without the need for stand-by arrangements. 
 
 
3.4.6.3 Chargeable Services 
 
 
Chargeable costs are associated with services that provide an economic benefit to 
other group companies. Chapter VII provides that the recipient companies in this case 
would conceivably be willing to perform it themselves or to pay a third party to 
provide them with these services, if they were not provided by the related party. 
Chargeable services typically have related/inherent costs that fall into two major 
categories (OECD guidelines, Para. 7.20): 
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a) Directly Allocable Costs 
 
 
Directly allocable costs refer to costs for services which can be directly identified as 
benefiting a particular group company. In this instance the service performed and the 
basis for payment can be clearly identified and thus allowing the costs for the 
provision of the service to be directly assigned to a particular recipient in determining 
an arm’s-length fee (OECD guidelines, Para. 7.20-7.23). 
 
 
b) Indirectly Allocable Costs 
 
 
Indirectly allocable costs relate to those services that benefit a number of companies 
in a group and where the costs for such services cannot be readily identified with a 
specific service performed for a particular company. In such instances it is usually 
difficult to apply the direct-charge method (OECD guidelines, Para. 7.23).  
 
 
Chapter VII suggests the use of cost allocation and apportionment method to allocate 
these costs, for example the use of employee headcount, number of users and/or 
turnover to allocate costs.  Such methods are referred to as indirect-charge methods 
and should be allowed by revenue authorities, provided that the following have been 
met or considered (OECD guidelines, Para. 7.23-7.28): 
 
 
a) Sufficient regard has been given to the value of the services to the recipients. 
 
 
b) The extent to which comparable services are provided between independent 
enterprises. 
 
 
c) The specific service that is provided to service recipients is not the main activity 
of the service provider and that the service provider does not provide the same 
service to third parties. 
 
 
d) The service should be charged for fairly. 
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e) Any charging has to be supported by an identified and reasonably foreseeable 
benefit to the recipient. 
 
 
f) The charge method selected should contain safeguards against manipulation and 
follow sound accounting principles. 
 
 
g) The charge method selected should produce charges or cost allocations that are 
proportional with the expected benefits to the services recipients. 
 
 
3.4.7 Chapter VIII 
 
 
Chapter VIII of the OECD guidelines contains the cost contribution arrangements and 
discusses these arrangements between two or more associated enterprises. The OECD 
guidelines define cost contribution agreements as (OECD Guidelines, Para. 8.6); 
 
 
‘a contractual agreement among business enterprises to share costs and risks of developing, 
producing or obtaining assets, services or rights, and to determine the nature and extent of the 
interests of participants in those assets’.  
 
 
Chapter VIII provides that, for the conditions of cost contribution arrangements to 
satisfy the arm’s-length principle, the guidelines require that each participant’s 
proportionate share of the overall contributions to the arrangement be consistent with 
the participant’s proportionate share of the overall expected benefits to be received 
under the arrangement (OECD Guidelines, Para. 8.8).  
 
 
This chapter discusses different types of cost contribution arrangements and provides 
that the common type of cost contribution arrangement is the joint development of 
intangible property. It follows that the cost contribution arrangement need not be 
limited to the development of intangible property type and may be extended to the 
pooling of resources for acquiring centralized management services or for such 
projects as the development of advertising campaigns. For cost contribution 
arrangement to satisfy the arm’s-length principle, Chapter VIII states that (OECD 
guidelines, Para. 8.8); 
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‘A participant’s contributions must be consistent with what an independent enterprise would 
have agreed to contribute under comparable circumstances given the benefits it reasonably 
expects to derive from the arrangement. What distinguishes contributions to a CCA from an 
ordinary intragroup transfer of property or services is that part of all of the compensation 
intended by the participants is the expected benefits to each from the pooling of resources and 
skills.’ 
 
 
Chapter VIII further highlights that for the purpose of determining whether a cost 
contribution arrangement satisfies the arm’s-length principle, each participant’s 
proportionate share of the overall contributions to the cost contribution arrangement is 
consistent with the participant’s proportionate share of the overall expected benefits, it 
is necessary to measure the value or amount of each participant’s contributions to the 
arrangement. Under the arm’s-length principle, the value of each participant’s 
contribution should be consistent with the value that independent enterprises would 
have assigned to that contribution in comparable circumstances, and that the value of 
the application of the arm’s-length principle should take into account, the contractual 
terms and economic circumstances particular to the cost contribution arrangement (for 
example the sharing of risks and costs), (OECD guidelines, Para. 8.13-8.14). 
 
 
In determining each participant’s expected benefits of the cost contribution 
arrangement, Chapter VIII provides that allocation keys is frequently used in practice 
and such allocation keys includes sales gross or operating profit units used, produced 
or sold number of employees and capital invested (OECD guidelines, Para. 8.13-
8.14). For the tax treatment of the cost contribution arrangement on income, Chapter 
VIII states (OECD guidelines, Para. 8.23); 
 
‘Contributions by a participant to a CCA should be treated for tax purposes in the same 
manner as would apply under the general rules of the tax system(s) applicable to that 
participant if the contributions were made outside a CCA to carry on the activity that is the 
subject of the CCA (e.g. to perform research and development, to obtain a beneficial interest 
in property needed to carry out the CCA activity).’ 
 
 
The tax treatment of the cost contribution arrangement on the tax deductible side, 
Chapter VIII reflects that (OECD guidelines Para. 8.23);  
 
 
‘the contributions would be treated as deductible expenses by reference to these criteria. No 
part of a contribution in respect of a CCA would constitute a royalty for the use of intangible 
property, except to the extent that the contribution entitles the contributor to obtain only a 
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right to use intangible property belonging to a participant (or a third party) and the contributor 
does not also obtain a beneficial interest in the intangible property itself.’  
 
 
Chapter VIII also provides the approach that should be followed regarding the entry 
into, withdrawal from, or termination of, the cost contribution arrangement. With 
regard to entry (or buy-in) to the cost contribution arrangement under the arm’s-length 
principle, any transfer of pre-existing rights from participants to a new member must 
be compensated based on an arm’s-length value of the transferred interest (OECD 
guidelines, Para. 8.31). 
 
  
When a participant withdraws from a cost contribution arrangement (a buy-out), that 
participant may dispose of its interest in the results of past cost contribution 
arrangement activity (including work-in-progress) to other participants. Similar to 
buy-in transfers, the buy-out transfer should be compensated in accordance with the 
arm’s-length principle. The principles applied in a buyout payment are not different 
from a buy-in payment with regard to the taxation treatment (OECD guidelines, Para. 
8.33-8.34).  
 
 
Chapter VIII provides that upon termination of the cost contribution arrangement, 
each participant should receive a beneficial interest in the results of the cost 
contribution arrangement activity consistent with the participant’s proportionate share 
of contributions to the cost contribution arrangement throughout its term, or a 
participant could be properly compensated according to the arm’s-length principle by 
one or more participants for surrendering its interest in the results of the activity 
(OECD guidelines, Para. 8.39). Chapter VIII concludes by listing the cost 
contribution arrangements conditions which would normally meet the arm’s-length 
principle. Such conditions are as follows: 
 
 
a) Participants would include only enterprises expected to derive mutual benefits from the 
CCA activity itself, either directly or indirectly (and not just from performing part or all 
of that activity). 
 
b) The arrangement would specify the nature and extent of each participant's beneficial 
interest in the results of the CCA activity. 
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c) No payment other than the CCA contributions, appropriate balancing payments and buy-in 
payments would be made for the beneficial interest in property, services, or rights obtained 
through the CCA. 
 
d) The proportionate shares of contributions would be determined in a proper manner using 
an allocation method reflecting the sharing of expected benefits from the arrangement. 
 
e)  The arrangement would allow for balancing payments or for the allocation of contributions 
to be changed prospectively after a reasonable period of time to reflect changes in 
proportionate shares of expected benefits among the participants. 
 
 f) Adjustments would be made as necessary (including the possibility of buy-in and buy-out 
payments) upon the entrance or withdrawal of a participant and upon termination of the 
CCA. 
 
 
Chapter VIII further concludes by listing the information which would be relevant and 
useful with regard to the terms of the cost contribution arrangements. Such 
information is as follows: 
 
 
a) a list of participants 
 
b) a list of any other associated enterprises that will be involved with the CCA activity or 
that are expected to exploit or use the results of the subject activity 
 
c) the scope of the activities and specific projects covered by the CCA 
 
d) the duration of the arrangement 
 
e) the manner in which participants’ proportionate shares of expected benefits are measured, 
and any projections used in this determination 
 
f) the form and value of each participant’s initial contributions, and a detailed description of 
how the value of initial and ongoing contributions is determined and how accounting 
principles are applied consistently to all participants in determining expenditures and the 
value of contributions 
 
g) the anticipated allocation of responsibilities and tasks associated with the CCA activity 
between participants and other enterprises 
 
h) the procedures for and consequences of a participant entering or withdrawing from the 
CCA and the termination of the CCA 
 
i)  any provisions for balancing payments or for adjusting the terms of the arrangement to 
reflect changes in economic circumstances. 
 
 
3.4.8  Annex and Glossary  
 
 
The Annex contains guidance on how to conduct advance pricing arrangements under 
the mutual agreement procedure. The Annex provides guidance to tax authorities 
about conducting the mutual agreement procedures that involve advance pricing 
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arrangements. The Glossary defines important transfer pricing terms that are used 
throughout the OECD guidelines. 
 
 
3.5 THE PRACTICE NOTE 7 
 
 
3.5.1 Background and History of Practice Note 7 
 
 
On 6 August 1999 Practice Note 7 was introduced in South Africa. The objective of 
Practice Note 7 is to provide taxpayers in South Africa with guidelines about the 
procedures to be followed in the determination of arm’s-length prices, taking into 
account the South African business environment. Practice Note 7 also represents the 
views of SARS Commissioner on other transfer pricing practical issues (Practice Note 
7, Para. 2.8).  
 
 
The design of Practice Note 7 is broadly based on the OECD guidelines and has also 
adopted the approach in chapter 5 of the Australian Tax Office’s Taxation Ruling 
98/11, called the Four-Step Approach. An annexure is provided at back of the end of 
the Practice Note 7 providing guidance on how to apply the Four-Step Approach.   
 
 
3.5.2 Practice Note 7 and Section 31 of the Act 
 
 
In paragraph 16 of the OECD guidelines, the OECD emphasises that member 
countries should follow the OECD guidelines in conjunction with their domestic 
transfer pricing legislations or rules. Meaning that although domestic transfer pricing 
guidelines of a number country might be based on the OECD guidelines, the member 
country transfer pricing guidelines/rules should still concur with the domestic 
legislation regulating transfer pricing practices. The issue is, to what extent does 
Practice Note 7 concurs with the South African transfer pricing tax legislation (section 
31 of the Act) as the OECD guidelines recommends.   
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As discussed in chapter 2, section 31 of the Act was changed and updated several 
times since the year 2007. The first change was an amendment to the connected 
person definition as contained in section 1 and section 31(2) of the Act with the 
inclusion of the word ‘group of companies’ in the connected persons definition. The 
second amendment was a restructuring of section 31 of the Act with the primary 
change being the removal of the term ‘international agreement’, and the third change 
was the amendment of adding subsection (1A) of section 31 of the Act by broadening 
the connected person definition with regard to the intellectual property transaction.  
 
 
Even though these amendments were made in section 31 of the Act, the issue still 
remains that the amendments in section 31 of the Act are not effected in Practice Note 
7. By virtue of Practice Note 7 not being updated with the amendments of section 31 
of the Act, it means that Practice Note 7 does not concur with the OECD guidelines as 
envisaged in the OECD guidelines that a country transfer pricing rules/guidelines 
should concur with the domestic transfer pricing tax legislation. 
 
 
3.5.3 Practice Note 7 and the Arm’s-length Principle 
 
 
Practice Note 7 concurs with the OECD guidelines as it has also adopted the arm’s-
length principle embodied in paragraph 1 of the OECD Model Tax Treaty. As 
discussed in chapter 1 of this research study, Practice Note 7 also accepts the view of 
the OECD guidelines that the determination of arm’s-length price is not an exact 
science and that certain factors should be taken into consideration with regard to the 
application of the arm’s-length principle (Practice Note7, Para. 7).  
 
 
Such comparability factors include the availability of information; determining the 
party to be evaluated in a controlled transaction; determination of an arm’s-length 
range; use of multiple year data confirming transfer prices through multiple methods; 
materiality in a practical assessment of comparability; interest-free loans to non-
residents; losses incurred by a member of a multinational; recognition of actual 
transactions undertaken; evaluation of separate and combined transactions; intentional 
set-offs; arrangements common between group-companies; real bargaining at the time 
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the transaction was entered into the use of hindsight; safe harbours; and the effect of 
government policies (Practice Note7, Para. 11).  
 
  
3.5.4 Practice Note 7 and the Transfer Pricing Methods 
 
 
Practice Note 7 does accept the use of the five transfer pricing methods for 
determining arm’s-length price as adopted by the OECD guidelines These methods 
are the three traditional transactional methods which consist of the control 
uncontrolled price, cost plus and resale price and the transactional profit methods 
which consist of the transaction net margin method and profit split.  
 
 
Although there have been some updates with regard to the status of the transactional 
profit methods, that they should not be viewed as methods of last resort through the 
issuing of the discussion draft document addressing the status of the transactional 
profit methods, these updates have not been effected in Practice Note 7.  
 
 
The view of Practice Note 7 on the transactional profit methods is that they are still 
the methods of last resort as they are less reliable as compared to the traditional 
transactional methods ( Practice Note 7, Para.  9.7.2).  
 
 
3.5.5 Practice Note 7 and the Transfer Pricing Administrative Procedures 
 
 
Practice Note 7 does not make provision for some administrative procedures used to 
resolve transfer pricing issues mentioned in the OECD guidelines, such as the mutual 
agreement procedures, the simultaneous tax examination procedures and the 
arbitration procedures.  
 
 
Practice Note 7 does however make mention of certain administrative procedures 
used to resolve transfer pricing issues and ensuring that the transactions of the 
multinational enterprises are at arm’s-length, which are mentioned in the OECD 
guidelines. Such administrative procedures are examination practices, burden of 
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proof, advance pricing agreements and safe harbours. The view of Practice Note 7 on 
these administrative procedures is as follows: 
 
 
a) Examination Practices 
 
 
Practice Note 7 mentions that the SARS Commissioner may, in conducting a transfer 
pricing examination ensuring compliance to the arm’s-length principle, follow certain 
procedures accessing information from the taxpayer or external sources, publicly 
undisclosed sources and also from the foreign person connected to the taxpayer 
information (Practice Note 7, Para. 12.3 -12.4). 
 
 
Practice Note 7 explains further that the SARS Commissioner may also pay close 
attention to the transactions of the taxpayer which are with entities residing at lower 
tax rates jurisdictions than South Africa. In addition to the transfer pricing tax 
legislation, the SARS Commissioner may also apply the general anti-avoidance 
provisions on transfer pricing practices (Practice Note 7, Para. 12.6 -12.7).  
 
 
b) Burden of Proof 
 
 
The discretion to adjust the consideration in respect of a transaction that it is not at 
arm’s-length, is with the SARS Commissioner. Should the SARS Commissioner 
discharge its burden of proof that a transaction is not at arm’s-length, it will be up to a 
taxpayer to prove an appropriate transfer pricing policy, determine the arm’s-length 
amount as required by section 31and produce documentation to evidence their 
analysis (Practice Note 7, Para. 12.15). 
 
 
c) Penalties and Interest 
 
 
The Act does not impose specific penalties and interest in respect of non-arm’s-length 
transfer pricing practices. General penalty provisions, additional tax and offence 
provisions are applicable in the event of default or omission in the completion of the 
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tax return or evasion of taxation and will also apply to default, evasion or omission 
relating to transfer pricing. The Act provides that interest should be levied on the 
underpayment of any tax and will also apply if the underpayment of tax results from 
non-compliance with section 31 of the Act (Practice Note 7, Para. 13).  
 
 
Furthermore, the Act deems any amount adjusted or disallowed with respect to non-
arm’s-length transfer pricing practices in terms of section 31 of the Act to have been 
distributed to a recipient by the company. The recipient in this case might be a 
shareholder and such amount deemed to be received is subject to dividend tax 
(Practice Note 7, Para. 14). 
 
 
d) Advance Pricing Agreements 
 
 
Practice Note 7 does not make provision for advanced pricing agreement and it does 
mention that the advance pricing agreement process will not in the foreseeable future, 
be made available to South African taxpayers (Practice Note 7, Para. 16). Practice 
Note 7 does however mention that in the event that the taxpayer has entered into the 
advanced pricing agreement in a foreign country, it would be expected of the 
taxpayer’s transactions to comply with the arm’s-length requirements in terms of 
section 31 of the Act (Practice Note 7, Para. 12.5). 
 
 
e) Safe Harbours 
  
 
Practice Note 7 provides a brief explanation with regard to the use of safe harbours 
and concurs with the view of the OECD guidelines that safe harbours should not be 
used (Practice Note 7, Para. 11.16). 
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3.5.6 Practice Note 7 and the Transfer Pricing Documentation Requirements 
 
 
Practice Note 7 concurs with the OECD guidelines for transfer pricing 
documentations procedures. It mentions that there is no explicit statutory requirement 
to prepare and maintain transfer pricing documentation in South Africa. Practice Note 
7 does, however, emphasise that it is in the taxpayer’s best interest to document how 
transfer prices have been determined, since adequate documentation is the best way to 
demonstrate that transfer prices are consistent with the arm’s-length principle, as 
required by section 31 of the Act. 
 
 
Even though Practice Note 7 does not specify a comprehensive pre-defined set of 
transfer pricing documentation which a taxpayer should prepare, it does however 
provide that the transfer pricing should address the following (Practice Note 7, Para. 
10.3.6): 
 
 
a) identification of transactions in terms of international agreements entered into 
with connected persons and the extent of any other commercial or financial 
relations with connected persons which fall within the scope of Section 31 of the 
Act 
 
 
b) copies of the international agreements entered into with connected persons 
 
 
c) a description of the nature and terms (including prices) of all the relevant 
transactions (including a series of transactions and any relevant off-setting 
transactions) 
 
 
d) the method that has been used to arrive at the nature and terms of the relevant 
transactions (including the functional analysis undertaken and an appraisal of 
potential comparables) 
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e) the reasons why the choice of method was considered to be the most appropriate 
to the relevant transactions and to the particular circumstances 
 
 
f) an explanation of the process used to select and apply the method used to establish 
the transfer prices and why it is considered to provide a result that is consistent 
with the arm’s-length principle 
 
g) information relied on in arriving at the arm’s-length terms such as commercial 
agreements with third parties, financial information, budgets, forecasts etc. 
 
 
h) details of any special circumstances that have influenced the price set by the 
taxpayer. 
 
 
Furthermore, Practice Note 7 provides that the SARS Commissioner would expect 
that the transfer pricing documentation of a taxpayer should also address the 
following (Practice Note 7, Para. 10.3.7): 
 
 
a) which goods or service, if any, are considered most comparable to the goods or 
services being reviewed 
 
 
b) its major competitors 
 
 
c) the competitors the taxpayer considers most comparable 
 
 
d) the methodologies used and why they should be considered appropriate in the 
taxpayer’s particular circumstances.  
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3.5.7 Practice Note 7 and the Transfer Pricing treatment on Intellectual Property 
transactions 
 
 
In respect of the transfer pricing treatment on intellectual property transactions, 
Practice Note 7 agrees to the approach which is adopted in Chapter VI of the OECD 
guidelines. Practice Note 7 provides that,  
 
 
‘The Commissioner considers the guidance provided in that chapter relevant and recommends 
that taxpayers follow the guidance in establishing arm’s-length conditions in international 
agreements with connected persons involving intra-group services.’ 
 
 
3.5.8 Practice Note 7 and the Transfer Pricing treatment on Intra-Group Services 
transactions 
 
 
Practice Note 7 concurs with the OECD guidelines with regard to the transfer pricing 
treatment of the intra-group services transactions. Practice Note 7 specifically 
mentions that the SARS Commissioner will considers the guidance provided in 
Chapter VII of the OECD guidelines relevant in respect of the transfer pricing 
treatment on the intra-group services transactions, and recommends that taxpayers 
follow the guidance in establishing arm’s-length conditions of such transactions. 
 
 
3.5.9 Practice Note 7 and the Transfer Pricing treatment on Cost Contribution 
Arrangements 
 
 
In respect of the transfer pricing treatment on cost contribution arrangements, Practice 
Note 7 agrees to the approach which is adopted in Chapter VIII of the OECD 
guidelines. Practice Note 7 provides that,  
 
 
‘The Commissioner considers the guidance provided in that chapter relevant and recommends 
that taxpayers follow the guidance in establishing arm’s-length conditions in international 
agreements with connected persons involving cost contribution arrangements.’ 
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3.5.10 Practice Note 7 and the Transfer Pricing treatment of Permanent 
Establishment  
 
 
Although the OECD has issued a number of discussion draft documents with regard 
to the transfer pricing treatment of a permanent establishment businesses, Practice 
Note 7 still does not provide guidance on how the transfer pricing transactions of a 
permanent establishment business should be treated. This is despite the fact that 
section 31 of the Act requires that a transaction between a taxpayer and a permanent 
established business should be at arm’s-length. Practice Note 7 does not make the 
effort of making any reference that the OECD guidelines or OECD Model Treaty 
should be applied in this case as it does with the intangible property, intra-group 
services and cost contribution arrangement transactions. 
 
 
3.5.11 Practice Note 7 and the Transfer Pricing treatment on aspects of business 
restructuring 
 
 
Practice Note 7 does not make any mention of the treatment of the business 
restructuring effecting transfer pricing, even after the OECD has issued a discussion 
draft document providing suggestions on how the arm’s-length principle should be 
applied when business restructuring is taking place.  
 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to address the second sub-problem of this research 
study, which is to determine whether Practice Note 7 in its current status is consistent 
with the current status of the OECD guidelines, and whether, as a result of being 
consistent or inconsistent with the current status of the OECD guidelines, Practice 
Note 7 can be included in the regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length price in 
the South African transfer pricing tax legislation in order to amend the legislation, so 
that it becomes prescriptive. 
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To proceed with the argument of whether or not the South African transfer pricing tax 
legislation should be amended to be prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact at 
arm’s-length, the analysis of the impact of not having prescriptive transfer pricing tax 
legislation and the impact of having prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation is 
conducted in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: TRANSFER PRICING TAX LEGISLATION IN THE US 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to address the third sub-problem of the research study, 
which is the impact of having a non-prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation and 
the impact of having a prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation. This is achieved by 
looking at the enforcement of transfer pricing tax legislation in the US.  
 
 
To this end the chapter analyses the background and the history of the US transfer 
pricing tax legislation (Section 482), the provisions of section 482, and the other 
transfer pricing compliance procedures implemented in the US such as penalty and 
documentation procedures, advance pricing agreements and competent authority 
procedures, tax returns and tax treaties. The chapter also provides an analysis of the 
relationship between section 482 and the OECD guidelines.  
 
 
The chapter further provides an analysis of the US transfer pricing tax cases, prior to 
the year 1968 when section 482 was not yet  prescriptive, and subsequent to 1968 
after section 482 was amended to be prescriptive, to investigate the impact of having 
non-prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation and prescriptive transfer pricing 
legislation.  
 
 
4.2 BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE US TRANSFER PRICING TAX 
LEGISLATION 
 
 
The US tax law is made up of over 7,000 statutes or numbered code sections. The 
code sections are referred to as Internal Revenue Code Sections or IRCs. These 
statutes are enforced by the organisation called Internal Revenue Service (also known 
as the IRS) operating under the US Treasury Department. The US transfer pricing tax 
legislation is contained in one of the statutes or numbered code section, simply known 
as IRCs 482.  
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The section gives the IRS Commissioner authority to make adjustments and allocate 
the income, deductions, and credits of commonly controlled organisations, trades or 
business to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly reflect income (SARS, Transfer 
Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: Participation Guide 
13). In order to have a good understanding of this legislation, the history of the 
enforcement of this legislation is analysed below.   
 
 
4.2.1 The Period between the 1910s and 1920s.   
 
 
The US transfer pricing tax legislation was introduced as early as 1917. Since the US 
transfer pricing tax legislation was introduced in the year 1917, it has gone through a 
number of updates (Ciancia, 2001:4; Eden, Dacin, and Wan, 2001:7; Steiss and 
Banchette, 1995:1570).  
 
 
On 23 November 1921, Section 240(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921 was enacted in the 
IRCs (Steiss and Banchette, 1995:1570; Ciancia, 2001:5). The section provided that,  
 
 
‘In any case of two or more related trades or businesses (whether unincorporated or 
incorporated and whether organized in the United States or not) owned or controlled directly 
or indirectly by the same interests, the Commissioner may consolidate the accounts of such 
related trades and businesses, in any proper case, for the purpose of making an accurate 
distribution or apportionment of gains, profits, income, deductions, or capital between or 
among such related trades or businesses.’ 
 
 
The introduction of section 240(d) came as a reaction to the concern by the US 
Congress, that taxpayers were able to use subsidiaries for manipulating the income of 
a parent corporation. The purpose of this section was to give the IRS Commissioner 
authority to consolidate the accounts of related parties and such authority was deemed 
necessary to prevent the arbitrary shifting of profits and related businesses, 
particularly in the case of subsidiary corporations and foreign trade corporations 
(Ciancia, 2001:5; Steiss and Banchette, 1995:1570). 
 
 
 
 124 
Section 240(d) was revised through the introduction of section 45 in the year 1928. 
Section 45 of IRCs gave the IRS Commissioner a broader authority to adjust accounts 
of related corporations and also affirmed the IRS Commissioner authority to initiate 
such adjustments to a taxpayer’s income as may be necessary to prevent tax 
avoidance and to ensure clear reflection of income among related parties in 
determining true tax liability (Webber, 2001: 2006; Ciancia, 2001:5).  
 
 
The section provided that, 
 
 
‘In any case of two or more trades or business (whether or not incorporated, whether or not 
organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by the same interests, the Commissioner is authorized to distribute, apportion, or 
allocate gross income or deductions between or among such trades or businesses, if he 
determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent 
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of such trades or businesses.’ 
 
 
4.2.2 The Period between the 1930s and 1950s.   
 
 
In the year 1935, the transfer pricing regulations in section 482 were promulgated 
under section 45-1(b) and provided the arm’s-length principle as a fundamental 
principle and recommended that the arm’s-length principle be used by the IRS 
Commissioner in making adjustments on income of related parties, and preventing tax 
evasion among related parties (Ciancia, 2001:6; Steiss and Banchette, 1995:1570). 
 
 
The regulations provided that, 
 
 
‘The purpose of Section 45 is to place a controlled taxpayer on a tax parity with an 
uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, 
the true net income from the property and business of a controlled taxpayer. The interests 
controlling a group of controlled taxpayers are assumed to have complete power to cause each 
controlled taxpayer so to conduct its affairs that its transactions and accounting records truly 
reflect the net income from the property and business of each of the controlled taxpayers. If, 
however, this has not been done, and the taxable net incomes are thereby understated, the 
statute contemplates that the Commissioner shall intervene, and, by making such distributions, 
apportionments, or allocations as he may deem necessary of gross income or deductions, or of 
any item or element affecting net income, between or among the controlled taxpayers 
constituting the group, shall determine the true net income of each controlled taxpayer. The 
standard to be applied in every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm’s length 
with another uncontrolled taxpayer.’ 
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The regulation under section 45 did however not provide any guidance on how the 
arm’s-length price should be determined and this function was left to the US courts to 
be performed (Steiss and Banchette, 1995:1570). In the year 1954, section 45 was 
renumbered and it became section 482 in the IRC.  It has since then continued as the 
relevant section for regulating transfer pricing practices in the US (Desai, 2002:4; 
Webber, 2006:14). 
 
 
4.2.3 The Period between the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
 
In the 1960s the business climate of the foreign multinational enterprises operating in 
the US changed substantially. There was a renewal of concern about the possibilities 
of tax avoidance offered by transfer price manipulation. This was due to the 
multinational enterprises in the US being active in expanding abroad. The US 
Treasury Department concluded that section 482 did not effectively protect the US 
taxing jurisdiction, and therefore, the US Congress strongly supported more active 
enforcement of controls over transfer pricing (IRS, 2003:27-28; Steiss and Banchette, 
1995:1571). 
 
 
Another reason why section 482 was considered ineffective against transfer pricing 
practices in the US, was that it was established that the US courts were inconsistent in 
making judgments on what was regarded as arm’s-length price, as the section had no 
guidelines on how to determine arm’s-length price. A review of US litigation 
confirms that prior to the year 1968, there was a relatively broad judicial approach in 
interpreting the law and determining whether specific related-party transactions 
reflected the arm’s-length principle (IRS, 2003:27-28; Aiv-Ayonah, 2007). A detailed 
analysis of these cases is conducted later in this chapter. 
 
 
In the year 1968, regulations were issued under section 482 that divided related party 
transactions into five classes, and provided methods and guidelines for determining 
arm’s-length price (Steiss and Banchette, 1995:1571; Desai, 2002:4; Ciancia,2001:7). 
These regulations are discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
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4.2.4 The Period between the 1980s and 1990s 
 
 
In the 1980s, section 482 again experienced other challenges with regard to the 
intangible property transactions. The US Congress had a concern that high profit 
intangibles were being transferred outside the US tax jurisdiction without adequate 
consideration, and that history with regard to the application of section 482 reflected 
dissatisfaction with comparability analysis in some judicial decisions (IRS,1999:3; 
Eden, Dacin, and Wan, 2001:7; Steiss and Banchette, 1995:1575). 
 
 
In the year 1986, the US Congress added a second sentence to section 482, which 
required related party transfers of intangible property to yield income ‘commensurate 
with the income attributable to the intangible’ (IRS,1999:3; Eden, Dacin, and Wan, 
2001:7; Steiss and Banchette, 1995:1575). 
 
 
After the 1986 amendments, in particular the introduction of the commensurate-with-
income test, the US Congress concluded that there still remained many unresolved 
section 482 issues. Accordingly, it recommended that a comprehensive study of 
related party pricing be undertaken, with the clear objective and intent of formulating 
such modifications to the law as may be needed to ensure its effective application 
(Steiss and Banchette, 1995:1577). 
 
 
In October 1988, the US government released the comprehensive document under the 
US Treasury Department called, A Study of Intercompany Pricing Under Section 482, 
also known as ‘the White Paper’. The White Paper contained extensive commentary 
on the difficulties experienced in applying section 482 and its attendant regulations, 
and offered recommendations, methodology, and basic principles that should be 
reflected in the drafting of further amendments (White Paper,1988).  
 
 
The primary motivation for the White Paper had been the need to consider how the 
1986 commensurate-with-income standard should be applied in respect of intangibles. 
The issue of the White Paper by the US Congress has however progressed much 
further than its initial objective, as it addressed other aspects of transfer pricing with 
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regard to the application of section 482 (Avi-Ayonah, 2007; Steiss and Banchette, 
1995:1575).  
 
 
In the years 1989 and 1990, the US Congress focused on one key area of the White 
Paper discussion, namely, the problems encountered by the IRS in obtaining 
appropriate information to enable it to pursue pricing examinations on a timely basis, 
particularly with respect to US activities of foreign-based entities. This resulted in the 
US congress responding by introducing section 6662 which was the section making 
provision for the IRS Commissioner to specifically levy penalties for failure to 
comply with information demands with regard to transfer pricing issues (Steiss and 
Banchette, 1995:1578; IRS,1999:4).  
 
 
In the year 1993, these provisions were amended to specifically focus on whether the 
taxpayer generates contemporaneous documentation and analysis of its transfer 
pricing decisions, and provides such documentation promptly in response to a request 
from the IRS (IRS, 1999:4).  
 
 
In mid 1990s, a draft revenue procedure was released which provided the basis for an 
advance determination ruling process. At the time of the release, the IRS commented 
that the purpose of this ruling process was to produce an understanding between the 
IRS and the taxpayer on an appropriate method under section 482 for determining the 
transfer pricing practices or cost sharing arrangements of controlled taxpayers (Steiss 
and Banchette, 1995:1580; IRS, 1999:3).  
 
 
This initiative represented a major departure from the IRS’s historical resolve to rule 
only on matters of legal interpretation as opposed to factual issues, such as pricing. 
After comments on the draft had been reviewed and considered, formal ruling 
procedures dealing with advance pricing agreements were released in 1991 (Steiss 
and Banchette, 1995:1580; IRS, 1999:3; Eden, Dacin, and Wan, 2001:8).   
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The introduction of the advance pricing agreements was followed by the proposed 
regulations in 1992, and temporary regulations in 1993, and the final regulations 
issued under section 482 in July 1994. The 1994 regulations represented a 
comprehensive restatement of the rules implementing the arm’s-length standard of 
section 482 and commensurate with income standard added in 1986 (Steiss and 
Banchette, 1995:1581-82; IRS, 1999:4; Eden, Dacin, and Wan, 2001:8).  
 
 
The same year in which the final regulations were issued, the IRS also issued 
temporary regulations on penalty provision under section 6662(e) and then the final 
regulations in the year 1996 (IRS,1999:4). Section 482 and its regulations are 
discussed in the section below. 
 
 
4.3 THE US SECTION 482 AND ITS REGULATIONS 
 
 
4.3.1 Section 482 
 
 
The purpose of section 482 is to ensure that taxpayers clearly reflect income 
attributable to controlled transactions and to prevent the avoidance of taxes with 
respect to those transactions. Section 482 provides that, 
 
 
‘In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorporated, 
whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated) owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or 
allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, 
trades, or businesses, if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is 
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such 
organizations, trades, or businesses. In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible 
property (within the meaning of section 936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer 
or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.’ (Underlined 
emphasis added.) 
 
 
4.3.2 Application of Section 482 
 
 
As per the underlined above, there are four prerequisites to which section 482 can 
apply and these prerequisite are analysed below. The fourth prerequisite is analysed 
later in this chapter, when the treatment of the intangible transaction under section 
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482 is discussed (SARS, Transfer Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border 
Transactions: Participation Guide:15).  
 
 
a) Two or more organisations are involved in the transaction(s) 
 
 
The definition specifically encompasses any organisation and intends to include sole 
proprietorship, partnership, trusts, estates, associations and corporations. It makes no 
difference whether these entities are domestic or foreign, taxable or exempt (SARS, 
Transfer Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: Participation 
Guide:15). 
 
 
b)  Common ownership or control 
 
 
The second prerequisite, common ownership, is also broadly defined. The regulations 
state that any kind of control, whether or not legally enforceable and however 
exercised, is sufficient. The reality of control is decisive, not the form or mode of 
exercise. It is further determined that a presumption of control exists if clear but 
arbitrary shifting of income or deductions is present (SARS, Transfer Pricing, 
Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: Participation Guide:15).  
 
 
c) The IRS determination 
 
 
Finally, for section 482 to apply there must be an IRS determination that a 
reallocation is necessary. In this case the allocation can only be made by the IRS and 
not the taxpayer. Taxpayers cannot compel the Service to apply section 482, nor can 
they file amended or untimely returns to decrease taxable income based on allocations 
or other adjustments to their controlled transactions. Taxpayers, however, may only 
use section 482 to report on a timely filed return of an arm’s-length result that is 
different from the actual result (SARS, Transfer Pricing, Examining Intercompany 
Cross Border Transactions: Participation Guide:15).  
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4.3.3 The Subsections of Section 482 
 
 
Section 482 issued in the year 1994 reflects three basic concepts, namely; 
comparability, flexibility, and documentation. As discussed in chapter 2, 
comparability means that the prices paid by the taxpayers to related parties should 
compare favourably to prices paid by unrelated parties in similar transactions. 
Flexibility means that the uncertainty inherent in this highly factual area needs to be 
accommodated by using transfer pricing methods that achieve the most direct reliable 
measure of the arm’s-length result in the taxpayer’s particular situation. The 
documentation means that the taxpayer must establish the economic justification for 
its transfer prices in the year the transactions occurred, and not later when the IRS 
auditors arrive (SARS, Transfer Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border 
Transactions: Participation Guide:16).  
 
 
Section 482 is divided into 8 main subsections and these subsections are analysed as 
follows: 
 
4.3.3.1 Subsection 1.482-1 
 
 
As discussed previously in this chapter, subsection 1.482-1 provides that only the IRS 
may make allocations under this section and again provides that the taxpayer is 
generally barred from invoking the provisions of this section (SARS, Transfer 
Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: Participation 
Guide:17). 
 
 
This subsection further offers guiding principles for the application of the best method 
rule approach and comparability analysis. Under the best method rule, subsection 
1.482-1 requires that the arm’s-length result of a controlled transaction must be 
determined, under the facts and circumstances which provide the most reliable 
measure of an arm’s-length result. There is no strict priority of methods and any 
method may be used without establishing the inapplicability of another method 
(SARS, Transfer Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: 
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Participation Guide:17). In selecting a method, the factors to consider in identifying 
the best method are: 
 
 
a) The degree of comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions. 
 
 
b) The completeness and accuracy of the data. 
 
 
c) The soundness of the assumptions relied upon. 
 
 
d) The sensitivity of results to deficiencies in data and assumptions. 
 
 
e) Where two methods produce inconsistent results, the confirmation of the chosen 
result is by comparison with a third method. 
 
 
Subsection 1.482-1 recognises that there will not merely be a single, but a range of 
possible arm’s-length results of a controlled transaction (arm’s-length range). The 
results reported by the taxpayer for a controlled transaction will not be subject to an 
IRS adjustment if the results fall within the arm’s-length range (Deloitte & Touch 
Tohmatsu, 2001:46).  
 
4.3.3.2 Subsection 1.482-2 
 
 
This subsection provides guidance on the application of section 482 on the types of 
transactions which would be affected by section 482. These transactions are analysed 
below. 
 
 
a) Loans and Advances 
 
 
Subsection 1.482-2 requires that when one member of a group makes a loan or 
advance to another member of the group, either directly or indirectly, that member 
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must charge an arm’s-length rate of interest, from the day after the indebtedness arises 
to the day on which the indebtedness is redeemed, subject to certain exceptions. An 
arm’s-length interest rate is defined as the rate of interest that was charged, or would 
have been charged at the time the debt arose, in independent transactions with or 
between unrelated parties under similar circumstances. The regulations include a safe 
harbour rate based on the applicable federal rate, but this rate does not apply to any 
loan or advance expressed in a currency other than US dollars (Deloitte & Touch 
Tohmatsu, 2001:47).  
 
 
b) Services transactions 
 
 
Subsection 1.482-2 states that the IRS may make adjustments under section 482 
where one member of a group of controlled entities performs marketing, managerial, 
administrative, technical, or other services for the benefit or on behalf of, another 
member of the group, for less than an arm’s-length charge. An arm’s-length charge 
for services is defined as the amount that was charged or would have been charged for 
the same or similar services in independent transactions with, or between unrelated 
parties under similar circumstances, considering all the relevant facts (Deloitte & 
Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:47-48).  
 
 
For services that are not ‘integral’ to the business activity of the service provider or 
the recipient, the regulations include a cost chargeback safe harbour. This safe 
harbour includes all direct and indirect costs of providing such services, and taxpayers 
may use any reasonable method of allocating and apportioning these expenses (for 
example, allocation formulas or analysis of time spent). The cost chargeback safe 
harbour is not available for so-called ‘integral’ services, which are subject to the 
arm’s-length principle (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:47-48).  
  
 
One significant issue that arises in the services area is whether the particular services 
performed are merely a duplication of a service that the related party is performing for 
itself, or whether the support services are provided solely to the subsidiary. This 
distinction between ‘stewardship’ services, for which no compensation is required, 
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and support services that require an arm’s-length charge, often applies when the 
services involve the subsidiary’s day-to-day operations (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 
2001:47). 
 
 
c) The use of tangible property (Leases) and Sales of tangible property transactions. 
 
 
Subsection 1.482-2 requires that when a member of a controlled group, by lease or 
other similar arrangement, transfers the use of tangible property to another member of 
the group, the lease must include an arm’s-length charge between the parties. Arm’s-
length rent is defined as the amount of rent that was charged, or would have been 
charged, for the use of the same or similar property, in independent transactions 
between unrelated parties under similar circumstances (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 
2001:48).  
 
 
When determining the arm’s-length price on rental income or expense, the period and 
location of the use, the owner’s investment in the property or rent paid for the 
property, expenses of maintaining the property, type of property involved, its 
condition and all relevant facts must be considered (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 
2001:47-48).  
  
4.3.3.3 Subsection 1.482-3 
 
 
This subsection provides guiding principles for the use of the five specific methods 
and unspecified methods to determine taxable income in connection with the sale of 
tangible property. The six methods for determining taxable income are: the controlled 
uncontrolled price, resale price, cost plus, comparable profit (as discussed previously 
in this chapter, comparable profit method is similar to transactional net margin 
method in the OECD guidelines) and other unspecified methods (SARS, Transfer 
Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: Participation 
Guide:17). 
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4.3.3.4 Subsection 1.482-4 
 
 
Subsection 1.482-4 provides guiding principles on the specific transfer pricing 
methods which should be used in the allocation of income on intangible property 
transactions.  The 1968 regulations provided little guidance for the determination of 
arm’s-length consideration for transfers of intangible property (SARS, Transfer 
Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: Participation Guide: 
17).  
 
 
They provided that (section 482):  
 
 
‘In determining the amount of an arm’s-length consideration [for a transfer of intangible 
property], the standard to be applied is the amount that would have been paid by an unrelated 
party for the same intangible property under the same circumstances. Where there have been 
transfers by the transferor to unrelated parties involving the same or similar intangible 
property under the same or similar circumstances the amount of the consideration for such 
transfers shall generally be the best indication of an arm’s-length consideration.’ 
 
 
After the amendments in the year 1994, subsection 1.482-4 now provides that arm’s-
length consideration for a transfer of intangible property must be determined using 
one of four methods: (a) the comparable uncontrolled transaction method, (b) the 
comparable profits method, (c) the profit split method,  (d) any unspecified method. 
Subsection 1.482-4 provides that the arm’s-length consideration must be determined 
under the method that, under the facts and circumstances, provides the most reliable 
measure of arm’s-length results (the best method rule) (SARS, Transfer Pricing, 
Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: Participation Guide:17). 
 
 
An ‘intangible’ is defined as an asset that has substantial value independent of the 
services of any individual, including: (i) patents, inventions, formulae, processes, 
designs, patterns or know-how, (ii) copyrights and literary, musical or artistic 
compositions, (iii) trademarks, trade names, or brand names, (iv) franchises, licenses, 
or contracts, (v) methods, programs, systems, procedures, campaigns, surveys, 
studies, forecasts, estimates, customer lists or technical data, (vi) other similar items 
that derive value from their intellectual content or other intangible properties, not 
from their physical attributes (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:50).  
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This subsection continues that the owner of a particular intangible is either the legal 
owner of the right to exploit the intangible if it is legally protected, or the developer of 
the intangible if the intangible is not legally protected. However, if the owner received 
assistance (for example, loans, services, tangible or intangible property) in the 
development or enhancement of the intangible from a related party, then such related 
party may be entitled to an arm’s-length consideration for such assistance (Deloitte & 
Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:50).  
 
 
Subsection 1.482-4 provides that contractual terms of intercompany agreements, 
including allocations of risk, will be respected if they are consistent with the 
economic substance of the transactions. If the terms are inconsistent with economic 
substance, the IRS may disregard such terms and impute terms consistent with 
economic substance of the transactions (Wills, 1999: 15-16).  
 
 
Furthermore, in the absence of a written intercompany agreement, the IRS may 
impute an agreement consistent with economic substance (Wills, 1999: 15-16). 
 
 
This subsection gives guidance on the ‘commensurate with income’ principle with 
respect to transfer of intangible property. In terms of commensurate with income 
principle, subsection 1.482-4 authorises the IRS to adjust the consideration charged 
for the transfer in subsequent years, even if the charges in earlier years are determined 
to be arm’s-length (periodic adjustments). Exceptions to the periodic adjustments rule 
are discussed. Among the exceptions are cases in which the consideration charged for 
the transfer is based on an exact comparable or, where an inexact comparable is used, 
the actual results do not diverge (except due to extraordinary events beyond the 
taxpayer’s control that could not reasonably have been anticipated) from projected 
results by more than 20% (IRS,1999: 2.12-13).  
  
 
4.3.3.5 Subsection 1.482-5  
  
 
Subsection 1.482-5 provides guiding principles respectively on the application of the 
comparable profit method. Subsection 1.482-5 provides that a reliable application of 
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the comparable profit method requires the selection of a profit level indicator that will 
produce the most reliable measure of income that the tested party would have earned 
had it dealt with the related party at arm’s-length. Profit level indicators that may be 
used are: (i) the return on operating assets, (ii) financial ratios that measure 
relationships between profit and costs or sales revenue such as, but not limited to, the 
operating margin or the Berry ratio (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:51-52).  
 
4.3.3.6 Subsection 1.482-6 
 
 
Subsection 1.482-6 provides guiding principles on the profit split method (SARS, 
Transfer Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: Participation 
Guide:17; Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:52).  
.  
 
4.3.3.7 Subsection 1.482-7 
 
 
Subsection 1.482-7 provides the guiding principles for sharing of costs and risks 
(costs sharing arrangement rules). The cost sharing regulations under subsection 1-
482.7 sets forth the rules under which affiliates may share ownership of intangibles by 
sharing the development costs, thereby obviating the need to apply the transfer of 
intangible property rules to determine an arm’s-length royalty (Deloitte & Touch 
Tohmatsu, 2001:54) (SARS,Transfer Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border 
Transactions: Participation Guide: 17; IRS,1999:2.14). 
 
 
This subsection provides that a taxpayer must satisfy formal requirements in order to 
claim the treatment provided under the regulations for a qualified cost sharing 
arrangement. In particular, there must be contemporaneous documentation of the 
arrangement, the methodology, the research to be undertaken, and each participant’s 
interest in any intangible property that is developed. The IRS may apply the treatment 
under the regulations to what in substance constitutes a cost sharing arrangement, 
notwithstanding a failure to meet a formal requirement for a qualified cost sharing 
arrangement (IRS,1999: 2.14). 
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Subsection 1.482-7 provides that IRS adjustments with regard to a qualified cost 
sharing arrangement are limited to bringing cost shares into equivalence with benefits 
shares. However, if a controlled taxpayer acquires an interest in intangible property 
from another controlled taxpayer (other than in consideration for bearing a share of 
the costs of the intangible’s development), then the IRS may make adjustments under 
the general rules governing transfers of intangible property. The participation rules 
generally require that a participant in a qualified cost sharing arrangement must 
reasonably anticipate benefits from the use of intangibles that are developed as the 
result of research undertaken, pursuant to the arrangement (covered intangibles) 
(IRS,1999: 2.14). 
  
 
The regulations flexibly permit the taxpayer to define the scope of research and 
development to be covered (intangible development area). Thus, the intangible 
development area includes research and development actually undertaken under the 
cost sharing arrangement. Covered intangibles include any intangible that actually 
results from the research and development under the cost sharing arrangement 
(IRS,1999:2.15).  
 
 
The intangible development costs to be shared under a cost sharing arrangement 
include all costs related to the intangible development area (for example, operating 
expenses, other than depreciation or amortization, plus a charge for the use of tangible 
property), plus cost sharing payments made, and minus cost sharing payments 
received. Separate consideration (the buy-in) is required for pre-existing intangible 
property made available to the arrangement, as determined under the general rules 
governing transfer of intangible property (IRS,1999:2.15). 
 
4.3.3.8 Subsection 1.482-8 
 
 
Subsection 1.482-8 provides examples of the best method rule (SARS Transfer 
Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: Participation 
Guide:17).  
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4.4  OTHER US TRANSFER PRICING COMPLIANCE PROVISIONS 
 
 
4.4.1 Penalties and Contemporaneous Documentation 
 
 
Section 6662(e) and (h) of the IRC sets forth penalties of 20% and 40% for certain 
increases in US income tax attributable to section 482 adjustments. One significant 
objective of the transfer pricing penalty was to improve taxpayer compliance with the 
arm’s-length standard by encouraging taxpayers to make reasonable efforts to 
determine and document arm’s-length prices for their intercompany transactions 
(Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:57). The penalty will, however, not apply to the 
extent that the taxpayer complies with specified contemporaneous documentation 
requirements. In addition, a taxpayer can avoid the imposition of the transfer pricing 
penalty only if contemporaneous documentation is created by the time the taxpayer 
files its return for each specific year (Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:57). 
 
 
4.4.2 Tax Returns 
 
 
Form 5471 is required to be filed by the US taxpayer for every foreign corporation in 
which the parent company holds a 50% or larger investment in the foreign 
corporation’s voting stock. Schedule M of the form requires the taxpayer to provide 
reports on the transactions between the foreign corporation and the shareholders or 
other related persons. This form serves as a primary source that helps the IRS 
examiners to identify any potential transfer pricing issues and it also requires that 
taxpayers should comply with the  arm’s length principle as required by section 482 
(SARS: Transfer Pricing, Examining Intercompany Cross Border Transactions: 
Participation Guide, 2-9,10).  
 
 
4.4.3 The US Tax Treaties 
 
 
The US government has signed a number of tax treaties with a number of countries, 
including South Africa. The US tax treaties are also modelled from the OECD Model 
Treaty and they incorporate the arm’s-length principle for the purpose of evaluating 
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all related party transactions. Section 482 does not violate the arm’s-length principle 
in the US tax treaties. The US Treasury department confirms that there is no 
inconsistency between arm’s-length principle in section 482 and in the US tax treaties 
(Fisher and Nooman: 2009: 6171; Webber, 2006:19).    
 
 
4.4.4 Competent authority 
 
 
In situations where the application of the US and foreign tax laws would result in the 
taxpayer being subject to double taxation, a taxpayer may invoke a tax treaty’s mutual 
assistance procedure to request relief from double taxation. Once a taxpayer’s request 
for relief is accepted, the competent authorities of both treaty countries will attempt to 
reach a settlement that eliminates double taxation through the mutual attribution of 
income, deductions, credits, or allowances between related taxpayers. A request for 
competent authority assistance may be filed under the following circumstances 
(Deloitte & Touch Tohmatsu, 2001:59): 
 
 
a) US initiated adjustment: upon receipt of a proposed adjustment in writing. 
 
 
b) Foreign initiated adjustment: As soon as the taxpayer believes that such filing is 
warranted based on the actions of the country proposing an adjustment. 
 
 
c) Transfer pricing related adjustment: when the taxpayer can establish that there is a 
probability of double taxation. 
 
 
4.4.5 Advance Pricing Agreements 
 
 
The IRS established a procedure to issue advance determinations for pricing methods 
proposed by the taxpayer. This enables taxpayers to have their controlled pricing 
structures sanctioned by the IRS for a specified number of years in an advanced 
pricing agreement. The negotiation and approval of an advanced pricing agreement 
can be a lengthy process, so the IRS also offers a streamlined advanced pricing 
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agreement process for smaller taxpayers (Californian Tax Board, Water’s Edge 
Manual, 2001:i).  
 
 
The advanced pricing agreement program commenced in the year 1991. By the year 
1999, more than 180 advanced pricing agreements had been finalised and 
approximately 195 advanced pricing agreement requests were pending. A goal of the 
advanced pricing agreements process is to reduce the time and expense of an audit. 
Under the advanced pricing agreements process, the taxpayer must file a specific, 
detailed pricing proposal with the IRS National Office in Washington D.C. 
(Californian Tax Board, Water’s Edge Manual, 2001:i).  
 
 
The information must include detailed descriptions of the effected transactions and 
the methodology used by the taxpayer in arriving at prices. The methodology used in 
the advance pricing agreement procedures should still be in terms of section 482 
(Californian Tax Board, Water’s Edge Manual, 2001:i). 
 
 
4.5 SECTION 482 AND THE OECD GUIDELINES 
 
 
One of the significant influences to the development of the OECD guidelines is the 
US section 482 regulations. The OECD revised its 1979 transfer pricing guidelines 
and introduced the new OECD guidelines in the year 1995 after the US amended its 
transfer pricing regulations in 1994.  
 
 
Section 482 regulations issued in 1994 and the OECD guidelines issued in 1995 are 
similar in structure and broadly compatible in approach. While differences remain, 
they are essentially differences of emphasis and their approaches are sufficiently 
similar. One of the more controversial aspects of the OECD guidelines issued in 1995, 
was the apparent yielding to the US through the sanctioning of the use of profit-based 
methods (Steiss and Banchette, 1995:1583). 
 
 
The OECD guidelines and profit methods in the section 482 regulations are generally 
similar, and the OECD guidelines seem to draw upon the US section 482 regulations. 
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The comparable profit method endeavours to determine appropriate profit levels that 
should have resulted in controlled business transactions if the returns on such 
transactions had been realised in a comparable, uncontrolled business (Steiss and 
Banchette, 1995:1583). 
 
 
Another similarity between section 482 regulations and the OECD guidelines is that, 
in the OECD guidelines, profit method is labelled a transactional net margin method 
whereas it is labelled comparable profit method in section 482 regulations. Both these 
methods are basically similar in approach, although there are differences in emphasis 
with respect to application (Steiss and Banchette, 1995:1583).  
 
 
4.6 THE US TRANSFER PRICING TAX CASE LAW PRIOR TO SECTION 482 
BEING AMDENDED IN THE YEAR 1968 TO INCLUDE REGULATIONS 
PRESCRIBING HOW TO TRANSACT AT ARM’S  LENGTH PRICE 
 
 
The concept of transacting at arm’s-length price between related parties has been dealt 
with by the US courts from as early as the 1830s, prior to the US Congress 
introducing the arm’s-length principle in the US tax law.   
 
 
In Estate of Delamater26 the court declined to rescind a transaction in part because 
arm’s-length dealing cured any potential impropriety attributable to relationship 
between the parties. In United States v. Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad 
Company27 the court invalidates the contract because of facts proving that the 
relations between the parties was so friendly that they were not trading at arm’s-
length (Webber, 2006: 5).  
 
 
The arm’s-length principle was first introduced in the US transfer pricing tax 
legislation in the year 1921 through the introduction of section 45. In the year 1935 
the regulations were promulgated under section 482’s predecessor, section 45 
                                               
26
 1Whart. 362 (1836) 
27
 238U.S. 516, 530 (1915) 
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requiring that related parties should transact at arm’s-length. Prior to the year 1935, 
section 45 did not specifically mention that taxpayers’ taxable income or transactions 
should reflect the arm’s-length principle. But the cases decided under section 45 prior 
to the arm’s-length regulations being promulgated in the year 1935, shows that the 
court applied the arm’s-length principle though section 45 did not contain the arm’s-
length principle (Webber, 2006: 6).  
 
 
In Advanced Cloak Co. v. Commissioner28 the Board of Tax Appeal first applied the 
arm’s-length principle under section 45 based on the language of section 45, which 
required that the income of the taxpayer should reflect the true taxable income.  
The court said (Webber, 2006:7),   
 
 
‘The purpose of section [section 45 (1928)] is to place transaction between related trades and 
business owned or controlled by the same interests upon the same basis as if such business 
were dealing at arm’s-length with each other.’ 
 
 
Also in Gordon Can Co. v. Commissioner29, the arm’s-length principle was applied 
by the court so that the real income of the petitioner might be clearly reflected. In 
Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner30, the Board of Tax Appeal applied the arm’s-
length principle under section 45 and upheld the Commissioner’s re-allocation of gain 
between the related corporations to clearly reflect their income because the sale was 
not an arm’s-length transaction (Webber, 2006:7). 
 
 
In Tennessee-Arkansas Gravel Co. v. Commissioner31, the Board of Tax Appeal 
applied the arm’s-length principle under section 45 and held that (Webber, 2006:7): 
 
 
‘[t]he  obvious purpose of section 45 is to place a controlled taxpayer on parity with an 
uncontrolled taxpayer for purposes of determining tax liability,…in order clearly to reflect 
petitioner’s true income.’ 
 
 
 
                                               
28
 B.T.A Memo 1933-78, 1993 B.T.A.M (P-H) 33,078. 
29
 29 B.T.A 272, 275 (1933) 
30
 31 B.T.A 1152, 1159 (1935), aff’d 79 F.2d 234 (2d. Cir. 1935) 
31
 B.T.A. Memo 1938-240, 1938 B.T.A.M (P-H) 38,240 
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The challenges that were experienced by the court in deciding cases after the arm’s-
length principle was introduced in section 482 and its predecessor, section 45, was 
that the arm’s-length principle under section 482 regulations did not have any specific 
rules or methods on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price with related 
parties. As a result, this led to the US courts applying a wide variety of standards in 
deciding whether or not certain transactions were at arm’s-length (Steiss and 
Blanchette, 1995:1571).  
 
 
The standards applied by the US courts were that related party transactions should 
reflect a fair value, a fair and reasonable price, a fair price or a reasonable profit. This 
approach by the US courts has been seen as inconsistent (Steiss and Blanchette, 
1995:1571) (Avi-Yonah, 2007).  
 
 
The following is an analysis of some of these cases illustrating that the US courts 
applied a wide variety of standards in deciding whether or not transactions were at 
arm’s-length under section 482. 
 
 
Seminole Flavor Co. v. Commissioner32 is one good example of the cases which 
illustrate the courts applying one of the various standards mentioned above. The issue 
in this case was whether transactions between a corporation and a partnership 
organised to market the corporation's products, should be adjusted to shift income 
from the partnership to the corporation. The court, deciding in favour of the taxpayer, 
stated that the arm’s-length nature of the transaction should be determined by whether 
it was fair and reasonable, and that the question of whether unrelated parties would 
have entered into the same agreement was irrelevant. The court then held that the 
commission fixed does not appear to be out of line with petitioner's own experience 
(for example, its expenses for marketing prior to forming the partnership). On this 
basis, the court held that the transaction would seem to be fair and entitled to 
classification as an arm’s-length transaction (Avi-Yonah, 2007).  
 
 
                                               
32
 4 T.C. 1215 (1945). 
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In Palm Beach Aero Corp. v. Commissioner33, the court applied the standard whether 
the transaction reflected fair consideration, which reflects arm’s-length dealing in 
deciding whether the transaction was at arm’s length as required by section 45 at that 
time.  
 
 
In Grenada Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner34, the standards applied by the court in 
deciding whether the transaction was at arm’s length as required by section 45 at that 
time, included whether the transaction was fair on the basis of the functions 
performed by the parties in the transaction (Avi-Yonah, 2007).  
 
 
In both The Friedlander Corp. v. Commissioner35 and Motors Securities Co., Inc. v. 
Commissioner36cases, the court applied the standard ‘whether the related party paid 
full fair value’ in deciding whether or not the transaction was at arm’s-length as 
required by section 45. In Polak's Frutal Works, Inc. v. Commissioner37, the court 
however applied the standard ‘whether the prices paid would have been considered 
fair and reasonable in the trade’ in deciding whether or not the transaction was at 
arm’s-length (Avi-Yonah, 2007).  
 
 
The above cases illustrates how the courts were inconsistent by applying  a wide 
variety of standards in deciding cases under section 482 and its predecessor, section 
45. The inconsistency of the US courts in deciding whether or not a transaction was at 
arm’s-length can also be seen in Hall v. Commissioner38case.  
 
 
In Hall case the IRS used a comparable transaction to establish that Hall’s transaction 
was not at arm’s-length price even though the legislation did make such provision that 
comparable should be used. Hall involved sales to a Venezuelan marketing affiliate at 
cost plus 10% (a price which amounted to a discount of over 90% from the regular list 
                                               
33
 17 T.C. 1169, 1176 (1952) 
34
 17 T.C. 231, 260 (1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1953); aff'd, 346 U.S 819 
35
 25 T.C. 70, 77 (1955) 
36
 11 T.C.M. 1074, 1082 (1952). 
37
 21 T.C. 953, 976 (1954). 
38
 32 T.C. 390 (1959), aff'd, 294 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1961). 
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price) when unrelated distributors of the same product received a discount of only 
20% (Avi-Yonah, 2007). 
 
 
In this case, the court agreed with the IRS for using comparable in reaching the 
decision that the transaction was not at arm’s length, rather than applying the 
standards fair or reasonable and held that ‘gross income had been arbitrarily shifted to 
the Venezuelan corporation’, and that the IRS Commissioner's allocation reflected 
Hall's income as if he had been dealing with unrelated parties. The court further held 
that the Commissioner's allocation reflected Hall's income as if his dealings with 
unrelated parties was the purpose of the statute (Avi-Yonah, 2007). 
 
 
The position taken by the court in Hall was however different from the one taken in 
Frank v. International Canadian Corporation39. In Frank, the issue was whether the 
arm’s-length principle should always be applied in applying section 45. The case 
involved transfer prices for sales of chemicals by a US parent to a Western 
Hemisphere Trade Corporation. The parties stipulated that the sales reflected a 
reasonable price and profit between the two corporations, and the district court found 
that the Commissioner had thereby stipulated himself out of court on the section 45 
issue (Avi-Yonah, 2007). 
 
 
The Commissioner appealed, arguing that the district court used the reasonable return 
standard instead of the proper arm’s-length principle as required by section 45 (Avi-
Yonah, 2007).  
 
 
The court of appeals affirmed on the following terms (Avi-Yonah, 2007):    
 
 
‘We do not agree with the Commissioner's contention that "arm’s-length bargaining" is the 
sole criterion for applying the statutory language of section 45 in determining what the "true 
net income" is of each "controlled taxpayer." Many decisions have been reached under section 
45 without reference to the phrase "arm’s-length bargaining" and without reference to 
Treasury Department Regulations and Rulings which state that the talismanic combination of 
words-"arm’s-length"-is the "standard to be applied in every case." For example, it was not 
any less proper for the District Court to use here the "reasonable return" standard than it was 
for other courts to use "full fair value," "fair price, including a reasonable profit," "method 
                                               
39
 308 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1962) 
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which seems not unreasonable," "fair consideration which reflects arm’s-length dealing," "fair 
and reasonable," "fair and reasonable" or "fair and fairly arrived at," or "judged as to fairness," 
all used in interpreting section.’    
 
 
After the decision in Frank, a number of cases followed in which taxpayers made use 
of Frank’s decision as an argument to shun away from the arm’s-length principle in 
section 482 and its predecessor, section 45. Meanwhile, during this period when the 
US courts were experiencing challenges in making decisions on the arm’s-length 
cases under section 482, the business and regulatory climate with regard to transfer 
pricing was also changing (Avi-Yonah, 2007). 
 
 
In the year 1961, the US Treasury department urged that significant changes be made 
in the taxation of US enterprises with foreign affiliates. In particular, the US Treasury 
department contended that section 482 was not effectively protecting US taxing 
jurisdiction. In the meantime significant new developments were also taking place in 
the courts (Avi-Yonah, 2007).  
 
 
In Oil Base, Inc. v. Commissioner40case which involved the application of the arm’s-
length principle to sales commissions paid by an US corporation to its Venezuelan 
marketing affiliate. These commissions were about twice the amount that the same 
corporation had paid its previous unaffiliated distributor of the same product in 
Venezuela, and was twice the amount it was currently paying to distributors in other 
countries. The taxpayer, however, based his argument on the principle in Frank’s case 
that the reasonable price principle should be applied instead of arm’s-length, and that 
since it still retained higher profits from export sales to Venezuela even after the 
double commission than from domestic sales, the commissions were reasonable under 
Frank’s case (Avi-Yonah, 2007).   
 
 
The court, in a memorandum decision, disagreed and held that (Avi-Yonah, 2007):  
 
 
‘It is unnecessary for us to decide whether the sole standard in cases under section 482 is one 
of an amount which would be arrived at in arm’s-length transactions between unrelated 
                                               
40
 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1838 (1964) 
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parties. The commissioner has been given much latitude in his use of section 482 when 
necessary to prevent the evasion of Federal income tax by shifting of profits between 
taxpayers subject to common control. The burden is on petitioner to show error in respondent's 
allocation....[There] is no evidence to show that the percentage return retained by petitioner on 
domestic sales would represent a reasonable return on export sales. There is likewise no 
evidence to show that the amount of commissions and discounts paid to Oil Base, Venezuela, 
represented a reasonable amount, a fair amount, or an amount which would meet any of the 
other criteria referred to by the court in Frank’s case. Certainly the fact that these commissions 
are almost double those paid by petitioner to unrelated persons in arm’s-length transactions is 
evidence that they were not fair and reasonable.’ 
 
 
The taxpayer appealed and on appeal, the taxpayer, citing Frank, repeated the 
argument that the Commissioner erred in applying the arm’s-length test bargaining 
that was not in the statute. The court of appeals, however, held that the application of 
arm’s-length test in this case was appropriate (Avi-Yonah, 2007).  
 
 
The court said, 
  
 
‘We cannot agree. Where, as here, the extent of the income in question is largely determined 
by the terms of business transactions entered into between two controlled corporations it is not 
unreasonable to construe "true" taxable income as that which would have resulted if the 
transactions had taken place upon such terms as would have applied had the dealings been at 
arm’s-length between unrelated parties.’ 
 
 
The court of appeals further said, Frank did not hold that the arm’s-length principle 
established by regulation was improper. It held that it was not the sole criterion for 
determining the true net income of each controlled taxpayer (Avi-Yonah, 2007). For 
the fact that the court in Oil Base mentioned that a sole criterion cannot be used in 
determining that an arm’s-length price is an indication that the court could allow other 
criterion in determining what is an arm’s-length price.  
 
 
Hence that is the reason their decisions were considered inconsistent on what 
constitutes an arm’s-length price, because they applied various standards as the 
legislation lacked provisions of how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length. The 
Commissioner's victory in Oil Base was followed by a series of cases which applied 
the arm’s-length principle, although not always to the Commissioner's satisfaction.  
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In Johnson Bronze Company v. Commissioner41, the taxpayer formed an international 
marketing subsidiary in Panama for the majority of its foreign sales accounts. The 
Commissioner reallocated 100% of the subsidiary's income to the parent under 
section. The court held that the 100% allocation was arbitrary and unreasonable. In 
determining the proper allocation, the court held that ‘the standard to be applied in 
every case is that of an uncontrolled taxpayer dealing at arm’s-length with another 
uncontrolled taxpayer’. Again, in this case the taxpayer argued from the basis of the 
decision in Frank, but failed.  
 
 
The court referred to Frank as requiring a choice between the reasonableness standard  
and applying the arm’s-length test, but stated that ‘on this subject we shall only say 
that, on the facts of this case, the only reasonable price charged by petitioner would be 
one which would have been arrived at if the parties were at arm’s-length’. The court 
then held that the allocation should be based on the prices charged by unrelated 
parties that bought the same products from the taxpayer for resale in foreign markets 
(Avi-Yonah, 2007).  
 
 
The inconsistency of the courts in deciding what constitutes the arm’s-length price 
can again be seen in Johnson Bronze Company case. The court in this case equates the 
reasonableness standard argued in Frank with the arm’s-length principle. Meanwhile 
in Oil Base the reasonableness standard in Frank was referred to as a criterion to be 
followed when applying the arm’s-length principle.  
 
 
In Eli Lilly & Company v. Commissioner42, the first of several section 482 cases 
involving pharmaceutical manufacturers, involved transfer pricing between Eli Lilly 
and Company (Lilly) and its subsidiary which qualified as a Western Hemisphere 
Trade Corporation. The Commissioner based his reallocation on the profit earned by 
Lilly on sales to domestic distributors, arbitrarily divided in half to reflect volume 
discount (Avi-Yonah, 2007).  
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 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1542 (1965) 
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 372 F.2d 990 (1967) 
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The court agreed, holding that Lilly's contention that it should be allowed to benefit 
from the tax subsidy to Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation, would require the 
court to ignore the provisions of subsection 1.482-1, requiring the application of the 
arm’s-length principle. The reason was that if the subsidiaries were unrelated, it 
would not have been able to retain all the profit on the sales. Lilly then cited Frank, in 
arguing that its allocation was motivated by business purposes and was fair and 
reasonable, and that the arm’s-length principle should not control. The court disagreed 
and held (Avi-Yonah, 2007):  
 
 
‘The Ninth Circuit has since indicated that only a very narrow departure from the arm’s-length 
standard was allowed in the particular circumstances of Frank [citing Oil Base]. Moreover, 
even accepting Eli Lilly's interpretation that Frank establishes a criterion of a fair and 
reasonable price, such a price can best be determined by hypothesizing to an arm’s-length 
transaction. The thrust of section 482 is to put controlled taxpayers on a parity with 
uncontrolled taxpayers. Consequently, any measure such as "fair and reasonable" or "fair and 
fairly arrived at" must be defined within the framework of "reasonable" or "fair" as among 
unrelated taxpayers. Simply because a price might be considered "reasonable" or "fair" as a 
business incentive in transactions among controlled corporations, does not mean that unrelated 
taxpayers would so consider it. Thus, even if the arm's-length standard is not the sole criterion, 
it is certainly the most significant yardstick.’    
 
 
The inconsistency of the courts in applying the arm’s-length test is seen again in this 
case. Lilly tried to argue Frank but was also unsuccessful. The Eli Lilly case 
illustrates the problem of the absence of any comparable transactions as it becomes 
unclear as to how the arm’s-length price should be hypothesised. To this question, the 
court gave no answer. It rejected the comparables offered by Lilly (bulk sales to 
government agencies) because the market was not comparable, yet accepted the 
revenue agent's arbitrary decision to cut the profits of the Western Hemisphere Trade 
Corporation affiliates by half, because the results were reasonable.  
 
 
The case law analysis prior to section 482 being amended to contain regulations on 
how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price, establishes that inconsistency 
happened in the application of the arm’s length principle as the US courts developed 
various standards in applying the arm’s-length principle. Under these circumstances, 
when section 482 regulations did not have any specific rules or methods on how 
related parties should transact at arm’s-length price, taxpayers could conduct self-
examination of their transactions without any reference to the comparable transactions 
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and provide such examination before the IRS and the US courts as an evidence that 
their transactions are at arm’s-length. It was the responsibility of the courts to decide 
whether such transactions are at arm’s-length.  
 
 
The situation of the US transfer pricing tax legislation prior to it being amended to be 
prescriptive, reflect the current situation of the South African transfer pricing tax 
legislation. Under this situation, taxpayers, SARS, and the courts may have a different 
view on the interpretation of what exactly constitute an arm’s-length transaction. 
Hence, it is the reason the US amended section 482 in the year 1968 to be prescriptive 
by including regulations containing methods on how taxpayers should transact at 
arm’s-length price to solve this problem. 
 
 
4.7 THE US TRANSFER PRICING TAX CASE LAW SUBSEQUENT TO 
SECTION 482 BEING AMENDED IN THE YEAR 1968 TO INCLUDE 
REGULATIONS PRECRIBING HOW TO TRANSACT AT ARM’S-
LENGTH PRICE 
 
 
This section provides an analysis of the challenges and advantages when the transfer 
pricing tax legislation is prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length 
price.  
 
 
In the year 1968, the regulations under section 482 were amended by including 
methods on how to transact at arm’s-length. Thereafter, the regulations formed the 
starting point for the US courts in determining whether or not the transaction was at 
arm’s-length or not. The regulations attempted to establish rules for applying the 
arm’s-length principle to specific types of transactions, but with different degrees of 
specificity (Avi-Ayonah, 2007).      
 
 
For services transactions, the regulations recited the arm’s-length principle without 
any guidance as to its application in the absence of comparables. For intangibles 
property transaction, the regulations contemplated a failure to find comparables. They 
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list twelve factors to be taken into account, but without establishing any priority or 
relative weight among them (Baker & McKenzie, 2005: 11).  
 
 
For tangible property transactions, details were provided for transfers of tangible 
property. The regulations described the three methods that should be used in 
determining an arm’s-length price: the comparable uncontrolled price method, the 
resale price method, and the cost plus method, in that order of priority. All three 
methods relied on finding comparable transactions, either directly or by reference to 
appropriate mark-ups (Baker & McKenzie, 2005: 11). In the absence of comparable 
transactions, the regulations stated that (Avi-Ayonah, 2007): 
 
    
‘Where none of the three methods of pricing . . . [c]an reasonably be applied under the facts 
and circumstances as they exist in a particular case, some appropriate method of pricing other 
than those described in subdivision (ii) of this subparagraph, or variations on such methods, 
can be used.’   
 
 
The above provision in section 482 regulations gave the courts freedom to determine 
their own fourth method of determining the arm’s-length price in the absence of 
comparable transactions. One of the advantages with section 482 regulations after it 
was amended to be prescriptive, was that the regulations effectively ensured that the 
US courts would apply the arm’s-length principle as opposed to the various standards 
applied by the courts, prior to section 482 being amended to have regulations on how 
to transact at arm’s-length in 1968.  
 
 
The other advantage with section 482 after it became prescriptive, was that the section 
required taxpayers to illustrate that their transactions were at arm’s-length by having 
comparable transactions. Therefore, where comparable transactions were available as 
a benchmark against the taxpayer’s transaction, the litigation process could not be 
further pursued because the taxpayer showed compliance with legislation. As a result, 
a number of cases which were litigated became smaller as compared to the time the 
legislation was without regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length (Avi-Ayonah, 
2007).  
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The analysis of the following cases illustrates how the courts interpreted the arm’s-
length principle and the challenges faced by the courts subsequent to the amendments 
of section 482 in the year 1968. These challenges were experienced in situations 
where the comparable transactions were not available or inexact comparable 
transactions were used by taxpayers. These cases involved situations where intangible 
property transactions were an issue, as section 482 regulations did not prescribe which 
methods should be applied to determine the arm’s-length price with regard to 
intangible property transactions.  
 
 
United States Gypsum Co. v. United States43case, is one of the cases that illustrates 
clearly how the amendments made to section 482 in the year 1968, had a significant 
influence in the courts when deciding whether or not a transaction was at arm’s-length 
(Avi-Ayonah, 2007).      
 
 
United States Gypsum Co. case involved two section 482 issues: (i) shipping fees paid 
by the taxpayer to its Panamanian subsidiary, (ii) transfer pricing for goods sold by 
the taxpayer to its Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation. The district court held for 
the taxpayer on both issues. On the shipping issue, it held that the amounts were 
reasonable and equal to an arm’s-length charge because they were within the range of 
unrelated party prices, as it was required by section 482 that prices of related parties 
should be within the price range of unrelated parties to be considered at arm’s-length 
(based on comparables) (Avi-Ayonah, 2007).     
 
 
On the transfer pricing issue, the district court held that even though the prices were 
arbitrarily set to shift income to the Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation, on the 
basis of cases like Frank and Polak's Frutal which allowed similar mark-ups, the 
prices were not unreasonable (which the district court considered to be automatically 
equivalent to arm’s-length )(Avi-Ayonah, 2007).    
 
 
The court of appeals affirmed the first decision by the district court and reversed the 
second decision. On the shipping issue, the court of appeals considered the fact as to 
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 304 F.Supp. 627 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1971) 
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whether the alleged comparables were indeed comparable, and whether unrelated 
parties would not have adjusted the terms of the contract once the profits that the 
shipping subsidiary was making became clear, but affirmed under a clearly erroneous 
standard. On the transfer pricing issue, the court of appeals reversed the decision of 
the district court, rejecting the reliance on Frank and its predecessors and its 
application of a reasonableness standard.  
 
 
The reason for the court of appeals to reject the district court’s decision was that the 
reliance on Frank and its predecessors was not an option under the new section 482 
regulations, as these cases were decided under the old section 482. The court of 
appeals held, as argued by the Commissioner, that applying the arm’s-length principle 
was mandatory in all cases under section 482 (Avi-Ayonah, 2007).  
 
 
Again, in this case the court of appeals emphasised that the application of the arm’s-
length principle was mandatory under section 482, and that the standards applied in 
section 482 cases prior the amendments in the year 1968, cannot be allowed after the 
section was amended to be specific on the application of the arm’s-length principle. 
 
 
Ross Glove Co. v. Commissioner44  represents the application of section 482 to an 
inbound transaction, involving the sale of sheepskins to the taxpayer by a Bahamian 
corporation which also provided sewing services. The Commissioner attempted to 
hold the taxpayer to its representations to the Philippine authorities, regarding the 
mark-up on its costs for currency control purposes. The tax court rejected this 
argument and held that ‘there is nothing in section 482 or the regulations to indicate 
that the arm’s-length principle under section 482 is to be ignored simply because of 
representations made in foreign countries’. The court then determined the transfer 
price on the basis of arbitrary adjustments to an approximate comparable as required 
by section 482 (Avi-Ayonah, 2007).   
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Lufkin Foundry and Machine Co. v. Commissioner45 case is also one of the first cases 
after section 482 was amended to be prescriptive, which illustrates that the court 
would not accept any other methods to determine what the arm’s-length price of a 
transaction was, except the methods prescribed in section 482 after its amendment. 
Lufkin case involved the transfer pricing between the taxpayer and its subsidiary 
where the selling of machines and marketing arrangements transactions were an issue. 
The taxpayer introduced evidence to argue the reasonableness test for both these 
transactions. The tax court accepted the taxpayer’s argument on that basis.  
 
 
The Commissioner appealed, citing the need to meet the arm’s-length principle in 
terms of the amended section 482 and arguing that no evidence regarding a taxpayer's 
internal operations could satisfy the arm’s-length principle on its own under this 
section. The appeal court reversed the decision of the tax court and held for the 
Commissioner.  
 
 
On the sale of the machine the appeal court said that the US Treasury department has 
promulgated regulations under section 482 to assist in the implementation of the 
arm’s-length standard. The regulations delineate the methods by which one can 
calculate whether or not controlled companies dealt with each other at arm’s-length.  
 
 
On the marketing arrangement the appeal court said the following (Avi-Ayonah, 
2007),    
 
 
‘No amount of self-examination of the taxpayer's internal transactions alone could make it 
possible to know what prices or terms unrelated parties would have charged or demanded. We 
think it palpable that, if the [arm’s-length] standard set by these unquestioned regulations is to 
be met, evidence of transactions between uncontrolled corporations unrelated to Lufkin must 
be adduced in order to determine what charge would have been negotiated for the performance 
of such marketing services.’    
 
 
The argument is that both the Ross Glove Co. and Lufkin cases illustrate how the US 
courts were able to decide whether the taxpayer was transacting at arm’s-length based 
on the requirements of section 482 after the section was amended to be prescriptive, 
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as opposed to prior the amendments in the year 1968 when the section was not 
prescriptive.  In both these cases, the courts made decisions whether the taxpayers 
were transacting at arm’s-length without developing different standards, but by 
making reference of what is required in terms of amended section 482.  
 
 
Further analysis of the following court cases also illustrates that the decisions of US 
courts on section 482 after it was amended to be prescriptive, were consistent with the 
arm’s-length requirements in the section, although there were some challenges that 
the courts experienced.  
 
 
As mentioned in this chapter the US courts still faced some challenges in applying 
section 482 after it was amended in the year 1968. Such challenges are evident when 
the US courts applied section 482 in the situation where taxpayers used inexact 
comparable transactions in proving that their transfer pricing transactions were at 
arm’s-length, or in situations where taxpayers had no comparable transactions 
available at all. The following is a further analysis of the US transfer pricing case law 
with challenges as mentioned above. 
  
 
R.T. French Co. v. Commissioner46 is one of the cases which show that the US courts 
were consistent with the language of section 482 even though they experienced 
challenges with regard to inexact comparable transactions.  In the French case, the 
taxpayer, a US subsidiary of a UK parent, negotiated a royalty rate for the parent's 
valuable patented process for producing instant mashed potatoes in the year 1946, for 
a 21 year period. This was before the profitability of the process was known and when 
there was an unrelated 49% minority shareholder in the parent. In the year 1960, when 
the minority shareholder had been bought out and the process had proved highly 
profitable, the licensing contract was amended, but the royalty rate remained 
unchanged for the duration of the contract (Avi-Ayonah, 2007).   
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The taxpayer’s argument was that the contract was comparable to what the unrelated 
parties could have done. The IRS argued that unrelated parties would have amended 
the royalty rate to be commensurate with the income derived from the patent, and that 
the low rates of the contract resulted in constructive dividends to the UK parent, 
which should be subject to withholding. The tax court disagreed with the argument of 
the IRS and held that the original contract in the year 1946 was negotiated at arm’s-
length because of the 49% minority shareholder in the UK parent (Avi-Ayonah, 
2007). The tax court said (Avi-Ayonah, 2007),  
 
 
‘The position of [the minority shareholder] in the scheme of things in all likelihood assured 
the arm's-length character of the transaction." Thereafter, the fact that profitability changed "in 
no way detracted from the reasonableness of the agreement when it was made," and there was 
no basis for a section 482 adjustment "so long as the "arm’s-length' test is met. ... There is no 
reason to believe that an unrelated party in [the parent's] position would have permitted 
petitioner to avoid its contractual obligations.’    
 
 
Again French illustrates how the court became consistent with the decisions in other 
cases when it was against the IRS in this case to depart from the arm’s-length 
requirements in section 482.  
  
 
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. United States47 case involved transfer pricing 
between the taxpayer and its Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation. The 
Commissioner reallocated all of the income of the subsidiary to the taxpayer. The 
district court held that the reallocation was arbitrary, and upheld the taxpayer's 
allocation based on pricing studies using assumptions that were tipped in the 
taxpayer's favour, by using inappropriate comparables (Avi-Ayonah, 2007). 
 
 
The court of appeals reversed in part, and remanded to the district court for partial 
reallocation on the basis of the arm’s-length principle, stating that the district court 
should reject those aspects of the taxpayer's theories which do not meet the arm’s-
length standard (Avi-Ayonah, 2007). Baldwin is one of the cases where even the 
taxpayer applied section 482, but the use of comparables in determining the arm’s-
length price was a challenge for the court.  
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The U.S. Steel Corp. v. Commissioner48 case is another case which illustrates that the 
court applied the arm’s-length principle in section 482 but had difficulty in comparing 
intragroup transactions with unrelated party transactions, even where the same 
product or service is involved as section 482 required that comparable transactions of 
independent parties should be used to proof that the taxpayer’s transaction is at arm’s 
length.  
 
 
US Steel owned a Liberian subsidiary, Navios, which was used to ship steel from 
Venezuela to the US. The prices charged by Navios were set at a level that would 
make the steel price equal to the price of domestic steel manufactured by US Steel, 
and the same price was charged by Navios for shipping for unrelated corporations, 
albeit at much lower quantities. As a result Navios had high profits which were totally 
exempt from tax. In the tax court, IRS successfully upheld its reallocation of $52 
million in profits to the taxpayer. The taxpayer appealed and the court of appeals 
reversed the decision of the tax court (Avi-Ayonah, 2007). The court of appeals held 
that,  
    
 
‘We are constrained to reverse because, in our view, the Commissioner has failed to make the 
necessary showings that justify reallocation under the broad language of section 482 . . . The 
Treasury Regulations provide a guide for interpreting this section's broad delegation of power 
to the Secretary, and they are binding on the Commissioner . . . [citing the ALS] This "arm’s-
length" standard . . . [i]s meant to be an objective standard that does not depend on the absence 
or presence of any intent on the part of the taxpayer to distort his income . . . [W]e think it is 
clear that if a taxpayer can show that the price he paid or was charged for a service is "the 
amount which was charged or would have been charged for the same or similar services in 
independent transactions with or between unrelated parties" it has earned the right, under the 
Regulations, to be free from a section 482 reallocation despite other evidence tending to show 
that its activities have resulted in a shifting of tax liability among controlled corporations.’       
 
 
The appeal court concluded that the only issue in this case was the comparability of 
Navios' transactions with those of unrelated parties. It held that they were comparable, 
despite the differences in volume and the assurance of continued service as a result of 
the parties' relationship, and despite the taxpayer's ability to manipulate the prices of 
the steel so as to leave a larger profit to the tax exempt shipper. In particular the court 
went further to state the following (Avi-Ayonah, 2007):  
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‘Attractive as this argument is in the abstract, it is a distortion of the kind of inquiry the 
Regulations direct us to undertake. The Regulations make it clear that if the taxpayer can 
show that the amount it paid was equal to "the amount which was charged . . . [f]or the same 
or similar services in independent transactions" he can defeat the Commissioner's effort to 
invoke section 482 against him.’   
 
 
The court of appeals rejected the Commissioner's argument that transactions with 
independent parties are only relevant in a competitive market and not where US Steel 
had a de facto monopoly, holding that this would impose an unfair burden on the 
taxpayer (Avi-Ayonah, 2007). Although section 482 was correctly applied by the 
taxpayer, the comparable transactions used by the taxpayer to proof that the 
transaction was at arm’s length was not accepted by the Commissioner. This is one of 
the areas were section 482 was not prescriptive enough to provide clarity after it was 
amended.  
 
 
In Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner49, the taxpayer licensed its unique process 
for manufacturing soft contact lenses to an Irish tax haven manufacturer and charged 
a royalty of 5%. The Irish subsidiary manufactured the lenses for $1.50 each and sold 
them to the taxpayer for $7.50 each, the same price charged by unrelated parties with 
much higher manufacturing costs for the same product (Avi-Ayonah, 2007).  
 
 
Even though the resale price of lenses to Bausch & Lomb in the US was comparable 
to the prices in the market, the Commissioner's proposed adjustments included 
eliminating the royalty (on the theory that Bausch & Lomb Ireland was a contract 
manufacturer assured of a market for its sales) but adjusting the income to give 
Bausch & Lomb Ireland its costs, plus a profit of 20% (Avi-Ayonah, 2007).  
 
 
The tax court held in favour of the taxpayer and said that these adjustments were an 
abuse of discretion. The tax court held that the transfer price was correct on the basis 
of the unrelated sales, despite the economic differences (volume differences, 
integrated business differences, and the fact that Bausch & Lomb Ireland had far 
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lower production costs than its competitors) between the alleged comparables (Avi-
Ayonah, 2007). The tax court further said,  
 
 
‘We find that use of the comparable-uncontrolled-price method of determining an arm's-length 
price is mandatory. The third-party transactions identified by petitioner provide ample 
evidence that the $7.50 per-lens price charged by B&L Ireland is equal or below prices which 
would be charged for similar lenses in uncontrolled transactions . . . [W]e place particular 
reliance on the Second Circuit's opinion in U.S. Steel . . . To posit that B&L, the world's 
largest marketer of soft contact lenses, would be able to secure a more favorable price from an 
independent manufacturer who hoped to establish a long-term relationship with a high volume 
customer may be to recognize economic reality, but to do so would cripple a taxpayer's ability 
to rely on the comparable uncontrolled price method in establishing transfer pricing by 
introducing to it a degree of economic sophistication which appears reasonable in theory, but 
which defies quantification in practice.’     
 
 
Therefore the tax court rejected the argument from disparities of volume and from the 
taxpayer's lower costs, holding that the $7.50 price was a market price and therefore 
the taxpayer had earned the right to be free of adjustment. The Commissioner 
appealed to the court of appeals and the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the 
tax court. The court of appeals admitted that the Commissioner's position is not 
without force, but held that under section 482 regulations and the arm’s-length 
principle, applying the comparable uncontrolled price method was mandatory, even 
though economic reality may differ.  
 
 
Although the US courts were able to apply the arm’s-length principle as required by 
section 482 in the French, US. Steel and Bausch & Lomb cases, it is also illustrated in 
these cases that the US courts had a problem in applying the arm’s-length principle 
when inexact comparable transactions were used by the taxpayer as the section was 
not prescriptive enough on how to deal with such situations. The US courts had also 
experienced problems in applying section 482 where comparable transactions were 
rejected by the court or there were not available as the section was not prescriptive 
enough on how to deal with such situations. Hence the section was further amended to 
be prescriptive to address these kinds of situations. The following cases illustrate how 
the US courts dealt with those challenges.  
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The Cadillac Textiles v. Commissioner50 case which was decided prior to the French, 
U.S. Steel and Bausch & Lomb cases shows the inconsistency of the decisions by the 
US courts even after section 482 was amended to be prescriptive. As mentioned  
above the reason of the inconsistency of the decisions by the US courts was that the 
section was still not prescriptive in certain areas on how one should comply with the 
arm’s length requirements. The case involved commissions paid by the taxpayer to a 
related entity for weaving. The taxpayer relied on the comparability of these 
commissions to those paid to unrelated entities (Avi-Ayonah, 2007).  
 
 
The tax court held that the alleged comparables were dissimilar because of volume 
differences and because there was no commitment for a continuing relationship. In 
determining what the arm’s-length transfer price was, the tax court applied the profit 
split method which was not prescribed as the method of determining the arm’s length 
in section 482 at that time (Avi-Ayonah, 2007). With these same facts as in French, 
US. Steel and Bausch & Lomb cases, one would have expected the court to accept the 
comparable transactions used by the taxpayer, but that was not the case (Avi-Ayonah, 
2007).  
 
 
In another case where court has rejected comparable transactions of the taxpayer, is in 
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Commissioner51 case. The facts in Du Pont were 
particularly favorable to the IRS, since the taxpayer admitted that it had set transfer 
prices with its tax haven (Swiss) marketing subsidiary, DISA, with no reference to 
anything but maximising DISA's profitability. The court rejected the taxpayer's 
comparable transactions drawn largely from general industry averages and the IRS 
sourcebook of statistics of income. The court was faced with the necessity of either 
determining its own transfer price, or accepting the allocation made by the IRS. 
Unlike in Cadillac Textiles, the court decided to take the easier route and accept the 
position of the IRS (Avi-Ayonah, 2007). 
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Hospital Corporation of America v. Commissioner52 case where the taxpayer formed 
a Cayman Islands subsidiary to perform a contract to manage a hospital in Saudi 
Arabia. The subsidiary (LTD) performed minimal functions, and all the substantial 
work on the contract was done by the taxpayer. The Commissioner argued that LTD 
was a sham, or alternatively, that all of its income should be allocated to the taxpayer. 
Applying section 482 to the transactions of the taxpayer, the court held that the 
Commissioner abused his discretion by the 100% allocation. Since there were no 
comparable transactions from the unrelated parties suggested by any side, the court 
was forced to make an arbitrary profit split determination (Avi-Ayonah, 2007). The 
courts said that,  
  
 
‘Even though we have rejected respondent's 100-percent allocation of taxable income from 
LTD to petitioner, the evidence indicates overwhelmingly that an allocation is necessary and 
proper in this case. . . . [U]nfortunately, there is little quantitative evidence in this record upon 
which we can determine what a reasonable allocation of profits would be. Neither party has 
been particularly helpful to the Court in this regard. However, we must do the best with what 
we have. . . . [U]sing our best judgment on the lengthy and inconclusive record before us, we 
have concluded and found as a fact that 75 percent of the taxable income of LTD in 1973 was 
attributable to petitioner.’ 
 
 
In G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner53 case, Searle transferred drug patents to its 
Puerto Rican subsidiary (SCO) for no consideration. SCO subsequently manufactured 
and sold the drugs to unrelated parties so no transfer price issue was involved. The tax 
court rejected the attempt by the IRS to ignore the transfer of the intangibles and 
allocate the income to the taxpayer by treating SCO as a contract manufacturer (Avi-
Ayonah, 2007).  
 
 
The court then held that some consideration for the transfer was necessary as the 
intangibles accounted for 80% of the taxpayer's income, and transferring the patents 
to an unrelated party solely for stock would be the height of corporate 
mismanagement. As there were no comparable transactions and section 482 did not 
make any provisions on what should be done in such situations, the tax court was 
required to use its arbitrary best judgment. The court applied profit split method 
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though the percentage was more lenient as compared to the extreme profit split 
allocation that was done by the IRS (Avi-Ayonah, 2007). 
 
 
Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Commissioner54 is another case where the court could not find 
comparable to apply section 482. The case involved the appropriate rate of royalty to 
be paid by the taxpayer to its Swiss parent under an exclusive license in which all the 
significant research and development had been done at the parent level. The IRS 
argued that the taxpayer was engaged in a joint venture with the parent and should 
have paid a lower royalty than 10% or, alternatively, the arm’s-length rate was lower. 
The taxpayer argued for a higher royalty than 10% (Avi-Ayonah, 2007). 
 
 
The tax court rejected the attempts by the IRS to deflect the thrust of its own transfer 
or use of intangible property regulations. Having rejected the proposed comparables 
of both parties because of different degrees of risk and the uniqueness of the 
relationship, the court held that the 10% rate was reasonable, based on the substantial 
negotiations between the related parties and based on the testimony of an unrelated 
party who would have paid between 10% and 12.5% for a nonexclusive license (Avi-
Ayonah, 2007).    
 
 
Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner55 case involved the license of valuable 
manufacturing technology for aircraft spare parts to the taxpayer's Singapore 
subsidiary which in turn sold the parts to the taxpayer for distribution. The IRS as in 
Bausch & Lomb attempted to apply its contract manufacturer analysis which seems 
appropriate because the subsidiary did not develop the product and was guaranteed, 
although not formally, to sell its products to the taxpayer (Avi-Ayonah, 2007).  
 
 
The tax court, relying on Bausch & Lomb, rejected this analysis and also rejected all 
proposed comparables of both the taxpayer and the IRS. The court made its own best 
estimate of the appropriate transfer price, relying on the discounts given by the 
taxpayer on other products and on its representations to US Customs. With respect to 
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the royalty, the court again rejected all comparables of both the taxpayer and the IRS 
and accepted a fixed rate of 10%. (Avi-Ayonah, 2007). 
 
 
The other case where the availability of comparables was an issue is Perkin-Elmer 
Corp. v. Commissioner56. The case involved facts similar to Bausch & Lomb and 
Sundstrand cases. In Perkin-Elmer, the US parent licensed its possessions corporation 
(PECC) to manufacture certain instruments, accessories and lamps in Puerto Rico. 
PECC manufactured the products in Puerto Rico and sold them to its parent for resale. 
On audit, the IRS collapsed the license and sales transactions and characterized PECC 
as a contract manufacturer.  Shortly before trial and in light of the opinion of the tax 
court in Bausch & Lomb and Sundstrand, the IRS, however, abandoned its contract 
manufacturer argument. Instead, the IRS directed its arguments to the arm’s-length 
terms for each separate transaction. The tax court determined the arm’s-length royalty 
rate for the license based on comparable transactions with unrelated parties. (Avi-
Ayonah, 2007). 
 
 
The transfer pricing US case law analysis subsequent to section 482 being amended in 
1968, establishes that when a transfer pricing tax legislation which is prescriptive on 
how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price, has positive impact as it has 
resulted in helping taxpayers, the IRS and the courts in the US interpret what 
constitutes the arm’s-length transaction as required by section 482 without using 
different standards. To be specific, the advantage is that the US courts are now 
obligated to follow the methods provided in the legislation when they decide on 
whether or not a taxpayer’s transaction is at arm’s-length.  
 
 
With regard to the challenges that arose subsequent to the amendments in the year 
1968; for example, where section 482 did not prescribe what process should be 
adopted in certain situations where the comparable transactions were not available, or 
inexact comparable transactions were used by taxpayers. Also in situations involving 
intangible property transactions because section 482 was not prescriptive which 
methods should be applied to determine the arm’s-length price.  
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Section 482 was further amended several times subsequent to 1968 amendments to be 
more prescriptive in addressing these issues. In the year 1986, the US Congress 
amended section 482 to provide as follows; 
 
 
‘In the case of any transfer (or license) of intangible property . . . [t]he income with respect to 
such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.’  
 
 
In the year 1994, section 482 was again amended and provided that arm’s-length 
consideration for a transfer of intangible property must be determined using one of 
four methods: (a) the comparable uncontrolled transaction method, (b) the comparable 
profits method, (c) the profit split method, (d) any unspecified method (Avi-Ayonah, 
2007). 
 
 
In September 2003, the IRS issued proposed section 482 regulations with regard to 
intercompany services. The proposed services regulations modify the rules regarding 
joint development of intangible property. The purposes of the proposed rules is to 
separate the determination of the ownership of intangible property from the 
determination of the allocation of the income from the intangible property (Lemein, 
2005:26). 
 
 
In August 2005, the IRS issued proposed section 482 regulations for costs sharing 
arrangements. According to Lemein (2005: 43) the proposed cost sharing 
arrangements regulations are a complete restatement of the current cost sharing 
arrangements regulations. They constitute a radical departure from the current 
regulations and if finalized in their current form, would substantially reduce the 
attractiveness of cost sharing arrangements to taxpayers.  
 
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to address the third sub-problem of the research 
study, which is the impact of having a non- prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation 
and the impact of having a prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation with reference 
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to the enforcement of transfer pricing tax legislation in the US. To further argue the 
question of whether or not the South African transfer pricing tax legislation should be 
amended to be prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length, the next 
chapter develops a research methodology.   
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CHAPTER 5: THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter discusses how the research study was designed and the specific research 
methods used to conduct the study. The chapter specifically discusses the research 
method adopted, research type, methods adopted for data collection and for data 
analysis.    
 
 
5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
 
The research design is actually a plan or blueprint of how one intends conducting the 
research. This includes focusing on the end product, formulating a research problem 
as a point of departure and focus on the logic of the research. (De Vos, 2002:137). 
Research projects are conducted by adopting either one or both quantitative or 
qualitative research approaches (Glatthorn, 1988:33).  
 
 
In order to address the research question whether or not the South African transfer 
pricing tax legislation should be amended to be prescriptive by having regulations on 
how to transact at arm’s-length, a qualitative research approach was adopted.  
 
 
Glatthorn (1988:33) explains the difference between quantitative and qualitative 
research by stating that, quantitative research approach holds that there is an objective 
reality that can be expressed numerically. As a consequence, the quantitative 
perspective emphasis studies that are experimental in nature, emphasise measurement 
and search for relationships. Such studies can be identified to be quantitative if they 
use the language such as variable, controls, validity, reliability, hypothesis, or 
statistically significant language. 
 
 
Glatthorn (1988:34) further explains the difference between quantitative and 
qualitative research approaches by stating that the studies derived from qualitative 
perspective, focus on meaning and understanding, taking place in naturally occurring 
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situations. Further, that such studies derived from qualitative perspective can be 
identified by adoption of the language such as naturalistic, field study, case study, 
context, situational, constructivism, meaning, or multiple realities.  
 
 
This research study is not aiming at resolving any numerical measurements or 
relationships, but it is aimed at providing descriptive analysis of certain situations. 
Hence it is the reason qualitative research approach is chosen to conduct this research 
study.   
 
 
5.3 THE RESEARCH TYPE  
 
 
According to Glatthorn (1988:35), research types can be identified by looking at 
whether they tend to use a quantitative or qualitative perspective, although there may 
sometimes be overlaps of some research types. Glatthorn (1988:33) mentions that 
qualitative research approach can be conducted using either case study research type, 
ethnography research type, or action research type. According to Maree (2007:71) 
there are three other qualitative research types in addition to the above. These are 
conceptual studies, historical, and grounded research types.  
 
 
Among these a case study type has been adopted in conducting this research study. 
The reason for this was that to a certain extent, this research study involves unit 
analysis. Citing Bromley, Maree (2007:75) explains case study research as a 
systematic inquiry into an event or a set of related events which aims to describe and 
explain the phenomenon of interest. Maree (2007:75) further explains that unit 
analysis is a critical factor in case study research and explains that case study research 
often focuses on a system of action rather than an individual or group of individuals.  
 
 
Maree (2007:75) also mentions that one of the advantages of case study research is its 
flexibility as it allows the use of multiple sources and techniques in the process of 
data gathering. Merriam (1998:31) states that case study research approach is the best 
for answering the research question and that its strengths outweigh its limitations. 
Merriam (1998:31) also mentions that case study plays an important role in advancing 
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knowledge base in the field being researched, as it helps structure future research. For 
these reasons, case study research has been adopted to conduct this research study. 
 
 
In conducting case study research, a heuristic and multiple case approach was 
adopted. Merriam (1998:31) explains that case study research is heuristic in nature 
when it is as follows: 
 
 
a) Explains the reason for a problem, the background of a situation, what happened, 
and why. 
 
 
b) Explains why an innovation worked or failed to work. 
 
 
c) Discusses and evaluates alternatives not chosen.  
 
       
d) Evaluates, summarises, and concludes, thus increasing its potential applicability. 
 
 
Merriam (1998:40) further mentions that case study research is multiple in nature 
when it involves collecting and analysing data from several cases and the data is 
distinguished from a single case study. The adoption of this approach is illustrated in 
chapter 1 where the problem statement was formulated by analysing the transfer 
pricing developments in certain countries and also in the entire research study where 
the OECD guidelines and the transfer pricing situation in the US is analysed and 
distinguished from the South African transfer pricing situation. This approach was 
adopted by addressing the following sub-problems of the research study: 
 
 
a) Determining how taxpayers in South Africa are required to transact at arm’s-
length price and what are some of the challenges in South Africa in the absence of 
prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation. 
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b) Determining whether Practice Note 7 in its current status is consistent with the 
current status of the OECD guidelines, and whether, as a result of being consistent 
or inconsistent with the current status of the OECD guidelines, Practice Note 7 
can be included as the regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length price in the 
South African transfer pricing tax legislation, in order to amend the legislation to 
become prescriptive. 
 
 
c) Determining what the implications are of having non-prescriptive transfer pricing 
tax legislation and of changing from non-prescriptive to prescriptive transfer 
pricing tax legislation by looking at the experiences of the US in the enforcement 
of transfer pricing.  
 
 
5.4 DATA COLLECTION METHODS  
 
 
The methods used to collect the data in this research study are the literature review; 
documentary analysis; and semi-structured interviews. These methods are analysed as 
follows: 
 
 
5.4.1 Literature Review 
 
 
The literature review was conducted in developing the background of the study and 
the context of the research study. Merriam (1998:49) acknowledges that one way of 
identifying and establishing the theoretical framework of a qualitative research study 
is through the literature review.  
 
 
Merriam (1998:50) further mentions that as there is literature available on the subject 
being researched, it confirms that the problem needs to be researched and that 
conducting a literature review will eliminate the problem of duplicating a research 
study already conducted, and also provide the foundation for contributing to the 
knowledge base.  
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Huysamen (1994:190) is of the opinion that the importance of literature review is that 
it creates awareness of inconsistencies and hiatuses which may justify further 
research.  As a result this could enable the researcher to indicate exactly where his/her 
proposed research fits. Creswell (2003: 30) shares the same view. Creswell (2003: 30) 
mentions that literature review allows the researcher to fill in gaps left by prior studies 
and also extends such studies.  
 
 
Therefore, both the South African literature and international literature on the subjects 
of transfer pricing and arm’s-length principle, were broadly consulted in conducting 
this research study. The consultation included publications such as books, 
dissertations, and periodicals and were searched in libraries and various internet sites.   
 
  
5.4.2 Documentary Analysis 
 
 
The documentation analysis is one of the methods of data collection used in this 
research study. According to Maree (2007:81) this method involves gathering written 
data which may includes published and unpublished documents, company reports, 
memoranda, agendas, administrative documents, reports and newspaper articles. 
Maree (2007:81) also expresses the view that it is important that one should 
distinguish between the documentation analysis and literature review. Maree 
(2007:75) mentions that both these methods overlap in the sense that both deal with 
data sources in written format. But documentation is something distinct from 
literature review.   
 
 
Maree (2007:81) makes a distinction between literature review and documentation 
analysis by explaining that the literature review involves an overview of scholarship 
in a certain discipline through analysis of trends and debates. Maree (2007:81) 
maintains that documentation analysis could be done by gathering primary documents 
and secondary documents. According to Maree (2007:81) primary documents 
represent original source documents and secondary documents represent materials 
generated from the original source documents.    
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In conducting this research study, a wide range of documents from libraries and 
various internet sites was gathered for analyses. Outstanding primary documents 
which were collected include income tax legislations, court cases, policy documents, 
commission reports, handbooks and guidelines relating to the transfer pricing and 
arm’s-length principle subject.  
 
 
A wide range of secondary documents in the form of books and articles was also 
gathered from libraries and various internet sites. These documents provided 
insightful information on the transfer pricing and the arm’s-length principle subject.  
 
 
5.4.3 Semi-structured Interviews 
 
 
Interviews were also conducted to collect data in addition to the documentation and 
literature review analysis. Maree (2007:81) describes the interview as a two-way 
conversation in which the interviewer questions the participant in order to collect data 
and learn about the ideas, beliefs, views, opinions and behaviours of the participant. 
Maree (2007:81) further explains the purpose of interviews in a qualitative research 
study as aiming to see the world through the eyes of the participant and thereby 
source valuable information. Merriam (1998:71) mentions that the purpose of 
interviews is to collect a special kind of information.   
 
 
In conducting this research study, a semi-structured interview was adopted. Merriam 
(1998:74) explains semi-structured interviews as a mixture of both structured and 
unstructured interviews, and that the semi-structured interviews are more open ended 
and less structured. Merriam (1998:74) explains that this type of interview is flexible, 
and why this type of interview is important and mentions that this format allows the 
researcher to respond to the situation at hand, to the emerging worldview of the 
participant, and to new ideas on the topic.  
 
 
Merriam (1998:83) says that collecting data through interviews requires that the 
researcher select participants on the bases of what they can contribute to the 
phenomenon being studied. Merriam (1998:83) further states that unlike the 
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quantitative research study scenario where the number of interview participants is 
crucial, in the qualitative research study the number of interview participants is not 
crucial but the potential of each of the interview participants to contribute insight and 
understanding to the phenomenon being studied, is of vital importance. 
 
 
Therefore, semi-structured interviews were conducted with two of the top tax 
professionals in South Africa to hear their views on the research subject. These tax 
professionals interviewed includes, the leading tax law expert and tax law practitioner 
in South Africa and the other tax professional is an employee of SARS. A brief 
background of these tax professionals is provided below.   
 
 
a) Professor Emil Brincker 
 
 
Professor Emil Brincker is a director at Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr law firm's tax 
practice. He is also a member of the Special Board for Income Tax Appeals hearing 
tax matters for 10 years and member of the Executive Committee of the South African 
Fiscal Association. His experience includes the areas of corporate finance, corporate 
reorganisation and restructuring, export finance, funding, general banking and 
commercial including derivative transactions, empowerment transactions, JSE 
Limited and Securities Regulation Panel, project finance and tax law including 
income tax, VAT, stamp duties, PAYE, capital gains tax (CGT) and other fiscal 
statutes. He holds BCom (cum laude), LLB (cum laude) LLM (cum laude), LLD, 
from the University of Stellenbosch and HDip (Tax) (cum laude) from Rand 
Afrikaans University. 
 
 
b) Mr Franz Tomasek 
 
 
Franz Tomasek is a general manager, legislative policy, at SARS Head Office and he 
has been with SARS since the start of his career. His past experience includes being 
manager, tax research and assistant general manager, legislation - comprising customs 
policy, legislative drafting, international treaties, and tax research. He is an admitted 
chartered accountant. He holds a BCom and a BAcc from Wits. 
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Three interview questions were designed from the research problem. A brief 
background was provided prior to each question being put to the interviewees. The 
following is how these questions are structured with a brief background to each of the 
questions:  
 
 
a) Question No. 1 
 
 
Section 31 of the South African income tax Act (the Act) requires that taxpayers 
should transact at arm’s-length, but it is not complemented by regulations providing 
methods on how to transact at arm’s-length. The guidelines on how to transact at 
arm’s-length are contained separately from the Act in Practice Note 7, which was not 
designed to be prescriptive on how to transact at arm’s-length. As a result the Practice 
Note 7 is not legally binding to taxpayers and it has also been proven in certain court 
cases such as ITC 1675, that Practice Note is not regarded as a law that could be 
enforceable. Hence for this reason section 31 of the Act is regarded as not prescriptive 
on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length, as it does not have regulations on 
how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length. 
 
 
In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages of having a transfer pricing 
tax legislation which is not prescriptive, such as section 31 of the Act?  
 
 
b) Question No. 2 
 
 
Practice Note 7 is broadly based on the OECD guidelines and its main objective is to 
serve as a guideline for taxpayers in South Africa on how they should comply with 
section 31 of the Act. The issue is that Practice Note 7 is consistent to a certain extent 
with section 31 of the Act and the OECD guidelines, but at other times it is 
inconsistent. For example, Practice Note 7 is not consistent in respect of the updates 
and changes made to section 31 of the Act concerning the deletion of the words 
‘international agreement’, the two connected person amendments and again on 
updates. Practice Note 7 is inconsistent with developments and changes made in the 
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OECD on certain transfer pricing issues such as the transactional profit methods, 
permanent establishment, and aspects of business restructuring.  
 
 
What is your general view about the status of Practice Note 7? 
 
 
c) Question No. 3 
 
 
Many countries around the world are moving away from transfer pricing tax 
legislation which is not prescriptive, by not having rules or regulations on how to 
transact at arm’s-length. These countries are amending their transfer pricing tax 
legislation to be prescriptive. One of the main reasons is that during the time they had 
non-prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation, problems arose especially in the 
courts. It was difficult for the courts to rule whether or not a transfer pricing 
transaction was at arm’s-length as the legislation did not make provision on how to 
transact at arm’s-length. The courts applied various standards in deciding whether a 
transaction was at arm’s-length or not.  
 
 
The US was the first country to experience such problems and also the first country to 
amend their transfer pricing tax legislation by including regulations in their 
legislation, providing guidance on how to transact at arm’s-length. Other countries 
such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Denmark, France, UK, Netherlands, and 
Venezuela have since followed the example of the US by amending their legislation 
to prescriptive.  
 
 
By the time South Africa needed to introduce transfer pricing tax legislation, the 
Commission led by Professor Michael Katz recommended that the prescriptive 
transfer pricing tax legislation such as the US approach, was not suitable for South 
Africa. The Commission recommended the legislative approach adopted by the UK 
which did not have any specific transfer pricing regulations but relied on the arm’s 
length principle contained in the OECD guidelines to combat transfer pricing. 
However, shortly after the Commission recommended that South Africa should adopt 
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the UK legislative approach, the UK also followed the example of the US by 
amending their transfer pricing tax legislation to be prescriptive.  
 
 
Do you think South Africa also needs a prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation 
which has regulations on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length, or is the 
current transfer pricing tax legislation still suitable for South Africa?  
 
 
5.4.4 Data Analysis 
 
 
In conducting the data analysis in this research study, the content analysis approach 
was used. According to Merriam (1998:160) all qualitative research studies 
automatically use the content analysis approach to analyse the data collected. Maree 
(2007: 101) explains content analysis as an inductive and iterative process where 
similarities and differences in the text identified and collected, is analysed and tested 
to establish if it would corroborate or disconfirm the theory investigated. According to 
Merriam (1998:160) content analysis process involves the simultaneous coding of raw 
data and the construction of categories that capture relevant characteristics of the 
document’s contents.   
 
 
In terms of data analysis, the researcher analyses the data by organising it into 
categories based on themes or concepts, which will directly answer the main research 
question. The research findings are organised in terms of major themes and concepts.  
 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter discussed the research methodology which was applied in conducting 
this research study. To mention but a few things that was addressed; various 
literatures, ranging from books, journal articles, academic articles, policies, 
guidelines, court cases and income tax legislations were used. Interviews with certain 
tax law professionals were conducted. Therefore, the main objective of the next 
chapter is to present findings of the research study as well as to analyse them. The 
interpretation of the research study and recommendations to this research study is 
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provided in the last chapter. Nevertheless, this research is qualitative. The next  
chapter presents and analyses the research findings 
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH FINDINGS.  
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research findings. The primary objectives 
of this research study was to examine whether or not the South African transfer 
pricing tax legislation should be amended to be prescriptive by including regulations 
on how to transact at arm’s-length price.  
 
 
The objective of the problem statement was achieved by addressing the following 
sub-problems: 
 
 
a) Determining how taxpayers in South Africa are required to transact at arm’s-
length price in the absence of prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation. 
 
 
b) Determining whether Practice Note 7 in its current status is consistent with the 
current status of the OECD guidelines, and whether, as a result of being consistent 
or not consistent with the current status of the OECD guidelines, Practice Note 7 
can be included as the regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length price in the 
South African transfer pricing tax legislation, in order to amend the legislation to 
become prescriptive. 
 
 
c) Determining what the implications are of having non-prescriptive transfer pricing 
tax legislation and of changing from non-prescriptive to prescriptive, by looking at 
the experiences of the US in the enforcement of transfer pricing.  
 
 
6.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 
As stated above, the research findings were achieved by answering the above sub-
problems and the results are analysed as follows:   
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6.2.1 First Sub-problem 
 
 
In the absence of the prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation in South Africa, this 
study has established that taxpayers are following the Practice Note 7 to transact at 
arm’s length price even though the legislation (section 31 of the Act) does not 
prescribe Practice Note 7 to be followed. This study has also established that there is 
no common view on the application of the arm’s length principle among section 31 of 
the Act, Practice Note 7, tax treaties, IT14 return and the tax case law.  In general the 
following has been established under this sub-problem. 
 
 
It was established when the transfer pricing practices in South Africa were first 
regulated under the exchange control regulations and general anti-avoidance 
provisions. Section 31 of the Act was later introduced in the year 1995 and requires 
that transfer pricing transactions between connected persons should be at arm’s-
length. Furthermore, these transactions between connected persons should not be less 
than or more than arm’s-length. The analysis has further established that section 31 of 
the Act is not prescriptive in providing guidance on how to transact at arm’s-length as 
it does not have regulations on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price. 
Even though the section was updated several times since its introduction, the issue of 
the section being prescriptive by having regulations providing guidance on how to 
transact at arm’s-length, has not been addressed. The other issue with regard to 
section 31 of the Act is that, though it requires that transfer pricing transactions 
should be at arm’s-length price and not be less than or greater than arm’s-length, it 
does not explain what is regarded as arm’s-length and what is less than or greater than 
the arm’s-length price. 
 
 
It was established that in the year 1999, Practice Note 7 was introduced as guidelines 
on how taxpayers in South Africa should transact at arm’s-length price and was not 
intended to be prescriptive, meaning that Practice Note 7 cannot be regarded as 
binding law to enforce transfer pricing practices for both taxpayers and the SARS 
Commissioner. The case law in South Africa shares the same sentiment that Practice 
Note 7 cannot be regarded as law, as it was said by the court that SARS Practice 
Notes cannot override the law. In providing guidance on how to transact at arm’s-
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length price, Practice Note 7 has adopted the OECD guidelines approach. Practice 
Note 7 provides that arm’s-length price does not necessarily constitute a single price, 
but a range of prices that independent parties charge. Meanwhile, section 31 of the 
Act makes reference to arm’s-length price as a single price.  
 
 
Furthermore, section 31 of the Act also makes reference to the price that is less than 
and greater than arm’s-length. The argument is whether section 31 of the Act, by 
making reference to the prices which are less than and greater than arm’s-length price, 
is referring to the points outside the arm’s-length range which are the points below 
and above this range. 
 
 
It was established that tax treaties on business profits and associated enterprises 
requires that the arm’s-length principle be applied. South Africa has signed and 
ratified double tax treaties with a number of countries. The tax treaties in South Africa 
are modelled from the OECD Model Treaty and are deemed to be part of the Act in 
terms of section 108 of the Act, section 231 of the South African Constitution. The 
tax case law also confirms that tax treaties in South Africa are part of the Act. The 
argument exists that, due to the fact that the interpretation in terms of section 108 of 
the Act, section 231 of the South African Constitution and the tax case law, that the 
tax treaties in South Africa are part of the Act. As the tax treaties relies on the OECD 
guidelines in complying with the arm’s length principle, this makes the tax treaties in 
South Africa to be prescriptive in requiring that an arm’s-length principle should be 
applied when business profits and associated enterprises are taxed. The SARS 
Commissioner, however, has a different view on this argument. In Practice Note 7, 
the SARS Commissioner mentions that the tax treaties in South Africa are not 
prescriptive on how taxpayers in South Africa should transact at arm’s-length price 
and that there is no conflict between section 31 of the Act and the South African tax 
treaties. 
 
 
It was also established that the IT14 return does not provide taxpayers with a solution 
with regard to how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price. The IT14 return 
requires that certain information and documents with regard to the transfer pricing 
transactions in terms of section 31 of the Act should be disclosed. 
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It was established that to a certain extent the tax case law in South Africa does make 
provisions of what constitute arm’s-length transactions. The tax case law analysis in 
this research study established that the hypothesis statement adopted by the South 
African tax case law in determining what constitutes an arm’s-length transaction, and 
the arm’s-length hypothesis statement in Article 9 of the OECD Model Treaty, is 
similar. In applying its hypothesis statement, the tax case law in South Africa has 
applied the legal test other than the economic test which is adopted by Article 9 of the 
OECD Model Treaty in applying the arm’s-length hypothesis statement.  
 
 
The OECD Model Treaty requires that in applying the economic test the OECD 
guidelines should be applied which is also adopted in Practice Note 7. Meanwhile in 
applying the legal test, the tax case law has looked at the special relationship of 
parties involved in a transaction, the circumstances under which the transaction was 
entered, the unusual features in the transactions and the pricing or the value of the 
transaction.  
 
 
It has been established that in certain court cases when the courts were determining 
whether or not a transaction is an arm’s-length transaction, the court accepted the 
similar approach to the economic test which taxpayers applied in proving that their 
transactions were at arm’s-length. Therefore, in as far as the courts in South Africa 
can rely on the legal test to determine whether or not a transaction is at arm’s-length, 
the courts can also accept the economic test outlined in Practice Note 7 and the OECD 
guidelines if it used by taxpayers to determine whether or not a transaction is at 
arm’s-length.  
 
 
6.2.2 Second Sub-problem 
 
 
It has been established that the current status of Practice Note 7 is not satisfactory as it 
has been established that although to a certain extent it is consistent with the current 
status of the OECD guidelines, to a certain extent it is not consistent. In respect of the 
following issues, it has been found that Practice Note 7 does concur with the OECD 
guidelines: 
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a) Arm’s-length principle 
 
 
b) Transfer pricing administrative procedures 
 
 
c) Transfer pricing documentation procedures 
 
 
d) Transfer pricing treatment on intra-group service transaction 
 
 
e) Transfer pricing treatment on intellectual property transaction  
 
 
f) Transfer pricing treatment on cost contribution arrangement. 
 
 
With regard to the following issues, it has been established that Practice Note 7 does 
not concur with the OECD guidelines: 
 
 
a) The updates and changes made to the South African domestic transfer pricing tax 
legislation (Section 31 of Act). 
 
 
b) Certain updates and developments made by the OECD on transfer pricing issues 
in respect of; (i) the transactional profit methods (ii) permanent establishment (iii) 
aspects on business restructuring. Although these updates and developments made 
by the OECD have not been finalised, the question remains whether Practice Note 
7 will be affected with these changes when the OECD implement these changes in 
their guidelines. The reason for this question is that, as mentioned above, changes 
have been made in section 31 of the Act which affects the application of Practice 
Note 7, which has not been updated with regard to these changes. 
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6.2.3 Third Sub-problem  
 
 
It is established that when the US transfer pricing tax legislation was still not 
prescriptive on how taxpayers in the US should transact at arm’s-length, inconsistency 
existed in the US courts on what constitutes the arm’s-length price with regard to 
transfer pricing. The courts developed various standards in reaching decisions on what 
constitutes the arm’s-length price on a number of transfer pricing cases.  
 
 
It is established that the situation of the US transfer pricing tax legislation prior to it 
being amended to be prescriptive, reflects the current situation of the South African 
transfer pricing tax legislation. Under these circumstance taxpayers, SARS, and the 
courts can have a different interpretation of what constitutes an arm’s-length 
transaction. Hence, it is the reason section 482 was amended in 1968 to be 
prescriptive by including regulations containing methods on how taxpayers should 
transact at arm’s-length price to solve this problem. 
 
 
It is further established that the US congress amended the legislation to be 
prescriptive by introducing regulations which provided guidance on how taxpayers in 
the US should transact at arm’s-length. The results of the amendments of the US 
transfer pricing tax legislation to be prescriptive was seen in the US courts, as 
legislation became the starting point for the US courts when making decisions on 
what constituted an arm’s-length price in resolving transfer pricing cases.  
 
 
Another advantage as a result of the US transfer pricing tax legislation being made 
prescriptive was that taxpayers, IRS, and the US courts could now use single 
approach to interpret what constitutes arm’s-length price in the transfer pricing cases. 
Another advantage resulting from the US transfer pricing tax legislation being made 
prescriptive was that, it was easy to prove prior the litigation process that the 
transactions of taxpayers were complying with the arm’s-length principle as it was 
required by section 482. As a result, fewer transfer pricing cases were litigated. 
 
 
 183 
It has been established that there were some challenges, subsequent to section 482 
being amended in the year 1968, to be prescriptive. These challenges were in 
situations where section 482 was not sufficiently prescriptive on how certain transfer 
pricing issues should be dealt with. For example, section 482 did not make provision 
on what should be done when exact comparable transactions of unrelated parties were 
unavailable as the benchmark against the transactions of taxpayers, since it was 
required by the section that in order to comply with the arm’s-length principle, 
comparable transactions of unrelated parties should be used as the benchmark. 
Another challenge was that the legislation was not prescriptive on what methods 
should be used in determining the arm’s-length price with regard to intangible 
property transactions.  
 
 
It is established that the US government addressed these challenges by further 
amending the US transfer pricing tax legislation several times subsequent to the 1968 
amendment, in order to make the legislation to be more prescriptive on how to 
transact at arm’s-length. These amendments were in 1986, 1993 and 1994 years and 
since these amendments, proposed changes were issued in 2003 and 2005 years.  
 
 
It is also established that the regulation providing guidance on how to transact at 
arm’s-length price in the US transfer pricing tax legislation is consistent with the 
OECD guidelines. In fact, the OECD guidelines were revised in the year 1995 to be in 
line with US regulations. It is further established that in addition to the US transfer 
pricing tax legislation (section 482), the US government has other transfer compliance 
measures to regulate transfer pricing practices. Such measures include the tax returns 
form, the tax treaties, competent authority, advance pricing agreements and penalty 
provisions for non-compliance. These measures also require that the taxpayer should 
comply with the arm’s-length requirements in section 482. 
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6.2.4 Interview Results  
 
 
Table 9: Interview Results from participants 
 
 
 
Mr Franz Tomasek Professor Emil Brincker 
Q1: What do you think are 
the advantages and 
disadvantages of having 
transfer pricing tax 
legislation which is not 
prescriptive as it has no 
regulations on how to 
transact at arm’s-length? 
The advantage is that the 
legislation is flexible such 
that it caters for the South 
African business 
environment. And the 
disadvantage is that it is 
uncertain as to what is 
regarded as an arm’s length-
price in terms of the 
legislation.  
The advantage is that the 
legislation is flexible. And 
the disadvantage is that it is 
uncertain as to what is 
regarded as an arm’s length-
price in terms of the 
legislation. It creates 
uncertainties as to what 
constitute arm’s-length price. 
Q2: What is your view on 
the current status of 
Practice Note 7? 
Practice Note 7 should 
address the changes made in 
section 31 of the Act. With 
regard to the OECD 
developments, they can only 
be noted once consensus has 
been reached by the OECD.   
Practice Note 7 should make 
note of the developments 
within the international 
environment, especially the 
OECD development.  
Do you think the South 
African transfer pricing tax 
legislation should be 
amended to be prescriptive 
by including regulations on 
how to transact at arm’s-
length, or should it remain 
as it is? 
It is not necessary for it to be 
amended. The South African 
transfer pricing tax 
legislation is similar to the 
UK approach and it works 
just fine. Again to amend it 
to be prescriptive might 
create administrative burdens 
which would require the Act 
to be substantially large like 
the US one. 
Yes, the South African 
transfer pricing tax 
legislation should be more 
specific in requiring how 
taxpayers should transact at 
arm’s-length. 
 
 
 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
 
 
This chapter presented and analysed the findings of this research study. Conclusion 
and recommendations to this research study is provided in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to conclude this research study. The chapter restates the 
problem statement and sub-problems, provides a brief summary of previous chapters, 
interprets the research findings and provides recommendations. The chapter concludes 
by discussing the contribution made by this research study by comparing it with 
previous research studies, and lastly providing areas for possible future research 
studies. 
  
 
7.2 THE STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
 
As stated in chapter 1, the primary objective of this research study is to examine 
whether or not the South African transfer pricing tax legislation should be amended to 
be prescriptive by including regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length price. This 
was achieved by addressing the following sub-problems: 
 
 
a) Determining how taxpayers in South Africa are required to transact at arm’s-
length price in the absence of prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation. 
 
 
b) Determining whether Practice Note 7 in its current status is consistent with the 
current status of the OECD guidelines, and whether, as a result of being consistent 
or inconsistent with the current status of the OECD guidelines, Practice Note 7 
can be included as the regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length price in the 
South African transfer pricing tax legislation, in order to amend the legislation to 
become prescriptive. 
 
 
c) Determining what the implications are of having non-prescriptive transfer pricing 
tax legislation and of changing from non-prescriptive to prescriptive transfer 
pricing tax legislation by looking at the experiences of the US in the enforcement 
of transfer pricing.  
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7.3 SUMMARY REVIEW OF CHAPTERS   
 
 
Chapter 1 provided the introduction which consists of the background of the study, 
the research problem with its sub- problems, research methods and chapter outline. 
Chapter 2 addressed the first sub-problem by discussing the South African transfer 
pricing tax legislation. Chapter 3 addressed the second sub-problem by discussing the 
OECD guidelines and Practice Note 7. Chapter 4 addressed the third sub-problem by 
discussing the transfer pricing tax legislation in the US. Chapter 5 discussed the 
research methodology applied in conducting this research study. Chapter 6 presented 
and analysed the findings of the research study. Chapter 7 concluded this research 
study. 
 
 
7.4 SUMMARY REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
 
A qualitative case study research methodology was adopted to conduct this research 
study and the literature review; documentation analysis and interviews were adopted 
as methods of data collection. A contend analysis methodology was adopted to 
analyse the data and the research study findings. The research study used various 
literatures, ranging from books, journal articles, academic articles, policies, 
guidelines, court cases and income tax legislations. The research study has used 
interviews whereby certain tax law professionals were interviewed.  
 
 
7.5 THE INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
 
This research study has established that the South African transfer pricing tax 
legislation (section 31 of the Act) is not prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact 
at arm’s-length. It has also been established that in the absence of prescriptive transfer 
pricing tax legislation in South Africa, there is a disconnection and gaps between 
section 31 of the Act and other remedies used in South Africa to address transfer 
pricing practices, such as Practice Note 7, the tax treaties and the IT14 return. This is 
due to the fact that section 31 of the Act, Practice Note 7, tax treaties, IT14 return and 
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the tax case law does not hold a common view on the application of the arm’s length 
principle.   
 
 
As this research study addressed the research question by also making reference to the 
OECD guidelines and the US transfer pricing tax legislation, the study has established 
that the South African transfer pricing tax legislation is to a certain extent consistent 
with the OECD guidelines but to a certain extent it is not. With regard to the US 
transfer pricing tax legislation, the research  study reveals that the legislation was at 
some stage in a similar situation as the South African transfer pricing tax legislation, 
and the legislation has since been updated several times to make it more prescriptive 
on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length.  
 
 
Furthermore, the research study reveals that there is no disconnections and gaps 
between the US transfer pricing tax legislation, section 482 and the other remedies 
used to address transfer pricing practices such as the tax treaties and tax returns. Both 
section 482 and the other remedies hold a common view on the application of the 
arm’s length principle. As compared with the South African transfer pricing tax 
legislation, the US transfer pricing tax legislation is considered to be conformed 
without any vagueness. The South African transfer pricing tax legislation is therefore 
considered to be vague and lacking conformity as it is uncertain how one should 
transact at arm’s length.  
 
 
Professor Emil Brincker and Mr Franz Tomasek also hold the view that, although the 
South African transfer pricing legislation is flexible such that it carters for the needs 
of the South African business enviroment. The disadvantage with this legislation is 
that it is also uncertain as it does not have provisions on how one should transact at 
arm’s length.(Telephone Interview, Johannesburg: October 2009). This situation 
creates an environment whereby SARS, taxpayers and the courts in South Africa are 
free to make use of any methods or processes to determine or interpret what is an 
arm’s length price of a particular transaction, as section 31 of the Act is not 
prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price. 
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Smith (1990:18) describes this situation whereby transfer pricing tax legislation of a 
particular country is not prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s-
length, as an omission of serious deficiency. The reason provided by Smith (1990:18) 
is that both taxpayers and revenue officers alike are entitled to a reasonable degree of 
certainty as to the manner in which taxable income is to be computed. Smith 
(1990:29) further states that such a situation leaves much room within the legislation 
for uncertainty and argument in the ascertainment of arm’s-length considerations.  
 
 
Vasconcellos (2007:13) mentions that where a tax law is uncertain there could be less 
investment, lower returns to investments, and slower economic growth for the 
economy as a whole. Vasconcellos (2007:13) argues that the uncertainty of the tax 
law should not disadvantage taxpayers whereby high penalties are levied, and 
taxpayers are forced to spend large sums of money on tax opinions in order to gain 
interpretation on the tax law. Vasconcellos (2007:13) further argues that if the 
legislation is to be applied to everyone, it should be made simple so that people can 
understand it without having to spend more time and money. Vasconcellos (2007:13) 
believes that although this situation could be harmful and unfair to the taxpayers, it 
could also be an advantage to them as they could use the uncertainty of the tax as an 
argument in courts of law, against any tax defaults claimed against them by tax 
authorities.  
 
 
De Waegenaere, Sansing, and Wielhouwer (2003:19) concur with Vasconcellos that 
the ambiguity of the tax law has a negative implication. De Waegenaere, Sansing, and 
Wielhouwer mention that the ambiguity of the tax law can decrease the taxpayer’s 
expected tax liability. It could also decrease government tax revenues and thirdly, it 
may increase social welfare by decreasing the deadweight losses associated with tax 
audit costs. 
 
 
Markham (2004:166) also shares the same view that it is necessary for a country to 
have clear transfer pricing rules. Markham (2004:166) citing the OECD guidelines, 
provides three reasons why a country’s transfer pricing rules should be clear. The first 
reason is to ensure that there is a fair application of the arm’s-length principle. The 
second reason is to adequately protect taxpayers and thirdly, to ensure that revenue is 
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not shifted to the countries with overly harsh procedural rules, thus resulting in 
pricing distortion. Markham (2004:166) further argues that prescriptive transfer 
pricing tax legislation will result in the elimination of the vagueness and the lack of 
conformity of the legislation and will provide certainty of compliance as to what is 
required of taxpayers.  
 
 
Baistrocchi (2005:8) shares the view that the application of the arm’s-length principle 
will be a problem when the legal system in which it works, is unable to produce case 
law capable of guiding taxpayers on how they are expected to behave in transfer 
pricing, or something functionally the same as the case law. Baistrocchi (2005:8) 
mentions that a situation where a country does not have the prescriptive transfer 
pricing tax legislation, is a common problem in both developed and developing 
countries.  
 
 
The analysis above illustrates that a situation where a country does not have 
prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation has a negative impact on the tax system. 
Hence certain countries around the world such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, 
Denmark, France, Netherlands, UK, US, and Venezuela have amended their transfer 
tax legislation to be prescriptive. Some of these countries have adopted legislative 
approach similar to the US’ approach. In coming to the conclusion of this research 
study, the question still remains whether or not the South African transfer pricing tax 
legislation should be amended to be prescriptive. Through the analysis in this research 
study, it is illustrated that South Africa needed prescriptive transfer pricing tax 
legislation which has regulations on how to transact at arm’s-length, from the time 
section 31 of the Act was introduced.  
 
 
Professor Emil Brincker also believes that, the South African transfer pricing 
legislation should be amended to be more specific and clear on what constitute an 
arm’s length price as it requires transactions of connected persons to be at arm’s 
length price. Mr Franz Tomasek has however a different view on this argument. Mr 
Franz Tomasek’s view is that the amendment of the South African transfer pricing tax 
legislation to be prescriptive will create administrative burdens for SARS. (Telephone 
Interview, Johannesburg: October 2009).  
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The view of Mr Franz Tomasek’s was the issue also raised by the Commission led by 
Professor Michael Katz when the Commission recommended that the transfer pricing 
tax legislation should be introduced in South Africa. The Commission said that the 
prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation such as the US approach was not suitable 
for the South African situation. The reasons provided by the Commission in rejecting 
the US transfer pricing tax legislative approach were that; (Interim report of the 
Commission of inquiry into certain aspects of the tax structure of South Africa, 1994: 
231); 
 
 
(a) A rigid, codified system lay outside the administrative capacity and experience of 
the revenue authorities, and to pass laws which cannot be enforced effectively 
would be to weaken the very core of South African legal system. 
 
 
(b) Such a rigid approach would be too restrictive in South Africa with the 
circumstances which needed to regain and extend its share of world markets, both 
as regards purchasing and selling. 
 
 
(c) Although it is the duty of the tax system to protect the fiscus against pricing 
practices that continue gross abuse of pricing mechanisms, while South African 
nominal tax rates are materially higher than those of its major investment source 
and competitor countries, care needed to be exercised so as not to push legitimate 
protection against abuse to a level which would discourage foreign investment and 
trade. 
 
 
The Commission then recommended the approach adopted by the UK, which did not 
have any specific transfer pricing regulations but relied on the arm’s length principle 
contained in the OECD guidelines to combat transfer pricing. As it has been 
mentioned in chapter 1 of this research study, the UK has however also followed the 
example of the US by amending their transfer pricing tax legislation to be 
prescriptive, a few years later after South Africa had adopted their legislative 
approach.  
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As it was also mentioned in chapter 1 that South Africa adopted the UK legislative 
approach in dealing with transfer pricing, the developments in the UK and around the 
world is a clear illustration that South Africa also needs to move with the rest of the 
world by having a transfer pricing tax legislation which is prescriptive rather than the 
current one which is non-prescriptive.  
 
 
In considerate of Mr Franz Tomaseck and the Commission led by Professor Michael 
Katz’s view that the amendments of the South African transfer pricing legislation to 
be prescriptive will create some administrative burdens for SARS. The question is can 
those administrative burdens outweigh the benefits which will results from the 
amendments being made to the South African transfer pricing tax legislation to be 
prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact at arm’s length price.  
 
 
Based on the research findings and the analyses above of situation where legislation is 
uncertain or ambiguous. And that in such situation as it has been proven taxpayers, 
revenue authorities and the courts have encountered problems in ascertaining what 
was the arm’s length price in certain transaction because the legislation was not 
prescriptive or providing methods or ways of how to ascertaining an arm’s length 
price.  
 
 
Therefore, in my opinion the administrative burdens which will be encountered by the 
revenue authority in South Africa as a result of the amendments of the South African 
transfer pricing tax legislation to be prescriptive on how taxpayers should transact at 
arm’s length price would not outweigh the benefits of amending the legislation to be 
prescriptive.  
 
 
The reason for my argument is that similar problems which has been encountered by 
taxpayers, revenue authorities and the courts in other parts of the world, as mentioned 
above, in ascertaining what is the arm’s length price of a particular transaction would 
not be present in South Africa as this was the situation in the US after the US’ transfer 
pricing tax legislation was amended to be prescriptive.  
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Although to a certain extend this research study has answered the question of whether 
or not the administrative burdens which will be encountered by the revenue authority 
resulting from the South African transfer pricing legislation being amended to be 
prescriptive will outweigh the benefits of amending the legislation. I still propose that 
a research study be conducted in this respect to further explore this argument.  
 
 
7.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
This research study has established that prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation is 
appropriate in regulating transfer pricing practices, and that the non-prescriptive 
transfer pricing tax legislation has been proven not to be appropriate in a number of 
countries, including South Africa. It is therefore recommended that section 31 of the 
Act should be amended so that it has regulations prescribing how taxpayers should 
transact at arm’s-length price, as the legislation currently requires that taxpayers 
should transact at arm’s length.  
 
 
Should the South African government through the department of National Treasury 
decide not to amend section 31 of the Act to have regulations prescribing how 
taxpayers should transact at arm’s-length price, Practice Note 7 should still be 
updated to be consistent with section 31 of the Act and the OECD guidelines, as it is 
currently not consistent.  
 
 
The following is the template proposing how section 31 of the Act should be in order 
for it to be prescriptive. The proposed legislation is based on section 482 regulations 
of the US transfer pricing tax legislation and the Canadian transfer pricing tax 
legislation (section 247).  
 
Table 10: Template on proposed section 31 of the Act 
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Section 31(1)  and (1A): 
Definitions 
 
The subsection contains definitions of certain words used in the 
application of the section. The subsection should remain as it is.   
Section 31(2) (a); (b); and (c): 
Application of the law 
The subsections outline conditions under which the section will 
apply. The subsections should also remain as they are. The 
following additional subsections should however be added in 
section 31 of the Act to make it prescriptive on how should 
taxpayers transact at arm’s length price. 
Section 31(2) (d): 
Arm’s-length principle 
The subsection should reflect the arm’s-length principle expressed 
in paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. 
This will eliminate any differing views between the tax treaties, 
IT14 returns and section 31 of the Act.  
 
Furthermore, as the arm’s-length principle can be achieved 
generally based on the comparison of prices and margins, the 
subsection should outline comparability factors as expressed in 
Chapter I of the OECD guidelines, namely; characteristics of 
property or services; functional analysis, contractual terms; 
economic circumstance; and business strategies. 
 
Other additional factors that should be considered expressed in 
Chapter I of the OECD guidelines such as; recognition of the 
actual transactions undertaken; evaluation of separate and 
combined transactions; use of an arm’s-length range; use of 
multiple year data; losses; the effect of government policies; 
intentional set-offs; use of customs valuations; and use of transfer 
pricing methods. 
Section 31(2) (e):  
Methods for applying arm’s-
length principle 
As the above subsection would be reflecting the arm’s-length 
principle as expressed in the OECD guidelines, therefore this 
subsection should outline the five methods outlined in Chapter II 
and III in the OECD guidelines.  
 
These methods are; the controlled uncontrolled price, resale price, 
cost plus, profit split, and transactional net margin method.  
Section 31(2) (f):  
Services transactions 
This subsection should provide guiding principles for the use of 
specific methods to determine arm’s-length price in connection 
with the services transactions. 
Section 31(2) (g): 
Tangible transactions 
This subsection should provide guiding principles for the use of 
specific methods to determine arm’s-length price in connection 
with the tangible property transactions. 
Section 31(2) (h): 
Intangible transaction 
This subsection should provide guiding principles for the use of 
specific methods to determine arm’s-length price in connection 
with the transactions involving intangible properties. 
Section 31(2) (i): 
Cost Contribution Arrangement 
This subsection should provide the guiding principles for sharing 
of costs and risks (costs sharing arrangements rules)  This 
subsection should also set forth the rules under which affiliates 
may share ownership of intangibles by sharing the development 
costs, thereby obviating the need to apply the transfer of intangible 
property rules to determine an arm’s-length royalty 
Section 31(2) (j): 
Documentation Requirement 
This subsection should provide guiding principles on what the 
transfer pricing documentations should contain.  
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7.7 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS RESEARCH STUDY AND THE 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH STUDIES CONDUCTED. 
 
 
The question outstanding in this research study is to what extent this study has this 
research study contributed to the knowledge base in relation to the other research 
studies conducted in the subject of transfer pricing. The previous academic research 
studies have researched transfer pricing with a scope limited to certain aspects.  
 
 
Richardson (2000) addressed the application of arm’s-length principle in transactions 
involving services, tangible assets, loans and E-commerce just after the transfer 
pricing tax legislation and Practice Note 7 was introduced.  
 
 
Cridlan (2001) in a comparative study, addressed South Africa and other countries 
such as Australia, UK and US. He discussed the arm’s-length principle and 
administrative approaches for dealing with transfer pricing problems, but did not 
discuss some important aspects of the South African transfer pricing tax legislation,  
such as the vital components of section 31, most importantly the definitions of 
‘international agreement’ and ‘connected persons’, and how they apply in practice. 
The other important aspects of the South African transfer pricing tax legislation which 
Cridlan did not discuss, were the investigative/audit procedures, disclosure and 
documentation requirements, cost contribution arrangements and mutual agreement 
procedures.  
 
 
Makola (2003) explored section 31 and its components, documentation requirements, 
investigative procedures, penalties and advance pricing agreement, but did not address 
recent changes and developments.  
 
 
Van der Linde (2004) evaluated and compared the legislative, judicial and 
administrative approaches to transfer pricing of outbound interest free loans as 
adopted by SARS with approaches adopted by other revenue authorities in other 
countries such as Australia, Netherlands, UK and US. 
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Steyn (2004) focused only on the intellectual property transactions, and evaluated the 
suitability of existing acceptable transfer pricing methods and their application to 
international transactions between related parties, involving intangible property; more 
specifically intellectual property that is legally protected.   
 
 
Allan (2007) evaluated the OECD guidelines with the view of examining the manner 
and extent to which South Africa has adopted them in its current transfer pricing 
policy. Allan did not address the recent changes and developments in the OECD 
guidelines and the South African transfer pricing tax legislation which took place 
prior the year 2007 as mentioned in this study.  
 
 
In addressing the research question, this research study explored the South African 
transfer pricing tax legislation relative to recent changes and developments in both the 
South African transfer pricing tax legislation and the OECD guidelines. These 
changes and developments include: 
 
 
a) Section 31 amendments with regard to the changes made on the international 
agreement definition, connected person definition with the inclusion of the word 
group of companies, and the broadening of connected person definition on the 
intellectual property transactions. 
 
 
b) The updates and developments by the OECD, which include the issuing of the 
four draft discussion documents discussing the transfer pricing treatment of the 
permanent establishment, the issuing of the draft discussion documents on the 
transfer pricing profit methods, the issuing of the draft discussion document on 
transfer pricing business restructuring transactions, and the issuing of proposed 
revision of chapters I-III of the transfer pricing guidelines.  
 
This study has also analysed the recent transfer pricing changes and developments 
within the international community illustrating that in a situation where a country 
does not have prescriptive transfer pricing tax legislation, problems will be 
encountered. A brief analysis of the transfer pricing developments in countries such as 
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Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Denmark, France, Netherlands, UK, and 
Venezuela and a detailed analysis of the transfer pricing developments in the US was 
conducted. 
 
 
7.8 CONCLUSION 
 
 
In concluding this research study, the question remains whether there are other 
possible transfer pricing areas which have not been researched.  If so, what are these 
other areas?    
 
 
After many years of sustained economic growth, the global economic growth is 
experiencing a highly complex and turbulent economic period which started in 2008. 
This economic downturn resulted in multinational enterprises experiencing losses 
instead of profits. Research studies are encouraged to investigate the following 
questions: 
 
 
• To what extent did the economic downturn affect multinational enterprises 
transfer pricing practices? 
 
 
• To what extent did the economic downturn affect the revenue collection on 
income tax assessments raised in respect of transfer pricing? 
 
 
Furthermore, the argument which could be encountered as a result of the economic 
downturn is that Article 9 of the Treaty Model Conversion and relevant treaty in other 
countries, can be applied to make profit adjustments as the article makes reference 
only to profit. The argument which could arise is; can Article 9 be applicable to adjust 
losses?  
 
 
With this economic downturn, tax authorities around the world could find themselves 
applying Article 9 against multinational enterprises which have realised business 
 197 
losses as a result of the economic downturn. The research study is therefore 
encouraged to investigate the following question: 
 
 
• Whether Article 9 of the Treaty Model Conversion can also be applied to adjust 
losses of multinational enterprises? 
 
 
Another argument is the issue around the transfer pricing treatment on the intellectual 
property transactions. In the year 2009, SARS issued Interpretation Note: No. 50 
which provides guidance on how expenses in relation to the intellectual property 
should be deducted for tax purposes, in terms of section 11D of the Act. The research 
study is therefore encouraged to investigate the following: 
 
 
• The application of section 11D of the Act and the Interpretation Note: No. 50 to 
the intellectual property transactions, when these transactions affect transfer 
pricing.  
 
 
Lastly, transfer pricing is known to be a corporate tax issue which could also affect 
indirect tax. In particular, indirect taxes could be affected by transfer pricing, 
especially custom duties. The research study is therefore encouraged to investigate the 
following: 
 
 
• To what extent is the impact of transfer pricing to custom duties and vice versa?    
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